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ABSTRACT
The investor sentiment hypothesis has become a promising avenue by way of a behavioural 
approach to complementing conventional explanations of financial market anomalies. In 
response to the problems exhibited in the existing theories, the investor sentiment hypothesis 
has been widely tested and the results of which turn out to be able to successfully explain the 
market anomalies to a great extent. The thesis applies the investor sentiment theory to 
analysing the fund anomalies in both the UK and US markets. The test results and their 
interpretations may help promote a better understanding of the investor sentiment and its 
impacts including their geographical differences. We contribute to the literature by focusing 
on the sentiment measures, among others. Since the investor sentiment reflects the investors’ 
behaviour and psychology, it is hard to be properly captured. We have constructed the 
proxies for the sentiment factor in both direct and indirect forms. 
The first fund anomaly we analysed is the “closed-end fund puzzle”. The puzzle is so-called 
because at IPO, the fund is issued at a premium to the net asset value (NAV); however, this 
premium disappears in the next few months. The fund then trades at a discount. This discount 
is not fixed, varying substantially during the closure period. When the closed-end fund is 
either converted into an open-end fund or liquidated, the discount shrinks and the share price 
will rise. We construct an out-of-sample test by using the two-factor and five-factor models. 
The results show that the investor sentiment can contribute to explaining closed-end fund 
discounts in the UK market and it is more prevalent in smaller size portfolios. We also find 
the evidence to support investor sentiment as an important factor to represent systematic risk 
in the return generating process. 
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Next, we examine the price deviations of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). Unlike closed end 
funds whose prices also deviate from the NAV, ETFs, through a mechanism known as 
redemption in-kind, allow institutional investors to potentially earn a profit by arbitraging 
away these price deviations through creating and deleting outstanding shares of the ETF.  
Hence, we are motivated to identify the factors that may impact on the determination of these 
premiums and discounts to the NAV. We first construct a sentiment proxy from the 
derivative market variables such as the option put–call trading volume ratio and the open 
interest ratio. Then we develop a sentiment proxy based on the consumer confidence index, 
obtained from the mainstream consumer surveys and this proxy is taken to the individual 
fund level. The results provide evidence that this sentiment proxy has explanatory power for 
most individual ETF mispricing. We take the whole industry into account and find that the 
sentiment factor has incremental explanatory power and is positively related to the fund 
premium. The evidence also shows that more sentiment-sensitive ETFs are those that have 
smaller, younger and volatile stocks with low dividend yields. 
Finally, the thesis considers the fund anomaly in the form of the REIT price momentum. In 
order to investigate the momentum profitability, we classify the formation period into two 
sentiment states, i.e. the optimistic and pessimistic periods. Evidence indicates that when 
sentiment is high, the REIT momentum profitability is substantial and significant; however, 
when the sentiment is low, the profits from the REIT momentum are much lower and not 
significant. We also examine the interplay between REIT liquidity and momentum 
profitability. We find that high REIT liquidity portfolios generate higher momentum returns, 
but this is only significant when the sentiment is optimistic. Furthermore, consistent with our 
previous findings, our evidence that momentum is generally larger for smaller companies 
confirms that the size effect is still available in the REIT industry. This is because the smaller 
Vcompanies are often difficult to value, as they are more prone to subjective evaluations. The 
sentiment thus could be more significant in small size companies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Overview and Motivations 
 
Most researchers are paying more attention to the investor sentiment hypothesis recently and 
the related theories have been developed in the last few years mainly due to a seminal paper 
published by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), who construct a model of investor sentiment 
based on behavioural finance perspective to try to explain the perplexing anomalies in the 
literature. They proposed that the predominant holders of closed-end funds are individual 
investors, and some of them are noise traders who exhibit irrational performance in their 
expectations and trading about future fund returns. In their theory, when noise traders are 
optimistic on their trading assets and enhance the prices; other times, noise traders are 
pessimistic, then the prices would be driven down and closed-end funds sell at relatively 
larger discount. The investor sentiment explanations seems to outperform than alternative 
theories in explaining the perplexing anomaly. In response to the problems exhibited in the 
existing theories, the investor sentiment hypothesis has been widely tested and the results of 
which turn out to be able to successfully explain the market anomalies to a great extent. The 
thesis applies the investor sentiment hypothesis to analyse the fund anomalies in both the UK 
and US markets. The test results and their interpretations may help promote a better 
understanding of the investor sentiment and its impacts including their geographical 
differences. We contribute to the literature by focusing on the sentiment measures, among 
others. Since the investor sentiment reflects the investors’ behaviour and psychology, it is 
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hard to be properly captured. We have constructed the proxies for the sentiment factor in both 
direct and indirect forms.  
 
My research was initially motivated by the shortcomings of the traditional finance paradigm. 
In this framework, it seeks to explain the financial markets based on the models that agents 
are “rational” and it states that the security prices in financial markets should be equal to the 
fundamental values and this perspective has been the central proposition in finance for 
decades. Nevertheless, after years of investigation and study, it has become clearer that this 
conjecture facing the fact that it cannot make us understand the financial markets and 
individual trading behavior fully and easily.  Specifically, despite these theories can explain 
some financial anomalies to a certain extent; however, none of them provides satisfactory 
explanation for all aspects of the anomalies because it is pointed out that each of the rational 
theories fails to account for a great deal of the existing evidence. The failure of the traditional 
finance theory to explain the anomalous behavior accelerates the development of an 
alternative approach which attempts to explain how the cognitive errors and psychology 
changes influence investor decision making process. Many researchers believe that 
behavioural finance is a developing perspective to the study of financial markets that has 
emerged, at least in part, in response to the perplexing problems encountered by the classical 
theories. This developing perspective motivates me to shed light on the market anomalies by 
the behavioural approach.  
 
Secondly, behavioural explanations are now lighting up the world of finance research as they 
attempt to explain any anomaly in the literature. Besides, the fund market is growing rapidly 
and becoming more popular, as a professional investment tool, it is interesting to link the 
fund anomalies to the new behavioural perspectives. In order to make sharp predictions on 
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the investment, we often need to specify the form of investors’ irrationality. The outcome of 
my research may give rise to potential opportunities for exploiting the relationship between 
the fund price anomalies and investor behaviours. Understanding the underlying mechanisms 
and influential factors of the fund price performance, can guide fund managers in their 
management and investment decisions. By undertaking this kind of fund market research, it 
will be possible to advise investors better regarding fund and stock markets, so that they can 
make their decisions much more skilfully and so reduce their investment risk. At the same 
time, the analysis of difference fund market anomalies will not only help guide management 
and investment decisions, but since the impact of these anomalies involves the same factors 
as those related to other securities, it will also have great significance for all kinds of 
financial investors. 
 
My third motivation originates from the imperfection of the existing investor sentiment 
measures. Since the investor sentiment reflects the investors’ behaviour and psychology, it is 
hard to be properly captured. It will benefit us to examine the investor behaviour and it 
impact on the securities if we can construct a good proxy for investor sentiment. The existing 
measures of sentiment, ordered from origins in investor psychology to responses by corporate 
insiders, include: surveys, mood proxies, retail investor trades, mutual fund flows, trading 
volume, dividend premia, closed-end fund discounts, option implied volatility, first-day 
returns on initial public offerings, volume of initial public offerings, new equity issues, and 
insider trading.1 Generally, the proxies for sentiment factor are from direct and indirect ways. 
Specifically, the direct measure is formed from the consumer confidence survey results. 
These surveys are conducted by the UK and US institutions which investigate into the 
                                                             
1 See Baker and Wurgler (2007), they comment on these sentiment proxies respectively and then choose among 
them. 
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consumer behaviour and expectations. The indirect measure is related to constructing the 
sentiment index by considering macroeconomic influences. According to the specific 
characteristics of the fund markets and firms, we cannot replicate these measures and need to 
choose among them or construct new proxies for our research. 
 
1.2 Fund Market Anomalies  
 
Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of 
asset-pricing behaviour, specifically, they show deviations from the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH)/Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) paradigm. The term anomaly can 
be traced to Kuhn (1970). The anomaly indicates either market inefficiency (profit 
opportunities) or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model. 
 
In the fund markets, although both CEFs and open-end funds are actively managed pooled 
investments, in contrast with open-end fund trading at their Net Asset Value (NAV), the 
CEFs are always traded at a price under or above the NAV. The deviation from the NAV 
constitutes a discount or premium, known as the closed-end fund puzzle, which is a hot issue 
in the “anomalies” of the fund market. Besides, our main focus in the fund market is the 
identification of anomaly in relation to the price deviation that exists in the underlying stocks 
the Exchange Traded Funds hold (see for example Switzer, Varson and Zghidi,2000; Hedge 
and McDermott, 2004 and Ackert and Tian, 2000). Moreover, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 
1999) show that stocks with strong past performance would continue to outperform stocks 
with poor past performance in the next period with an average excess return of about 1% per 
month. The price momentum is another market anomaly, which traditional finance theories 
5 
 
 
are struggling to explain. The momentum effect is also captured to be significant in REITs. 
Chui et al. (2003) find significant momentum in the U.S. REITs from 1983 to 1999. Derwall 
(2009) finds strong evidence to support for performance persistence in REITs. Hung and 
Glascock (2008) document that the REIT momentum is positively related to volatility and 
they find that idiosyncratic risk can partially explain momentum. 
 
1.2.1 The Closed-end Fund Puzzle 
 
The history of closed-end funds (CEFs) began from 1893 in the US, which is more than 30 
years before the first mutual fund was generated. By 2013, there are around 650 CEFs traded 
on the US market.2 In the UK, the first closed-end fund was launched in 1868 by Foreign & 
Colonial, which is listed on the London Stock Exchange. Since then, the UK CEF industry 
has developed substantially. 
 
A close-end fund is a collective investment scheme under professionally management of an 
investment company. The fund issues a fixed number of shares and unlike open-end funds; 
the shares of such a closed-end fund can be only purchased/sold in the market by the fund 
investors. That is, the investors who want to buy a share of the closed-end fund can only go to 
the exchange and buy it from other investors at the prevailing price (Barberis and Thaler, 
2002). Although both CEFs and open-end funds are actively managed pooled investments, in 
contrast with open-end fund trading at their Net Asset Value (NAV), the CEFs are always 
traded at a price under or above the NAV. The deviation from the NAV constitutes a discount 
                                                             
2 The sources are from the CEFA website and the figures shown above are current as of September 2013. 
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or premium, known as the closed-end fund puzzle, which is a hot issue in the “anomalies” of 
the financial market.  
 
In practice, the CEF discount is not fixed, since it trades at a discount about 10% on average, 
and this discount varies substantially over the time (Thompson, 1978). When the CEFs are 
created, the share price is usually above the NAV, so they are traded then at a premium 
(Weiss, 1989 and Peavey, 1990). However, when they are terminated, either through 
liquidation or open-ending, the price will be close to NAV (Brauer 1984). 
 
A large number of researches have attempted to explain this anomaly. Initially, the solutions 
that researchers put forward are based on rational theories. These include agency costs 
(Boudreaux, 1973; Ross, 2002), illiquidity of assets Seltzer (1989), and tax liabilities 
Brickley, Manaster and Schallheim (1991, among others. Although these findings may 
explain the CEF discount puzzle to some extent, there remain many aspects of the CEF 
discount puzzle that are unaccounted for. In this light, an alternative approach based on 
behavioural theory has been developed in the past decades to fill the gap, which helps us 
achieve a better understanding of the anomaly of this kind. In this approach, researchers 
believe that investors’ psychology and other behavioural issues replenish the efficiency of 
financial market and may explain many of the financial anomalies.  
 
Zweig (1973) and Delong et al. (1990) attempt to use the behaviour approach to give an 
alternative explanation for the puzzle; specifically, Zweig (1973) is the first to suggest that 
discounts of the closed-end funds reflect expectations of individual investors. Delong et al. 
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(1990) suggest that the discount of CEFs can be viewed as the result of fluctuations of 
investors’ expectations, which change the demand structures of CEF shares and produce a 
noise trader model to support their points. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), or LST hereafter, 
propose a simple investor sentiment theory to explain the CEF discount puzzle. They suggest 
that most of the investors who trade in CEFs are noise traders. These investors are prone to 
hold irrational expectations about the fund’s future returns. Changes of the investor sentiment 
impact on CEF trading prices and induce CEF prices to change over time. Specifically, when 
the investors are optimistic about future returns, the sentiment is high and there is premium 
on CEFs while there is a discount when they feel pessimistic about the market conditions. 
 
This explanation helps us understand the main driving force behind the CEF puzzle. The 
companies that issue the CEFs tend to crowd together in the time of investor exuberance. 
During this period, they would believe that the CEFs could be sold for more than their 
intrinsic value and the discount on CEFs could be lower than normal. On the other hand, 
when the CEFs are either turns to be open-ended or liquidated, rational investors do not need 
a compensation for assuming the noise trader risk; because they know that the CEF share 
price will be close to NAV. 
 
1.2.2 Exchange Traded Fund Price Deviation 
 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) are an emerging investment product. They are becoming 
substantially important and popular in the index mutual fund product category. Such funds 
are investment hybrids of open-ended fund and common stocks. They hold a fixed basket of 
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stocks based on an underlying index, with identical stocks and weights, but they trade 
throughout the day at market-determined prices on a stock exchange. ETFs are attractive to 
many investors due to their low costs, tax efficiency, and stock-like features.  
 
In January 1993, the first ETF was introduced in the US. This ETF is Standard and Poor’s 
Depository Receipts, also known as Spiders (SPDRs), which tracks the holdings and returns 
of the S&P 500. Other popular ETFs include DIAMONDS (DIA) and Qubes (QQQQ), which 
track the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), NASDAQ 100, respectively. They began 
trading in 1998 and 1999. Since then, the industry has undergone tremendous growth. There 
are now more than two trillion dollars invested in over 4,500 ETF products worldwide.3  
 
ETFs are similar to stocks; they can be traded on the exchange either by shorting or buying 
on margin. ETF products can track a wide variety of indexes, including not only the broad 
indexes of general stock and bond markets, but also industry sectors and international stock 
indexes. The ETFs do not give investors the opportunity to outperform the returns of the 
underlying index, however. With these peculiar features, ETFs have received a great deal of 
attention in the academic and practitioner communities. 
 
Recent literature has studied the impacts of ETFs’ issuance on financial markets. The main 
focus is the identification of anomaly in relation to the price deviation that exists in the 
underlying stocks these ETFs hold (see for example Switzer, Varson and Zghidi,2000; Hedge 
and McDermott, 2004 and Ackert and Tian, 2000). Besides, Ackert and Tian (2000), Elton et 
al (2002), Poterba and Shoven (2002), investigate in the ETF pricing and performance which 
includes, but not limited to, the ETF pricing that differs from the NAV pricing. Although the 
                                                             
3 Source: BlackRock: ETP Landscape: Industry Highlights (January 2013). 
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ETFs are traded in the way like CEFs, it is of interest that ETFs, through a mechanism known 
as redemption in-kind, allow institutional investors to potentially earn a profit by arbitraging 
away these pricing deviations through creating and deleting outstanding shares of the ETF. 
This creates the opportunity to test whether ETFs could be affected by investors’ biases, or 
other risk factors. 
 
1.2.3 REIT Price Momentum  
 
REIT stands for the Real Estate Investment Trusts, which is a type of real estate companies 
that modeled after mutual funds. REITs were introduced by American Congress in 1960 to 
provide an opportunity for investors to invest in real estates in a manner similar to stocks and 
bonds traded through mutual funds. REITs may invest in the properties themselves or in 
mortgage or mortgage-related securities tied to the properties. The trading of REITs is like 
that of the common stocks. After paying a conversion fee, a REIT escapes corporation tax. It 
must pay out 90% of its property income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends. 
With assets of more than $650 billion4, publicly listed REITs are traded in the US on all 
major stock exchanges and they offer both individual and institutional investors the 
opportunity to diversify their portfolio risks.  
 
In the finance literature, momentum is the empirically observed tendency for rising asset 
prices to rise further, and falling prices to keep falling. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 1999) 
show that stocks with strong past performance would continue to outperform stocks with 
poor past performance in the next period with an average excess return of about 1% per 
month. The momentum is a market anomaly, which traditional finance theories are struggling 
                                                             
4 Asset total is from www.nareit.com as of January 31, 2013. 
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to explain. The momentum effect is also captured to be significant in REITs. Chui et al. 
(2003) find significant momentum in the U.S. REITs from 1983 to 1999. Hung and Glascock 
(2008) document that the REIT momentum is positively related to volatility and they find that 
idiosyncratic risk can partially explain momentum. Derwall et al (2009) finds strong evidence 
to support for performance persistence in REITs. 
 
Controversies exist in the explanation of REITs’ price momentum. The contention 
documented in the previous study can be classified into three general categories: theories of 
market frictions (Hong and Stein, 1999), theories of time-varying expected returns (Johnson, 
2002), and behavioural theories of market inefficiency (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998). Much of the existing financial research attributes the appearance of 
momentum to the investor biases. Delong et al (1990) suggest that the noise traders who lack 
of fundamental information are likely to be trend-chaser, reinforcing the movements in stock 
prices. Another behaviour explanation is rejated to the underreaction theory which has been 
documented in Chan et al (1996), Barberis et al (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998, DHS hereafter), and Hong and Stein (1999). The authors suggest that 
price momentum strategy may benefit from the market's slow response to a broader set of 
information, including longer-term profitability. DHS (1998) suggest that the momentum 
effect is generated by investors’ overconfidence and self-attribution bias. These studies 
motivate us to further explore the investor sentiment, which may provide an alternative yet 
plausible explanation for the momentum of fund prices by way of examining the REIT price 
momentum.  
 
 
 
11 
 
 
1.2.4 Behavioural Finance Overview 
 
Behavioural explanations are now lighting up the world of finance research as they attempt to 
explain any anomaly in the literature, so as a broad area it is interesting, and has recently 
been on the cutting edge of finance which involves a simple behavioural approach. 
Behavioural finance is a developing perspective to the study of financial markets that has 
emerged, at least in part, in response to the perplexing problems encountered by the classical 
theories. Contrary to the EMH and CAPM, it announces that by using the models in which 
not all the agents are fully rational. 
 
Black’s (1986) theory of “noise traders” suggests that sometimes they trade without 
information, and as a result they are incorrect and irrational; these behaviours lead to noise 
trading, these investors cause the market to be inefficient, but often prevent us from taking 
advantage of inefficiencies. De long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) (DSSW 
henceforth), present a model of noise trader survival in perfectly competitive market 
conditions, noise traders are optimistic on their trading assets and enhance prices; at other 
times, noise traders are pessimistic about the returns on securities, so the prices are driven 
down. Less than fully rational investors could be able to affect the price, and these noise 
traders play a key role in our financial markets, which poses a huge challenge to the 
traditional efficient market hypothesis. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991), or LST hereafter, 
suggest that most of the investors who trade in funds are noise traders. These investors are 
prone to hold irrational expectations about the fund’s future returns. Changes of the investor 
sentiment impact on the fund trading prices and induce fund prices to change over time. 
Barberis and Thaler (2002) presents a number of behavioral finance applications: to the 
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aggregate stock market, to the cross-section of average returns, to individual trading behavior, 
and to corporate finance. 
 
1.3 Contribution and Main Findings        
 
In the past few decades, the application of traditional finance theory to the explanations of 
market anomalies has been faced with huge challenges. In order to improve the weak 
explanatory power of conventional factors, the investor sentiment hypothesis first proposed 
by LST (1991) has become a promising avenue by way of a behavioural approach to 
complement the conventional explanations of financial market anomalies. In response to the 
problems exhibited in the existing theories, the investor sentiment hypothesis has been widely 
tested (Neal and Simon, 1998; Qiu and Welch, 2005; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 
2007) and the results of which turn out to be able to successfully explain the market 
anomalies to a great extent.  
 
The existing investor sentiment literature has primarily focused on the stock market 
performance, especially that of the US market. Few past studies have been concerned with 
the fund market anomalies. The current research in this thesis not only investigates the fund 
market but also attempt to explore the role that investor sentiment may play in the UK fund 
market. Furthermore, our research also bridges the gap in the literature by applying the 
sentiment approach to explain the market anomalies within both the UK and US markets. 
 
The contributions that this study makes to the existing literatures include the following. First, 
our study is among the first to apply the investor sentiment theory to the fund anomalies in 
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the UK market. A small number of studies have examined the investor sentiment in the fund 
market (Levis and Thomas, 2000; McLean and Zhao, 2009). They however failed to extend 
the research to the anomalies observed in the fund market pricing and performance, while the 
fund industry is developing rapidly. Understanding the underlying mechanisms and 
influential factors of the fund price performance can guide fund managers in their 
management and is beneficial to individuals’ making of better investment decisions. A 
related contribution of our work lies in our investigation of the sentiment outside of US 
market. Since most investor sentiment studies are sampled in the US capital market, it cannot 
be ruled out that the results may be limited to the US case only. The test of sentiment theory 
in this thesis may give us a better understanding of the investor sentiment and its impacts 
based on the geographical difference. Finally, we contribute to the literatures by focusing on 
the sentiment measures. Since the investor sentiment reflects the investors’ behaviour and 
psychology, it is hard to be properly captured. We have constructed the proxies for sentiment 
factor in both direct and indirect forms. Specifically, the direct measure is formed from the 
consumer confidence survey results. These surveys are conducted by the UK and US 
institutions which investigate into the consumer behaviour and expectations. The indirect 
measure is related to constructing the sentiment index by considering macroeconomic 
influences, such as the closed-end fund discount, and the put-call ratio in the options market.    
 
Along these lines, an analysis of the theoretical foundations and empirical research on the 
data are attempted. Our results confirm that investor sentiment has significant impacts on 
fund market risk premium and the changing sentiment of individual investors can explain the 
discounts of closed-end funds in the UK market and this sentiment is sensitive to the size. 
Moreover, sentiment is likely to be generated from concentrated individual ownership. The 
investor sentiment has an explanatory power for most of UK ETF price deviation and ETFs 
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with different characteristics are sensitive to the investor sentiment in different ways. For the 
US REITs, we conclude that sentiment is significant to their momentum when it is optimistic. 
However, the momentum returns decline substantially when sentiment is pessimistic. We also 
find that investor sentiment can explain REITs’ short-run continuation and long-run reversal. 
Further, under different size and liquidity portfolios our results are robust as well. 
 
According to the empirical results, our theoretical contribution encompasses some aspects of 
the behavioral explanations on the fund market anomalies which is developed by the limited 
rationality model of LST (1991). Investor sentiment is defined as an aggregate measure of 
investors’ attitude toward market conditions and can be classified as pessimistic, neutral and 
optimistic. The examinations on investor sentiment generally investigate investors’ 
expectations which refers to “noise traders” or irrational investors, investor sentiment studies 
generally either support of refute whether non risk related measures have the ability to change 
some fundamental aspects of the funds such as price.  
We address that the irrational individual investors, the most dominant holders of closed-end 
fund shares, trade their assets by an additional risk, the misperceptions of these investors 
place them into optimistic or pessimistic overreactions. The risk of fund investment is 
systematic and holding the fund is risker than holding their portfolios directly. Consequently, 
investors require higher returns on the assets of funds than on the underlying asserts traded 
directly. This theory can explain why the closed-end funds must sell at a discount to the net 
asset value. Furthermore, the discount of funds and other securities (such as small stocks) are 
affected by the same sentiment, the changes of the sentiment should cause changes in 
discounts and the fluctuation of discounts should be highly correlated across funds. We 
confirm the small firm effect in investor sentiment theory, i.e. the discount in closed-end fund 
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industry is more likely to be influenced by smaller firms than by large firms, since the noise 
traders concentrate their holdings and trading activities in small firms, low priced firms and 
lower institutional ownership firms. This conjecture can also explain that why the different 
sectors of securities have the different level of the discounts. Similarly, we suggest that the 
investor sentiment have the significant effect on the pricing of UK ETFs, and it can impact 
the pricing of the ETFs at different level by various characteristics of the ETF firms.  
 
Momentum in stock prices is proposed in a seminal work by Levy (1967), which concludes 
that buying stocks that are historically comparatively strong can attain profitable results. By 
extending this work into the fund market, our study in REIT price momentum contributes to 
the notion theoretically that REIT short-run momentum and long-run price reversal jointly 
arise from investors’ behavioral biases and is robust when controlling for firm size and 
trading volume. 
 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises five chapters that is centred on three main essays. All of the three 
essays attempt to better our understanding of the interplay between investors and fund 
markets, in particular between the investor perceptions and potential biases and market 
anomalies. The investor perceptions of the market are proxied by measures of investor 
sentiment through which we analyse their impacts on the fundamental aspects of CEFs, ETFs 
and REITs. The structure of the thesis is as organised as follows: 
 
 Chapter 2: investor sentiment and closed-end fund puzzle. In this chapter, we 
investigate whether the investor sentiment plays a significant role in the formation of 
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closed-end fund discount, and hence its impacts on stock risk premium in the UK 
market. 
 Chapter 3: investor sentiment and ETF price deviation. Chapter 3 examines the 
relationship between investor sentiment and ETFs’ price deviation from the 
fundamentals in the UK market. We also investigate the relation of the sentiment and 
different ETF characteristics.    
 Chapter 4: investor sentiment and REIT price momentum. Chapter 4 estimates the 
REIT momentum returns in different investor sentiment states. Such analysis sheds 
empirical lights on whether investor sentiment affects the profitability of REIT price 
momentum strategies in the US market. 
 Chapter 5: Conclusions. In this final chapter, we summarise the results of this 
work as well as give suggestions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CLOSED-END FUND PUZZLE AND 
INVESTOR SENTIMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Closed-end funds are funds which issue a fixed number of shares after the initial public 
offering (IPO).  Unlike the more familiar open-end funds, which can issue new shares and 
sell to buyers at the net asset value (NAV), the per share market value of its asset holdings,5 
the price of a share in a closed-end fund is determined not just by the value of the assets in 
the fund, but also by the market demand; thus shares can be traded either below their NAV 
(discount) or above it (premium).  Investors who wish to buy a share of such funds can do so 
only by buying from other investors at the prevailing price (Barberis and Thaler, 2002).  
 
The discounting of closed-end funds is a common anomaly in financial markets 
internationally, presenting a theoretical and practical issue referred to in finance academia as 
the ‘closed-end fund puzzle’.  In the field of financial economics there can be few questions 
more complicated than the closed-end fund puzzle, and it has been a subject of investigation 
for several decades (for an overview, see Anderson and Born, 1992).  The puzzle is so-called 
because at IPO, in the US the average closed-end fund is issued at an almost 10 percent 
premium to the NAV, while in the UK funds are issued at a premium amounting to at least 5% 
(Weiss, 1989; Peavey, 1990). However, within a few months, averaging at around 120 days in 
                                                             
5 NAV is defined as the market value of the securities held less liabilities, all divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. 
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recent years, the premium disappears, the fund trades at a discount, and during the closure 
period transactions retain this discount,6 albeit that it is not fixed but varies substantially over 
time (Thompson, 1978). When the closed-end fund is either converted into an open-end fund 
or liquidated, the discount shrinks and the share price will rise (Brauer, 1984). 
 
A number of past studies have attempted to solve the puzzle by rational explanations such as 
agency costs, illiquidity of assets and capital gains tax. The agency costs theory proposes 
that in order to maintain normal operation, funds incur some costs, which would make the 
market price of a closed-end fund less than the NAV (Boudreaux, 1973; Ross, 2002). 
However, Thompson (1978), Malkiel (1977) and Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) find little 
support for this hypothesis, because agency costs are usually a fixed portion of the NAV and 
therefore should not impact the fund price. With regard to the illiquidity of assets, Seltzer 
(1989) suggests that because fund managers always invest large amounts of money into 
assets that are in restricted circulation, the market value of the assets exaggerates the real 
NAV; hence, there tends to be more discounting. However, this is inconsistent with the fact 
that when funds are open-ended, their price rises. Finally, in order to qualify for exemption 
from corporation tax a closed-end fund must distribute a certain percentage of realized gains. 
If funds have numerous unrealized gains, shareholders will be liable for capital gains tax, 
and therefore there would be a discount. However, contrary to this theory, Malkiel (1977) 
finds that unrealized capital gains can account for only a 6% discount, while evidence shows 
that the discount sometimes reaches 20%. Brickley, Manaster and Schallheim (1991) link an 
alternative tax-timing explanation to discounts on closed-end funds, based on the idea that 
investors of individual securities derive greater benefits from tax-timing than do fund 
                                                             
6 Gemmill and Thomas (2000) find that the average discount in the UK over 1970-99 is 18%, and in the US over 
1973-99 it is 14%. 
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shareholders, because current tax law prohibits the capital losses of individual assets from 
being passed through to investors of the portfolio. Nevertheless, their study fails to provide 
conclusive evidence that tax-timing can impact on closed-end fund discounts, nor can it 
explain why funds trade at a premium.7 Therefore, while these theories can offer some 
insights towards explaining the discount puzzle, none of them provides a satisfactory 
explanation for all aspects of the puzzle, because each fails to account for a great deal of the 
existing evidence.8 
  
Investor sentiment hypothesis, proposed in the US by Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) (LST 
henceforth), involves a simple behavioural approach using models in which not all the 
investors are fully rational. Although the concept of investor sentiment remains controversial, 
it is a developing perspective to the study of financial markets that has emerged, at least in 
part, in response to the perplexing problems encountered by the classical theories.  As such, it 
has taken its place on the cutting edge of finance studies. The investor sentiment theory has 
been reliably tested (LST, 1991; Chen et al, 1993; Barberis, 2002; Baker and Wurgler 2007), 
and the empirical findings demonstrate that investor sentiment plays a key role in evaluating 
the discount of closed-end fund. Many researchers have confirmed that a relationship exists 
between the closed-end fund discount puzzle and investor sentiment, and it has been argued 
that discount is a sentiment index. However, other studies and empirical evidence have 
indicated that investor sentiment seems to account for very little of the discount on closed-
end funds over time (Elton et al, 1998; Ross, 2002; Doukas and Milonas, 2004).  
 
Behavioural explanations are currently providing new insights in the world of finance 
research, as they attempt to explain existing puzzles in the literature. The outcome of my 
                                                             
7 See, for example, Constantinides (1983, 1984) and Kim (1994). 
8 See Roenfeld and Tuttle (1973), Malkiel (1977), Brauer (1984), Brickly and Schallheim (1985).  
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research opens up potential opportunities for exploiting the relationship between discounts 
and investor sentiment. Understanding the underlying mechanisms and influential factors of 
the closed-end fund discount can guide fund managers in their management and investment 
decisions. By undertaking this kind of closed-end fund research, it will be possible to offer 
better advice to investors regarding fund and stock markets, so that they can make better 
informed decisions and so reduce their investment risk. Moreover, the analysis of closed-end 
fund discounts will not only help guide management and investment decisions, but since the 
impact of closed-end fund discounts involves the same factors as those related to the open-
end fund redemption pressure, it will also have great significance for the management of 
open-end fund liquidity. 
 
With these considerations in mind, we begin by analyzing the theoretical foundations and 
empirical findings of existing research on this issue. To this end, we review the main studies 
which either support or sharply challenge the investor sentiment theory. We draw on studies 
not only from the US and UK, but also from the rest of the world.  
 
2.2 Literature Reviews  
 
Zweig (1973) was the first to suggest that discounts on closed-end funds reflect the 
expectations of individual investors. To support his hypothesis, he developed a test model 
which uses the change in closed-end fund premiums as an index of shifts in investor 
expectations. In his empirical work based on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) from 
December 1965 to January 1971, he found that investor expectations shown to be significant 
to related to the closed-end fund discount. This finding should be deemed the origin of 
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investor sentiment theory. According to Black (1986), investors usually trade based on 
information, and are rational. However, sometimes they trade without information, and as a 
result they are incorrect and irrational; these behaviours lead to noise trading, which is 
essential in liquid markets.9  
 
De long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) (DSSW henceforth), present a model of 
noise trader survival in perfectly competitive market conditions, which can be applied to the 
discount of closed-end funds. Sometimes, noise traders are optimistic on their trading assets 
and enhance prices; at other times, noise traders are pessimistic about the returns on 
securities, so the prices are driven down and closed-end funds sell at a relatively larger 
discount. Further, the authors assume that noise traders’ sentiment is stochastic and the risk of 
holding a closed-end fund includes not only the fund's portfolio risk but also the risk from 
noise traders’ sentiment on the fund changes. That is why Palomino (1996) suggests that the 
noise trading may explain the closed-end fund puzzle. 
 
LST (1991) build on the investor sentiment theory based on DSSW’s (1990) noise trading 
model. They point out that if investor sentiment changes, there are a number of empirical 
implications for the pricing of closed-end funds, most significantly because the risk of fund 
investment is systematic and holding the funds is riskier than holding their portfolios directly. 
Consequently, investors require higher returns on the assets of funds than on the same assets 
traded directly. This theory can explain why, in order to lead investors to purchase the funds, 
the closed-end funds must sell at a discount to the NAV. Further, the authors imply that the 
changes in investor sentiment on future returns may cause the fluctuations of the closed-end 
                                                             
9 Black (1986) launched the ‘noise’ concept in a paper entitled ‘Noise’. He stated: ‘In my model of the way we 
observe the world, noise is what makes our observations imperfect.’ 
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fund discount.  
 
However, the considerable body of theoretical literature generated since investor sentiment 
theory was first proposed is by no means unanimous in terms of findings. Investor sentiment 
theory has been sharply challenged, especially by studies testing mainly the US or UK 
market. Among US studies, Chen, Kan and Miller (1993) question the link between discounts 
and premiums on small firm returns, because the data show that the returns of small 
capitalization stocks are not so strongly related to closed-end fund discount, and the 
relationship between them is not substantially stronger than that of larger capitalization 
stocks. Pontiff (1997) uses the same sample as LST (1991) and finds that the monthly returns 
of US closed-end funds are 64% more volatile than their assets.  Moreover, the test for the 
difference in residual risk between top and bottom groups indicates that the discount is 
positively related to the residual risk; that is, the higher the residual risk, the higher is the 
absolute value of the discount, and vice versa.  
 
Among UK studies, Prior (1995) disputes investor sentiment theory and concludes that the 
existence of the discount does not itself reflect the noise trading in the pricing of closed-end 
funds. This is because, if noise is found, it is likely to be in the patterns of positive short-run 
correlation with the sector mean; however, these patterns are actually long-run, hence the 
explanations in terms of investor sentiment cannot be successful. More recently, Gemmill and 
Thomas (2002) use a large sample of 158 closed-end funds to make cross-sectional tests of 
the factors determining the average discount. Their results indicate that investor sentiment 
can cause the fluctuation in the discounts; nevertheless, they reject the hypothesis that 
investor sentiment leads to the long-run discount.  
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The above studies do challenge the investor sentiment theory to some extent; however, many 
papers still support LST (1991) because many of the opposing hypotheses or models are 
either limited as regards the sample and the market, or not robust enough to disprove the 
investor sentiment theory. Therefore, much of the literature pays more attention to the 
specific measures of investor sentiment, which could provide more reasonable and 
compelling evidence. As a result there have been numerous studies, some supporting the 
investor sentiment theory and some challenging it, on the grounds of empirical findings.  
 
2.2.1 New Issues (IPOs) 
 
The first strand of the investor sentiment theory literature focuses on the closed-end fund IPO. 
LST (1991) examine closed-end fund issuing activity in the US, and find that issuing patterns 
are substantially cyclical. The issuing of closed-end funds tends to be crowded together at 
certain times; most funds are issued when the discounts on closed-end funds are much lower 
than normal. Consistent with the implication of investor sentiment theory, Burch and Weiss 
Hanley (1996) suggest that when timing secondary offerings, the closed-end fund managers 
are likely to choose those periods when funds are in high demand and are being traded at a 
premium. Further, Weiss Hanley, Lee and Seguin (1996) use the evidence of uninformed 
buyers to support investor sentiment. Testing on a sample of 65 closed-end fund IPOs issued 
during 1988 and 1989 on the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) by applying the Lee-Ready 
(1991) algorithm, they find that most of the trading in the first few weeks is seller-initiated.10 
Their evidence shows that an extremely large number of the buys (sells) during the first 30 
days are originated by small (large) investors. They explain that the closed-end funds are 
                                                             
10 Weiss Hanley et al. (1996) interpret that since short-selling is impossible during this time period, this selling 
pressure confirms the presence of ‘flippers’ - investors who buy IPO shares during the pre-issue and 
immediately resell them in the aftermarket. 
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bought by uninformed buyers (irrational investors) from professionals; as a result, only small 
investors hold these funds over a long period, and this is why discount occurs.  
 
However, Ammer (1990) argues that although the discount and premium periods of the UK 
closed-end funds are similar to those of the US, the irrational investor sentiment waves are 
not sufficiently significant to be a proxy of the emergence of discounts. Contrary to this, 
Levis and Thomas (1995) support the investor sentiment model and show that UK closed-end 
fund IPOs are subject to ‘hot’ issue periods; specifically, IPOs tend to occur when there is a 
marked narrowing in the discount of seasoned funds. In a subsequent study, Levis and 
Thomas (2000) show that IPOs in UK funds are usually launched when the discounts are at 
historically low levels. Moreover, their evidence indicates that individual investors tend to 
invest in UK mutual funds when the discounts are narrowing. Inconsistent with LST (1991), 
Khurshed and Mudambi (2002) propose an alternative approach to explain short-run 
underpricing of closed-end fund IPOs in terms of information asymmetry hypothesis. They 
use comprehensive UK closed-end fund IPO data of the period 1989-1996 to test the short-
run fund price performance, and the results lead them to accept the hypothesis.  
 
Recent work has focused on testing investor sentiment using the cross-section of stock return 
from closed-end fund IPOs. Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct a composite index of 
sentiment based on six underlying variables which are measured annually from 1962 to 2001. 
The regression result illustrates that the IPO market is essentially sensitive to investor 
sentiment, since the high first day returns on IPOs could be a measure of investor optimism, 
and the low returns could be interpreted as a reflection of market timing. Qiu and Welch 
(2005) provide a true out-of-sample test by forming their sample from 1985 to 2002. From 
their empirical evidence, they show that a consumer confidence measure can explain closed-
25 
 
 
end fund IPO activity, while the closed-end fund discount cannot; the sentiment is an 
important factor in financial markets, but not in explaining the discount. Unlike previous 
studies, which focus on the market prices to measure sentiment, Lemmon and Portniaguina 
(2006) rely on a direct measure of sentiment compiled from survey data, and construct a 
regression of consumer confidence on a set of macroeconomic variables. After comparing the 
sentiment which is extracted from consumer confidence indices to the discount of closed-end 
fund, the number of IPOs and the average first-day IPO return, they argue that the closed-end 
fund discounts appear to be not related to the investor sentiment. 
 
2.2.2 Individual Investors 
 
Behavioural explanations for the discount of closed-end funds focus on the behaviour of 
individual investors. Some of the individual investors who are the primary owners of closed-
end funds are noise traders; sometimes they are too optimistic while at other times they are 
too pessimistic, and thus exhibit irrational swings in their expectations about future fund 
returns. Therefore, DSSW (1990) suggest that the risk of holding shares includes not only the 
fund's portfolio risk but also noise trader risk; hence the risk of holding fund shares is greater 
than the portfolio risk, and the discount is produced to compensate for the noise trader risk.  
 
Sias et al. (2001) examine the DSSW (1990) hypothesis that closed-end fund shareholders 
obtain greater returns than holders of the underlying assets as compensation for bearing 
‘noise trader risk’. Based on their result, they do not argue against the existence of noise 
traders in the market, because of the growth in closed-end fund IPO and negative aftermarket 
performance. Furthermore, the result is consistent with the noise trader model whereby 
closed-end fund share returns are more volatile and exhibit greater mean reversion than the 
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underlying asset returns. However, they find no evidence that fund shareholders earn greater 
returns than the holders of underlying assets, so investors cannot be compensated for the 
noise trader risk.  
 
Sias (1997a, 1997b) investigates the impacts of institutional investors on the closed-end fund 
market. In the first study (Sias, 1997a), contrary to Weiss (1989) and LST (1991), he finds 
that institutional investors do not play a minor role in the closed-end fund market.11 He 
reports that while institutional ownership, on average, is less than 5 percent, institutional 
investors account for more than 32 percent of the total volume of his fund sample. Therefore, 
the proportional ownership is much less than the institutional investor activity in the closed-
end fund market. His empirical finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the closed-end 
fund share discounts are driven mainly by the individual investors, and demonstrates that the 
variation in the net order imbalance due to institutional investors is as important as the one 
due to individuals in moving closed-end fund share prices and discounts.12 In the second 
study (Sias, 1997b), he investigates whether individual and institutional investors respond 
differently to changes in market conditions. Closed-end funds are the medium used to test the 
hypothesis because closed-end fund shares (held primarily by individual investors) and the 
underlying assets (held primarily by institutional investors) are claimed to be the same stream 
of distributions. The empirical results indicate that individual investors are more responsive 
than institutional investors to changes in market conditions, and these changes in market 
conditions generally contribute a larger change in share prices than do the value of the 
underlying assets. The results support the argument proposed by DSSW (1990) that noise 
                                                             
11 Weiss (1989) reports that institutional holdings account for less than 5% of closed-end fund IPOs versus 29% 
of the shares in a control sample of non-closed-end fund IPOs; LST report less than 7% for their sample versus 
under 27% for a sample of the smallest capitalization decile of NYSE firms. 
12 He assumes the weekly reporting of NAV minimizes information asymmetries in the market, and the order 
flow imbalance moves share prices. 
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trading can lead to a large divergence between market prices and fundamental values.   
 
Grullon and Wang (2001) posit that institutional investors and individual investors can also 
differ in terms of their abilities to access and/or process relevant information about the assets 
in which they invest. According to this argument, institutional investors prefer to concentrate 
their investments in the underlying assets rather than in funds, so that they can take an 
informational advantage over individual investors. In order to examine the closed-end fund 
discount, the authors develop a multi-asset trading model which emphasizes both institutional 
ownership and information asymmetry. The model provides testable implications for the 
closed-end fund discount: specifically, that the discount is negatively related to the 
institutional ownership differential and, in particular, the discount is positively related to the 
quality of private information in the fund’s underlying assets. In general the discount reflects 
a difference in risk perception between informed and uninformed traders.   
 
2.2.3 Small Firm Effect 
 
Another strand of investor sentiment hypothesis empirical research tests the small firm effect. 
LST (1991) conjecture that the smaller stocks are predominantly traded and held by 
individual investors, so the changes in their sentiment (the changes of discount) should be 
correlated with the returns on small capitalization stocks. They find that small stocks do well 
when discounts on closed-end funds narrow, and perform badly when discounts widen.13 
Furthermore, closed-end funds display a particular size-related January effect; that is, the 
return of common stock of closed-end funds during first month exceeds the average monthly 
                                                             
13 As LST (1991) assert, this evidence is inconsistent with the unmeasured capital gains tax liability hypothesis 
of discounts.   
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return of last months, especially in small closed-end funds. Kumar and Lee (2006) confirm 
the small firm effect in investor sentiment theory. In order to test their view, they construct a 
multifactor model using a database of more than 1.85 million retail investor transactions from 
1991 to 1996, as advanced by Barberis et al. (2005). Their empirical results show that retail 
investors concentrate their holdings and trading activities in small firms, lower priced firms, 
and lower institutional ownership firms, which indicates that investor sentiment shifts have 
incremental power to demonstrate return co-movements among small capitalization stocks. 
Therefore, they conclude that the closed-end fund discount is more likely to be influenced by 
smaller firms than by large firms. These findings are also consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (2001), in whose model the proxies for mispricing are market excess 
return (RMRF), the size factor (SMB), the book-to-market (HML), the momentum factor 
(UMD).  
 
However, the small firm effect, whereby small stocks perform better than large stocks when 
the discounts narrow has been debated ever since it was argued by LST (1991). Chen, Kan 
and Miller (1993) reject the sentiment story because, measured correctly, the co-movement 
between fund discounts and small firm returns is neither strong nor sufficiently robust. In 
their regressions, they find that the coefficients of small firms are quite similar to those of 
firms with high capitalization; specifically, the relationship between the discounts and small 
firm returns disappears after 1975. In response, Chopra and LST (1993) point out that in fact, 
all small stocks are mainly held by individuals, so even ‘high’ institutional small stocks can 
be related to the discounts. Using much better data, they confirm that small stocks outperform 
large stocks while discounts are narrowing, shown by the fact that nine out of ten size deciles 
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support their view.14 The small firm effect based on investor sentiment has been further 
investigated by Swaminathan (1996) and Nagel (2005). Both authors’ long horizon 
forecasting regressions demonstrate that the future excess returns on small firms can be 
predicted by closed-end fund discounts, and the additional tests indicate that the relationship 
between small firm expected returns and discounts emerges from positive covariance between 
their risk premiums.  
 
Examining turn-of-the-year return and volume patterns for municipal bond closed-end funds, 
which are held mainly by tax-sensitive individual investors, Starks et al (2006) document a 
January effect for these funds, but not for their underlying assets, which gives support to 
LST’s (1991) size-related January effect. They posit that this January effect can be explained 
by the tax-loss selling hypothesis: investors usually sell securities on which they have 
incurred losses before the year end, in order to lower their taxes on net capital gains. The 
intensified selling pressure depresses prices at year end, then prices rebound in January, 
resulting in large January returns. The differences in incentives for tax-loss selling between 
the holders of the closed-end funds and the holders of the underlying assets provide evidence 
to explain the discount and premium of the closed-end fund. However, the evidence in the 
UK market does not appear to support this hypothesis. Dimson and Minio-Paluello (2002) 
show that January returns are not higher than non-January returns throughout the period from 
January 1980 to March 1997. They also suggest that, on average, the discounts during 
January decrease, but the monthly changes of the discounts are not significantly different in 
January from those in other months. This phenomenon is explained in Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton (2002), who point out that stock market patterns are often unable to migrate across 
                                                             
14 Chen, Kan and Miller provide a further rejoinder to confirm their points and rebut LST (1991). See Chan, Kan, 
Miller, ‘Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds Are a Sentiment Index: a rejoinder’, Journal of Finance, 48, 
pp.809-810 
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the Atlantic, hence the UK closed-end fund discount tends not to be characterized by January 
effect, unlike that in the US market. 
 
2.2.4 Co-movements  
 
One of the implications in investor sentiment theory is that the fluctuations of discounts 
should be highly correlated across funds. Since the discounts of funds and other securities are 
affected by the same sentiment, changes in this sentiment should cause changes in discounts. 
LST (1991) use US domestic stock funds over the 1965–1985 period to show that the average 
pairwise correlation of annual changes in discounts among domestic stock funds is 0.389, 
while that of monthly changes is 0.248, which gives further support to their theory that 
discounts of different domestic funds tend to move together. Similarly, Minio-Paluello (1998) 
designs a co-integration analysis, which is a more robust specification of co-movements in 
discount than pairwise correlation. She finds that in the UK market, the average correlation of 
the changes in the discount of all pairs of funds in the ‘International general’ category is 0.3, 
which shows that the fund discounts in that category co-move strongly.  Moreover, she 
documents that the average discounts in different categories are co-integrated.  
 
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) investigate why certain groups of assets co-move 
while others do not. They consider two broad theories of co-movement. One traditional view, 
derived from the concept that there is no friction and that investors are rational, holds that co-
movement in prices reflects co-movement in fundamental values, while a more novel and 
currently prevalent view is a sentiment-based theory of co-movement, which believes that 
irrational investors exist, and that due to the limits to arbitrage, co-movement in prices is 
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delinked from co-movement in fundamentals.15 The authors use additions to the S&P 500 to 
construct a bivariate regression test to distinguish the two broad theories of co-movement, 
and find that the fundamentals-based view of co-movement cannot easily explain their results, 
but the sentiment-based view fits the evidence well.  This is consistent with Vijh’s (1994) US 
market findings and with Greenwood and Sosner (2002), who use data on additions to and 
deletions from the Nikkei 225 index. 
 
As argued by LST (1991), the fluctuations in the discounts on closed-end funds are related to 
changes in the sentiment of individual investors, and changes in closed-end fund discounts 
are correlated with the returns of small-cap stocks. Scruggs (2007) supports this view and 
suggests that changes in closed-end fund discounts are analogous to the returns on a portfolio; 
that is, long on the common stocks of closed-end fund and short on the underlying assets. He 
uses the habitat view of co-movement to indicate that changes in the sentiment of individual 
investors relative to the sentiment of the broader market cause fluctuations in the discounts on 
closed-end funds. His empirical evidence, which is consistent with LST’s (1991) limited 
arbitrage-noise trader model, shows that correlations between long-short portfolio returns and 
country-specific index returns are due to co-movement in noise shocks, not co-movement in 
fundamental shocks. Overall, the predictions of sentiment-based theories of co-movement 
add to the conviction of investor sentiment theory for valuation.  
 
However, Chan et al. (2008) claim that while the explanations based on investor sentiment 
                                                             
15 They examine three specific sentiment-based views of co-movement. 1.Category View: to simplify portfolio decisions, many investors first group assets into categories 
then allocate funds at the level of these categories. If some of them are noise traders with correlated sentiment, then as they move funds from one category to another, their 
coordinated demand induces common factors in the returns of assets that happen to be classified into the same category. 2.Habitat View: noise traders only invest in a subset 
of available securities; their noise trading induces sentiment-based co-movement in the returns of stocks in that habitat. 3.Information Diffusion View: due to market friction, 
information is incorporated more quickly into the prices of some stocks than others; some stocks reflect it today and move up together immediately; the remaining stocks 
also move up together, but only after some delay.  
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hypothesis have had some success in accounting for the co-movement of fund premia or 
discount, they do not explain the wide variation of such premia or discount. In their reports of 
US-traded single-country closed-end funds, according to the average values (across all funds) 
of the time series correlations of the variables used in the empirical analysis, there is a strong 
co-movement in the premia of different funds, as suggested by the correlation of 0.47 
between the individual and average fund premium, which is the proxy of small investor 
sentiment. They also find a strong co-movement among all country funds, but they suggest 
that it is not clear whether the co-movement necessarily reflects small investor sentiment. 
 
2.2.5 Investor Sentiment in Different Markets 
 
As noted by Elton et al. (1998), investor sentiment is priced in the US capital market, and as 
such it cannot be ruled out that it is limited to the US capital market. Investor sentiment 
theory cannot be sufficiently robust without being tested in capital markets outside the US. 
With this in mind, the final strand of empirical work tests the relationship between discount 
of closed-end funds and investor sentiment theory based on various capital markets. Simpson 
and Ramchander (2002) employ a novel approach to re-test the investor sentiment hypothesis 
for the Australia closed-end funds. Their evidence shows that after controlling for the 
movements between domestic and foreign stock market, as well as exchange rate, the 
changes of proportion between domestic and foreign investor sentiment are statistically 
significant to explain the changes in the discount of Australia closed-end funds. Jackson 
(2003) provides additional evidence to examine LST’s (1991) conjecture by studying 
systematic trading patterns in the Australian stock market. The findings offer supportive 
evidence for the small firm effect in Australia closed-end funds; however, the argument that 
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individual investors are irrational and that this may result in the discount of closed-end funds 
is not valid.  
 
Chowdhury (1994) compares different investor structures for closed-end funds in the US 
stock market and in Asian markets (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), and 
questions the general hypothesis that changes of closed-end fund discount seem to be related 
to announcement of changes in investment restrictions. His findings indicate that investor 
sentiment hypothesis is sensitive to the nature of the capital market. In the same vein, Chen et 
al. (2002) assert that due to the unique characteristics of the Chinese stock market, not only 
investor sentiment, but also imperfect arbitrage and the momentum effect play major roles in 
discounts of Chinese closed-end funds.  
 
Doukas and Milonas (2004) conduct an out-of-sample test of the investor sentiment 
hypothesis and suggest if the sentiment can represent a systematic asset pricing risk and enter 
the return generating process, it should be found in the Greek market, which is more reactive 
to investor sentiment than is the US stock market.16 However, the result fails to support the 
investor sentiment hypothesis. Using the same data and also testing in the Greek market, 
Halkos and Krintas (2006) find that the closed-end fund discount can be explained not only 
by the compensation for investor sentiment risk, which is consistent with LST (1991), but 
also by the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). In their model, fundamental factors have a 
significant relation and a slightly greater influence than behavioural factors on the growth of 
the discount of the closed-end funds, consistent with the arguments of researchers who rely 
on EMH as the answer to the closed-end fund discount puzzle.  
 
                                                             
16 They argue that the Greek capital market is not as mature as the US capital market, hence individual investors’ 
trading can be easily impacted by others, and consequently, investor sentiment is more likely to be detected.  
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The studies of investor sentiment on different markets extend even to Latin America. Garay 
and Venezuela (2001) provide an event study on the performance of closed-end funds in 
Latin America after the Asian Financial Crisis. They verify empirically that during the Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997-1998, following the currency devaluations the closed-end funds 
moved to large premiums. This fact makes powerless all the existing theories that attempt to 
explain the closed-end fund discount puzzle. 
 
2.3 Methodology and Data  
 
2.3.1 The Out-of-sample Test 
 
The results in the study of LST (1991) may be limited, due to the fact that the hypothesis of 
investor sentiment is based solely on the US market. That is, since investor sentiment is 
sampled only in the US capital market, it cannot be ruled out that the result is limited to that 
market. For example, by testing the investment decision rules, Draper and Paudyal (1991) 
find that the UK investment trust market, unlike the closed-end fund market in the US, is 
efficient. Our methodology is designed to investigate the investor sentiment theory by using 
out-of-sample test based on the UK market and different sample periods. As discussed, 
investor sentiment varies across different countries, each of which has its own unique 
corporate governance, financial system and capital structure. In this respect, Fama (1998), in 
his response to the many critics who oppose the idea of the rationality of capital markets, 
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provided instruction on how to deal with out-of-sample tests, because most capital market 
anomalies, such as closed-end fund discounts, tend to disappear in other markets or after the 
publication of the original papers. The out-of-sample test therefore seems applicable to 
unveiling the relationship between the closed-end fund discount puzzle and investor 
sentiment.  
 
However, previous models of the discount have been limited to using a small number of 
domestic equity market factors, notably the market sector factors. These risk factors have 
limited explanatory power, and additional factors are required to explain a substantial 
proportion of movements in the discount and the portfolio returns. We consider four such 
factors: the market, small firm, market-to-book, and momentum factors. This research uses 
time series models, because the closed-end fund discount puzzle is considered as a time series 
performance, and it is therefore necessary to use time-series sentiment evidence to test for it. 
If sentiment does play a systematic role in explaining the time series of stock returns, a time-
series regression on the different variables should essentially confirm the significance of 
investor sentiment to the closed-end fund market. We consider Pontiff’s (1997) empirical 
attempt to take into account the Fama and French (1993) three factor model and the models 
developed by Carhart (1997), as the first step toward shedding light on and improving 
understanding of this issue. 
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2.3.2 Data Sources and Descriptions 
 
Using the UK data from January 1990 to December 2008, we aim to shed more light on 
whether or not investor sentiment is related to the discounts of closed-end funds, and whether 
it could be incorporated in asset pricing. The selection of the UK closed-end funds is based 
on several reasons. First, as shown in Figure 1, we may find that the UK stock market 
experienced both a valley and a peak during the 1990-2000 periods. The bearish market 
lasted until the beginning of 2003, while the unprecedented bullish trend prevailed from 2002 
to 2008 and the last really high peak occurred in 2007. After 2008, the stock market became 
very unstable and experienced valleys again. The market has not yet regained its 1990 low 
value; it seems to be recovering slowly, but steadily. During the first period, the London 
Stock Exchange index (FTSE100) rose from about 2000 to more than 6000, while by July 
2007 it had reached 6700 points and after that fell to 4000. In such a stock market 
environment investors experienced both optimism and pessimism; hence the investor 
sentiment should be more noticeable.  
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Figure 2.1 Stock indices over time during 1/1990–1/2009 (Data source: DataStream). 
 
 
Second, the UK and US stock markets are the most sophisticated and developed in the world, 
and their capital structures are very similar. Consequently, if there is a relationship between 
closed-end fund discount and investor sentiment, the indications in the UK should be the 
same as in the US, and investor sentiment should have similar impact on the investment 
decision and asset pricing in the two markets. Third, investor sentiment hypothesis 
demonstrates that the closed-end fund discount is caused mainly by small investors. As the 
statistical evidence shows, in both the UK and the US the percentage of small investors is too 
low for them to play a bigger role than that of institutional investors. Institutional investors 
are much more significant in the UK market than in any other markets, including other 
developed countries. Their wealth represents around two thirds of the total equity in public 
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listed companies.17 If we find that investor sentiment plays a key role in the closed-end fund 
discount in a country where institutional investors take the dominant place in the capital 
market that will be strongly persuasive evidence for investor sentiment theory.    
 
 
Figure 2.2 Value-weighted discount for all closed-end funds listed in the LSE over the 
period of 01/1990-01/2009 
 
Finally, from Figure 2 we can find the most important and interesting factor in our sample; 
that is, almost all of the closed-end funds were trading at a discount during the 1990-2009 
periods, as shown by the fact that the value-weighted percentage of discounts is above zero. 
Therefore, the UK market provides us with a distinct opportunity to study the relationship 
between investor sentiment and the closed-end fund discount puzzle in a context where it is 
                                                             
17 The main types of institutional investor are insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds, closed-end 
funds and mutual funds. 
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more easily to be observed. If we are unable to find sufficient evidence to support the 
investor sentiment hypothesis, we may argue that investor sentiment is not a key factor in 
asset pricing.   
 
We employ monthly data spanning the period from January 1990 to December 2008; since 
previous findings are widely divergent, we restrict our sample to the post-1990 period to 
enable the data to be as new as possible.  The sample consists of 86 closed-end funds listed in 
the London Stock Exchange. Although 98 closed-end funds were initially identified in 
Datastream during this period, 12 either have missing data through this source, or do not 
provide share information. We use the FTSE 100 index, FTSE 250 index, and FTSE Small 
Cap index as the portfolio indices. Our data related to the closed-end funds, sector indices 
and individual stocks are collected from Datastream. All other data are obtained from the Xfi 
Centre for Finance and Investment. As Michou, Mouselli and Stark (2007) note, there is no 
freely downloadable equivalent to the data on Ken French’s US website; however, Gregory, 
Tharyan and Huang (2009) remedy this situation by making available the Fama-French and 
Momentum portfolios and factors for the UK market to the wide community of UK academic 
and post-graduate researchers. 
 
2.3.3 Portfolios and Indices 
 
Following Doukas and Milonas (2004), who use out of sample test methodology and LST 
(1991), we test the argument that investor sentiment plays a key role in the return generating 
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process by constructing several sets of portfolios. 18  First, we derive 3 value-weighted 
portfolios from the FTSE indices, which are classified by capitalization. The FTSE 100 is a 
share index of the 100 most highly capitalized UK companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange; this is followed by the FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap indices. Second, we adopt 
a more concise 10 size-decile portfolio from Gregory, Tharyan and Huang (2009), which is 
consistent with the study of LST (1991). We also use 10 FTSE sector indices to test the 
industrial returns. Finally, 383 individual stocks are taken into our portfolios; these are the 
remaining stocks of the original 419 listed in the LSE during my sample period, after the 
exclusion of 36 with missing data. Then, we evaluate equally-weighted monthly returns for 
each of these portfolios within the sample period. 
 
Taking the previous studies into account, we construct the investor sentiment index by using 
the value-weighted index of discounts.  The process is shown as follows: 
1
n
t i it
i
VWD w DISC

  
 Where,  
1
it
i n
it
i
NAV
w
NAV



                                                (2.1) 
itNAV = net asset value of fund at end of month t 
                                                             
18 LST (1991) built the changes in the discount on closed-end funds as the sentiment index. Chen, Kan and 
Miller (1993), and Elton et al. (1998) also use the changes in value-weighted discount as the sentiment index. 
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                                           (2.2) 
Where, itSP = stock price of fund I at end of month t 
n= the number of funds with available discount and NAV data at the end of month t. 
We also compute the changes in the value-weighted index of discounts, defined as:  
1t t tVWD VWD VWD                                              (2.3) 
 
2.3.4 The Return Generating Process 
 
In order to test the importance of adding sentiment index to the return generating process, we 
use two different models to test LST’s (1991) investor sentiment hypothesis that investors 
should require higher returns to compensate their small investor sentiment risk. If this 
hypothesis is valid, the sentiment factor should have a significant coefficient when it gets into 
the return generating process and the average alpha should be different from zero. First, as 
Doukas and Milonas (2004) use an improved model based on LST’s (1991) one-index model 
to examine the relationship between returns against market returns and ΔVWD, we employ 
the following similar model: 
  
0it i im mt i t itR R VWD                                      (2.4) 
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Where, 
itR = the return of a stock or portfolio i in month t minus the one-month London Inter Bank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
mtR = the return of market portfolio m in month t minus the one-month LIBOR 
tVWD = the change in value-weighted index of discount in month t  
i = the non-systematic mean return of stock or portfolio i 
im = the sensitivity of stock or portfolio i to market portfolio m 
0i = the sensitivity of stock or portfolio i to the index of changes of premiums 
it = the residual of stock or portfolio i in period t 
 
However, many studies remain unconvinced that model (4) is an appropriate return 
generating process; a more precise model should add the Fama-French three factors of market, 
size, and book-to-market, as well as the momentum factor.19 Therefore, the second model is 
designed to test the relationship between the sentiment in the return generating process and 
Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, which adds the momentum factor to the three-factor 
model. The model can be presented as: 
 
                                                             
19 See L’Her, Masmoudi and Suret (2004) for the Canada stock market. 
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it i i mt i t i t i t i t itR b R s SMB h HML wWHL VWD                   (2.5)  
Where,  
SMB= the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks 
(small minus big in terms of size)  
HML= the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth 
stocks (high minus low in terms of B/M) 
WML= the return on a portfolio of winner stocks minus the return on a portfolio of loser 
stocks (winners minus losers in terms of momentum) 
 
Moreover, we compute another sentiment proxy which is the survey based direct approach as 
the change of consumer confidence index ΔCCI. GFK NOP have been conducting the 
Consumer Confidence Barometer in the UK since June 1995. Each month the survey tracks 
changes in personal finance, general economic situation, inflation, unemployment, current 
purchasing climate, consumer spending and saving. We estimate the components of consumer 
confidence related to economic fundamentals and investor sentiment. This approach would be 
better than the traditionally indirect way to construct the sentiment proxy as it is easy to be 
captured and can be calculated more accurately. We compare the two different approaches for 
the sentiment proxy in order to test the robustness of the results. 
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2.4 Empirical Results 
 
2.4.1 Characteristics of the Sample  
 
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistic of our sample. It reports that almost all the closed-
end funds were trading at a discount to their NAV, 83 out of 86 closed-end funds, with a mean 
discount of around 12.05%. This table also illustrates that during our sample period, i.e. 
January 1990 to December 2008, the closed-end funds performed better than the UK stock 
market by about 0.284%. Furthermore, it reports the NAV returns of our sample. Given that 
these have a mean return of around 0.276%, it is clear that the closed-end fund returns 
outperform the NAV returns. This result would seem to support LST’s (1991) argument that 
closed-end funds should offer a higher (lower) return to compensate investors for the 
sentiment risk when a discount (premium) is introduced, since UK closed-end funds are being 
traded at a discount, but returns are higher than NAV returns,20 albeit not very significantly.  
 
Table 2.1 Closed-end Fund descriptive statistics 
 
  Obs.(No.) Mean(%) Value>0(No.) 
Discounts 228 12.05 83 
Returns 227 0.284 70 
NAV returns 227 0.276 72 
Notes: Table 2.1 reports the monthly average discounts, returns and NAV returns of 86 closed-end funds in our 
sample period from January 1990-December 2008.  
 
 
 
                                                             
20  See also Elton et al. (1998), who use an equation based on Return of Fund= Return of NAV+ 
Dividend*Discount/Price to support the argument by LST (1991). 
45 
 
 
2.4.2 Co-movements in Discounts of Closed-end Funds 
 
The investor sentiment hypothesis predicts that the discounts on closed-end funds will be 
correlated. Table 2.2 presents the correlation levels of monthly discounts of individual funds 
and the value-weighted discount (VWD) of all 86 closed-end funds from our sample. The fact 
that correlation coefficients are not too far from 1 and -1 indicates that most of the discounts 
of funds are correlated well. In addition, the correlation between VWD and each discount of 
individual closed-end funds is fairly strong; the average pairwise correlation of all funds and 
VWD is 0.28. This figure is close to the correlation reported in LST (1991) to support their 
conclusion that there is co-movement between the discounts of each individual closed-end 
fund. 
 
Table 2.2 Fund correlation levels 
CF1 CF2 CF3 CF4 CF5 CF6 CF7 CF8 CF9 CF10 CF11 
0.2320  0.2483  0.5718  0.3251  0.3251  0.5202  0.3199  0.1769  0.3557  0.3424  0.0420  
CF12 CF13 CF14 CF15 CF16 CF17 CF18 CF19 CF20 CF21 CF22 
0.3163  -0.4631  0.1531  -0.2692  0.5876  0.2141  0.0451  0.1540  -0.1361  0.2605  0.4286  
CF23 CF24 CF25 CF26 CF27 CF28 CF29 CF30 CF31 CF32 CF33 
0.3514  0.4329  0.1440  0.3374  -0.2426  0.5544  0.2368  0.1420  0.3349  0.2210  0.5173  
CF34 CF35 CF36 CF37 CF38 CF39 CF40 CF41 CF42 CF43 CF44 
0.1130  -0.0013  0.4138  0.2351  0.3608  -0.0070  0.1615  0.0598  0.1037  0.4085  0.4386  
CF45 CF46 CF47 CF48 CF49 CF50 CF51 CF52 CF53 CF54 CF55 
0.3068  0.4578  -0.0358  0.3309  0.3555  0.4236  0.3018  0.1732  0.2214  0.4052  0.0940  
CF56 CF57 CF58 CF59 CF60 CF61 CF62 CF63 CF64 CF65 CF66 
0.2571  0.5432  0.3464  0.4153  0.2857  0.0487  0.2763  0.1003  0.3320  0.3232  0.5095  
CF67 CF68 CF69 CF70 CF71 CF72 CF73 CF74 CF75 CF76 CF77 
0.2026  0.3801  0.6018  0.7499  0.1539  0.3639  0.4161  0.3367  0.2901  0.2380  0.4406  
CF78 CF79 CF80 CF81 CF82 CF83 CF84 CF85 CF86     
0.4949  -0.0748  0.3118  0.2412  0.5909  0.3248  0.2482  0.5561  0.3920      
Notes: This table presents the correlation levels of monthly discounts of individual funds and the value-weighted 
discount (VWD) of all 86 closed-end funds from our sample. 
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2.4.3 The Significance of Sentiment  
 
In LST’s (1991) theory, the main traders and holders of small stocks are individual investors, 
so if their sentiment changes, both small stocks and closed-end funds should be influenced. 
Table 2.3 reports the results of time series regression for our models. There are three 
parameters to be estimated in model 1, and six in model 2, to which have been added the 
Carhart (1997) four factors. The interesting finding here regards the significance of the 
parameter α, which defines the non-systematic mean return of portfolios. We obtain that the 
alphas of both models are statistically insignificant in all three portfolios. Moreover, identical 
to LST’s (1991) finding, all three ΔVWD are significant at 5% level,21 in the first model as 
well as in the ΔCCI model. 
 
However, in contrast, the second model’s regression demonstrates that not all of the 
coefficients of ΔVWD (ΔCCI) are significant at 5% level; the coefficients of ΔVWD for the 
FTSE 250 and FTSE Small Cap index are significant, but those for the FTSE 100 are not, 
which may indicate that the investor sentiment is more likely to be captured in small stocks. 
Furthermore, all of the size factors are significant, and consequently we may conclude that 
size enters the return generating process much more than do the market, B/M and momentum 
factors. The market betas are insignificant continuously in all regressions, while the alphas 
are relatively lower in regressions of model 2 than in regression model 1. From the values of 
adjusted R^2, we find that the Small Cap has the highest value; furthermore, since all the 
values of the adjusted R^2 are much higher in model 2 than in model 1, we can see that 
model 1 is able to explain a relatively small proportion of the variability of the excess returns 
on the market indices, and model 2 appears to be a rather better model. 
                                                             
21 In order to be consistent with previous studies, we test the coefficients only at 5% level. 
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Table 2.3, Panel A 
The time-series regression results with commonly used stock market indices 
  Intercept Market ΔVWD Size B/M Momentum Adj.R^2 
 
Model 1:  
 
FTSE 100 -0.003 0.132* -0.005*    0.031 
 (-1.01) (1.96) (-2.23)     
FTSE 250 -0.002 0.153 -0.011*    0.083 
 (-0.512) (1.90) (-4.40)     
FTSE Small-cap -0.004 0.061 -0.013*    0.104 
 (-1.34) (0.750) (-5.30)     
Model 2:  
 
FTSE 100 -0.002 0.092 -0.002 0.418* -0.021 -0.012 0.113 
 (-0.742) (1.39) (-1.07) (4.85) (-0.248) (0.865)  
FTSE 250 -0.001 0.099 -0.007* 0.587* 0.070 0.012 0.194 
 (-0.390) (1.27) (-3.08) (5.82) (0.694) (0.148)  
FTSE Small-cap -0.003 0.002 0.010* 0.589* -0.030 -0.026 0.218 
  (-1.02) (0.028) (-4.06) (5.82) (-0.293) (-0.311)   
Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on three indices of FTSE, 
changes in the monthly discount on a value–weighted portfolio of closed–end fund discounts (VWD), and the 
monthly excess return on the FTSE All Shares, which is used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the 
portfolio of small stocks minus big in terms of size, HML is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and 
WML is winner minus loser in terms of momentum. *denotes significant at 5% level.  
 
 
0it i im mt i t itR R VWD       
it i i mt i t i t i t i t itR b R s SMB h HML wWHL VWD         
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Table 2.3, Panel B 
The time-series regression results with commonly used stock market indices 
  Intercept Market ΔCCI Size B/M Momentum Adj.R^2 
 
Model 1: 0it i im mt i itR R CCI         
 
FTSE 100 -0.003 0.094 -0.003*    0.061 
 (-0.942) (1.41) (-3.62)     
FTSE 250 -0.001 0.095 -0.004*    0.070 
 (-0.406) (1.16) (3.98)     
FTSE Small-cap -0.004 0.009 -0.003*    0.033 
 (-1.21) (0.106) (3.09)     
Model 2: it i i mt i t i i t i itR R s SMB h HML wWHL CCI            
 
FTSE 100 -0.002 0.073 -0.002* 0.380* -0.044 -0.006 0.132 
 (-0.706) (1.11) (2.41) (4.42) (-0.508) (-0.0831)  
FTSE 250 -0.001 0.068 -0.002* 0.595* 0.058 0.034 0.181 
 (-0.375) (0.868) (2.39) (5.77) (0.562) (0.406)  
FTSE Small-cap -0.003 -0.026 0.001 0.648* -0.023 0.003 0.169 
  (-1.01) (-0.317) (1.49) (6.14) (-0.218) (0.031)   
Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on three indices of FTSE, 
changes in the monthly consumer confidence index, and the monthly excess return on the FTSE All Shares, 
which is used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the portfolio of small stocks minus big in terms of 
size, HML is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and WML is winner minus loser in terms of 
momentum. *denotes significant at 5% level.  
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2.4.4 Sentiment and Size 
 
In order to evaluate the contribution of a set of Carhart (1997) four factors to the return 
generating process, one major approach is to assess whether or not they impact on the size-
sorted portfolios.22 It is worthwhile to examine these because LST (1991) suggest that testing 
portfolios with different capitalizations of companies plays a key role in judging the investor 
sentiment hypothesis. Specifically, in their theory, small stocks held by individual investors 
are affected much more strongly than others. Therefore, small stocks are good candidates to 
be used for testing investor sentiment. The evidence based on size portfolios is presented in 
this subsection. To make a better comparison with prior studies, as discussed earlier, we use a 
more refined set of size-decile portfolios, ordered from smallest S1 to largest S10. 
 
Table 2.4 reports the time series regression results of the monthly excess returns of each size 
portfolio on ΔVWD or ΔCCI and the market returns; the five-index regression results are also 
shown. As shown in Table 3(B), we find that in model 1, the values and patterns of adjusted 
R^2 are quite close to the finding of LST (1991) that the level of fit is much higher for large 
stocks (0.924) than for small stocks (0.323). Interestingly, almost all of the alphas are 
statistically insignificant and the average value of alphas is extremely close to zero; moreover, 
we find that all portfolios have the market beta close to 1. The t-value demonstrates that 
ΔVWD does have a significant relationship with the returns on size portfolios at 5% level in 
the first 9 regressions, but not in the last regression; this means that stocks do well when 
discounts narrow, and for decile 10, the largest firms, stock price does poorly when discounts 
shrink. The betas of changes in VWD are monotonic in portfolio size; the sensitivity of small 
                                                             
22 Size portfolios are used as the unit of observation by Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989), Fama and French 
(1992), Elton et al. (1998), and Doukas and Milonas (2004). 
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firms is much greater than that of large firms, because for the smallest firms, which typically 
have the highest individual ownership, the co-movement with closed-end funds is the greatest. 
All these findings are identical to investor sentiment hypothesis that sentiment index should 
be more pronounced in small stocks.     
 
The regressions based on model 2 reveal that only one of the ΔVWD and only two of the 
ΔCCI have statistically significant coefficients. However, the patterns of regression 
coefficient on both ΔVWD and ΔCCI are different; specifically, there is no obvious sequence 
among the coefficients which relies on the size. Thus, if we take the Carhart (1997) four 
factors into account, the evidence fails to support LST’s (1991) argument that large 
companies tend to have positive loadings, and small companies have negative loadings.23 
However, all of the coefficients of market and size and most of the B/M are significant. 
Moreover, the return of larger size-sorted portfolio is correlated to the momentum factor. 
From the adjusted R^2, we note that generally, the fit of model 2 is much better than that of 
model 1, especially for the smaller portfolios. Overall, we can estimate that in the UK market, 
there is a strong relationship between the Carhart (1997) four factors and the portfolio returns; 
specifically, the momentum factor is more prevalent in larger size portfolios than in other 
portfolios. Investor sentiment cannot be captured by adding the Carhart (1997) four factors. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
23 In LST’s (1991) regression, the smaller the size-sorted portfolio is the greater absolute value of negative 
coefficient it has. This proves their hypothesis that small stocks do well when the discount narrows. 
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Table 2.4, Panel A 
The time-series regression results using 10 size-decile portfolios 
  Intercept Market ΔVWD Size B/M Momentum Adj.R^2 
Model 1:        
S1(smallest) 0.008* 0.668* -0.007*    0.323 
 (2.72) (10.1) (-3.31)     
S2 0.005 0.795* -0.006*    0.402 
 (1.83) (12.1) (-3.08)     
S3 0.002 0.793* -0.006*    0.412 
 (0.649) (12.3) (-3.32)     
S4 0.001 0.859* -0.006*    0.467 
 (0.574) (13.9) (-3.29)     
S5 0.001 0.914* -0.006*    0.521 
 (0.306) (15.5) (-3.62)     
S6 0.001 0.973* -0.007*    0.581 
 (0.370) (17.4) (-4.44)     
S7 -0.001 1.004* -0.006*    0.590 
 (-0.327) (17.8) (-3.71)     
S8 -0.001 1.083* -0.005*    0.689 
 (-0.558) (22.2) (-3.63)     
S9 -0.001 1.188* -0.002*    0.792 
 (-0.512) (29.4) (-1.99)     
S10(largest) -0.0002 0.921* 0.001    0.924 
 (-0.238) (52.3) (1.51)     
0it i im mt i t itR R VWD       
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Model 2:  
S1(smallest) 0.007* 0.598* -0.001 0.894* 0.161* 0.087 0.624 
 (3.36) (11.7) (-0.848) (13.5) (2.42) (1.60)  
S2 0.006* 0.693* -0.0003 0.989* 0.188* -0.018 0.748 
 (3.16) (15.8) (-0.280) (17.4) (3.30) (-0.391)  
S3 0.002 0.691* -0.0004 1.036* 0.198* 0.001 0.798 
 (1.49) (17.8) (-0.360) (3.91) (3.91) (0.03)  
S4 0.003 0.762* -0.0002 1.023* 0.073 0.003 0.832 
 (1.69) (21.30) (-0.192) (22.0) (1.56) (0.074)  
S5 0.002 0.823* -0.0008 0.977* 0.124* 0.013 0.848 
 (1.04) (24.0) (-0.731) (21.9) (2.78) (0.362)  
S6 0.002 0.871* -0.002* 0.954* 0.171* -0.040 0.894 
 (1.61) (30.0) (-2.31) (25.3) (4.50) (-1.30)  
S7 0.001 0.894* -0.0008 0.979* 0.275 -0.089* 0.912 
 (1.19) (33.5) (-0.965) (28.2) (0.789) (-3.12)  
S8 0.0006 0.989* -0.0005 0.852* 0.038 -0.066* 0.935 
 (0.565) (43.3) (-0.735) (28.7) (1.27) (-2.71)  
S9 0.002 1.09* 0.005 0.559* -0.020 -0.197* 0.920 
 (1.76) (42.3) (0.628) (16.6) (-0.604) (-7.09)  
S10 (Largest) 0.0004 0.929* -0.0004 0.189* -0.091* -0.059* 0.948 
 (0.736) (61.9) 0.862 (-9.65) (-4.62) (-3.67)  
Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on ten size grouped 
portfolios, changes in value-weighted discount of CEF, and the monthly excess return on the FTSE All Shares, 
which is used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the portfolio of small stocks minus big in terms of 
size, HML is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and WML is winner minus loser in terms of 
momentum. *denotes significant at 5% level.  
 
it i i mt i t i t i t i t itR b R s SMB h HML wWHL VWD         
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Table 2.4, Panel B 
The time-series regression results using 10 size-decile portfolios 
  Intercept Market ΔCCI Size B/M Momentum Adj.R^2 
Model 1: 
it i im mt io itR R CCI         
S1(smallest) 0.008* 0.620* 0.003*    0.346 
 (2.87) (9.42) (4.39)     
S2 0.005 0.749* 0.003*    0.424 
 (1.97) (11.6) (4.30)     
S3 0.002 0.744* 0.004*    0.440 
 (0.785) (11.8) (4.81)     
S4 0.002 0.820* 0.003*    0.472 
 (0.669) (13.2) (3.64)     
S5 0.001 0.869* 0.003*    0.538 
 (0.426) (14.8) (4.62)     
S6 0.001 0.925* 0.003*    0.593 
 (0.506) (16.6) (5.21)     
S7 -0.0004 0.960* 0.003*    0.607 
 (-0.212) (17.3) (4.88)     
S8 -0.001 1.052* 0.002*    0.690 
 (-0.463) (21.5) (3.77)     
S9 -0.001 1.170* -0.001*    0.796 
 (-0.448) (28.9) (2.76)     
S10(largest) -0.0002 0.927* -0.004*    0.924 
 (-0.289) (52.4) (-2.04)     
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Model 2: it i i mt i i t i t i t itR b R CCI s SMB h HML wWHL           
S1(smallest) 0.007* 0.588* 0.001* 0.874* 0.149* 0.091 0.627 
 (3.41) (11.5) (1.73) (13.1) (2.24) (1.68)  
S2 0.006* 0.688* 0.0005 0.976* 0.181* -0.017 0.750 
 (3.18) (15.7) (1.03) (17.0) (3.16) (-0.371)  
S3 0.002 0.684* 0.0007 1.02* 0.188* 0.003 0.800 
 (1.53) (17.7) (1.6) (10.11) (3.71) (0.0622)  
S4 0.002 0.763* -0.0005 1.028* 0.074 0.003 0.832 
 (1.68) (21.30) (-0.138) (22.0) (1.58) (0.091)  
S5 0.002 0.817* 0.0005 0.977* 0.118* 0.016 0.849 
 (1.06) (23.8) (1.40) (21.5) (2.62) (0.425)  
S6 0.002 0.861* -0.007* 0.954* 0.166* -0.034 0.894 
 (1.62) (29.5) (2.09) (24.9) (4.33) (-1.10)  
S7 0.001 0.888* -0.0006 0.968* 0.021 -0.087* 0.914 
 (1.23) (33.3) (1.86) (27.7) (0.596) (-3.07)  
S8 0.0005 0.989* -0.0001 0.863* 0.042 -0.065* 0.935 
 (0.539) (43.1) (-0.525) (28.7) (1.38) (-2.66)  
S9 0.002 1.098* -0.0003 0.563* -0.017 -0.199* 0.920 
 (1.75) (42.3) (-0.937) (16.6) (-0.513) (-7.18)  
S10 (Largest) 0.0004 0.928* 0.0001 0.188* -0.091* -0.058* 0.948 
 (0.737) (61.5) (0.617) (-9.50) (-4.61) (-3.61)  
Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on ten size grouped 
portfolios, changes in the monthly consumer confidence index, and the monthly excess return on the FTSE All 
Shares, which is used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the portfolio of small stocks minus big in 
terms of size, HML is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and WML is winner minus loser in terms of 
momentum. *denotes significant at 5% level.  
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2.4.5 Sentiment and Sector Returns 
 
According to LST (1991), the relationship between investor sentiment and closed-end fund 
discount puzzle also involves the ownership structure. Sentiment is supposed to be related to 
the firms with low institutional ownership, so we assume that the returns on different sectors 
will be affected differently by investor sentiment, based on the level of institutional 
ownership. Hence, an alternative way to test investor sentiment hypothesis is to specify 
whether the sentiment index can enter the return generating process of sectors with different 
institutional ownership, similar to small stocks. To test this conjecture, we replicate our 
earlier work to make an analysis on 10 sector indices. 
 
Table 2.5 presents the time series regression results of the monthly excess returns of 10 
sectors in LSE, ΔVWD or ΔCCI, and the monthly excess return on the market. From Table 
4(B), we can see that for the two-factor model, 6 out of 10 of the ΔVWD betas are 
statistically significant at 5% level. This pattern is quite similar to our size portfolio 
regression, which means that the sensitivity of sector returns is very strong on the ΔVWD and 
ΔCCI. The sentiment seems to be strongly related to the return generating process in mutual 
funds. Regarding the alpha, this parameter defines the non-systematic mean returns of sector 
returns. We note that almost all the alphas are insignificant; their values are very close to zero, 
which is consistent with the results of LST’s (1991) test. Furthermore, the goodness of fit for 
all regressions is strikingly low, with values lower than 0.1. 
 
Now we focus on the regressions based on the second model, to which have been added three 
further risk factors. The regression results show that four coefficients of ΔVWD (five 
coefficients of ΔCCI) are statistically significant at 5% level in our sample. This is identical 
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to the two-factor model, so that the relationship between the sentiment and sector returns is 
obvious. Interestingly, the pattern of alphas is also the same as in our two-factor model, with 
none being significant and all being close to zero. However, the adjusted R^2s are much 
higher than those in the two-factor model; thus, the explanatory power of these regressions is 
greater than those of model 1. Moreover, in our findings, different sector returns show 
substantially high sensitivity to the size factor; hence, both size and investor sentiment seem 
to be impacting on the sector returns.  
 
In view of these results, our tests on different sectors can support the argument that investor 
sentiment plays a systematic role in the return generating process of portfolios of traded 
assets, which is consistent with LST (1991). Overall, the evidence presented in our models 
supports the view that sentiment originates from concentrated individual ownership.    
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5, Panel A 
The time-series regression results using 10 sector indices 
  Intercept Market ΔVWD Size B/M Momentum Adj.R^2 
  
Model 1:  
 
  
 
Oil & Gas 0.0002 -0.101 -0.001    -0.002 
 (0.059) (-1.12) (-0.444)     
Basic Mats. -0.003 0.158 -0.012*    0.052 
 (-0.737) (1.45) (-3.56)     
Industrial -0.005 0.159 -0.010*    0.055 
 (-1.23) (1.64) (-3.59)     
Consumer Gds. -0.002 -0.002 -0.009*    0.030 
 (-0.556) (-0.232) (-3.02)     
0it i im mt i t itR R VWD       
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Heath Care -0.001 0.157* 0.0003    0.013 
 (-0.503) (2.27) (0.137)     
Comsumer Svs. -0.004 0.123 -0.01*    0.066 
 (-1.31) (1.54) (-4.01)     
Telecom -0.003 0.146 -0.004    0.009 
 (-0.711) (1.55) (-1.38)     
Financials -0.003 0.200* -0.009*    0.055 
 (0.429) (2.20) (-3.32)     
Utilities 0.002 0.058 -0.003    0.001 
 (0.512) (0.785) (-1.40)     
Technology -0.006 0.304 -0.011*    0.029 
 (-0.892) (-1.95) (-2.34)     
 
Model 2:  
 
  
 
Oil & Gas -0.0004  -0.138  0.002  0.473* 0.195 0.062 0.059 
  (-0.109)  (-1.54)  (0.605)  (4.04)   (1.65)   (0.646)  
Basic Mats.  -0.004  0.085 -0.006* 0.864* 0.372*   0.094 0.204 
 (-0.999)  (0.833)  (-2.08)    (6.48)   (2.78) (0.857)  
Industrial  -0.004  0.100   -0.006*  0.685*   -0.039  0.014 0.166 
   (-1.02)  (1.07)  (-2.29)   (5.62) (-0.322)  (0.140)     
Consumer Gds.   -0.003  -0.055   -0.006  0.627*   0.286*  0.075 0.117 
  (-0.754)    (-0.540)  (-1.82)   (4.77)   (2.17)     (0.689)     
Heath Care  -0.0007   0.126   0.001   0.157  0.045  -0.068 0.021 
   (-0.232)   (1.77)  (0.509) (1.70)  (0.486)   (-0.894)  
Comsumer Svs.  -0.003  0.075 -0.007* 0.502* -0.035  -0.014 0.150 
  (-1.03)  (0.959)     (-2.86)  (4.91)   (-0.341)  (-0.171)   
Telecom -0.0001  0.109   -0.002 0.409* -0.429*  -0.072 0.114 
  (-0.027) (1.19)     (-0.626) (3.44)  (-3.59)   (-0.737)   
Financials -0.003  0.149  -0.006*  0.496* 0.179 0.007 0.110 
  (-0.780)  (1.65)    (-2.26)  (4.22)  (1.52)  (0.0714)  
Utilities   0.002   0.032 -0.002 0.157   0.043  -0.045 0.002 
  (0.650) (0.422)  (-0.982)  (1.59)  (0.436)   (-0.559)  
Technology  -0.0003   0.236 -0.008  0.609*  -0.821*  -0.198 0.139 
  (-0.0446)  (1.56)   (-1.73)   (3.10) (-4.16) (-1.22)  
 
Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on ten industrial sectors, 
changes in the monthly discount on a value–weighted portfolio of closed–end fund discounts (VWD), and the 
monthly excess return on the FTSE All Shares, which is used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the 
portfolio of small stocks minus big in terms of size, HML is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and 
WML is winner minus loser in terms of momentum. *denotes significant at 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
it i i mt i t i t i t i t itR b R s SMB h HML wWHL VWD         
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Table 2.5, Panel B 
The time-series regression results using 10 sector indices 
  Intercept Market ΔCCI Size B/M Momentum Adj.R^2 
  
Model 1:  
 
 it i im mt io it
R R CCI       
 
 
Oil & Gas 0.0004 -0.128 0.002*    -0.015 
 (0.108) (-1.41) (2.05)     
Basic Mats. -0.003 0.092 0.004    0.049 
 (-0.648) (0.841) (3.44)     
Industrial -0.005 0.092 0.005*    0.069 
 (-1.14) (0.950) (4.06)     
Consumer Gds. -0.002 -0.052 -0.003*    0.021 
 (-0.556) (-0.232) (-3.02)     
Heath Care -0.001 0.132 0.0022    0.046 
 (-0.448) (1.92) (2.73)     
Comsumer Svs. -0.004 0.065 0.004*    0.072 
 (-1.21) (0.811) (4.21)     
Telecom -0.003 0.123 0.002    0.009 
 (-0.676) (1.30) (1.36)     
Financials -0.003 0.200* 0.009*    0.066 
 (-0.704) (1.57) (3.70)     
Utilities 0.002 0.028 0.002*    0.023 
 (0.580) (0.382) (2.60)     
Technology -0.006 0.264 -0.002    0.012 
 (-0.851) (1.67) (1.18)     
 
Model 2:  
 
 it i i mt i i t i t i t it
R b R CCI s SMB h HML wWHL         
 
 
Oil & Gas -0.0002  -0.143  0.001  0.426* 0.176 0.057 0.060 
  (-0.077)  (-1.58)  (0.849)  (3.60)   (1.48)   (0.596)  
Basic Mats.  -0.004  0.059  0.002* 0.875* 0.363*  0.114 0.197 
 (-0.989)  (0.573)  (1.50)    (6.46)   (2.68) (1.03)  
Industrial  -0.004  0.065   0.003*  0.659*   -0.066  0.033 0.173 
   (-0.991)  (0.689)  (2.70)   (5.37) (-0.537)  (0.335)     
Consumer Gds.   -0.003  -0.075   0.001  0.644*   0.282*  0.091 0.109 
  (-0.751)    (-0.736)  (1.11)   (4.83)   (2.11)     (0.842)     
Heath Care  -0.0005   0.112   0.002   0.085  0.013  -0.072 0.042 
   (-0.169)   (1.59)  (2.24) (0.917)  (0.143)   (-0.953)  
Comsumer Svs.  -0.003  0.041  0.003* 0.488* -0.057 0.006 0.152 
  (-1.00)  (0.521)     (2.94)  (4.72)   (-0.550)  (0.069)   
Telecom -0.0001  0.099   0.001 0.398* -0.438*  -0.067 0.116 
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  (-0.015) (1.07)     (0.867) (3.30)  (-3.64)   (-0.688)   
Financials -0.003  0.118  0.003*  0.483* 0.160 0.025 0.122 
  (-0.758)  (1.30)    (2.34)  (4.06)  (1.35)  (0.262)  
Utilities   0.002   0.013 0.002* 0.122   0.022  -0.039 0.002 
  (0.691) (0.170)  (2.06)  (1.23)  (0.219)   (-0.483)  
Technology  -0.0003   0.212 0.001  0.653*  -0.817*  -0.175 0.130 
  (-0.0536)  (1.39)   (0.727)   (3.27) (-4.09) (-1.08)  
 
Note: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on ten industrial sectors, 
changes in the consumer confidence index (CCI), and the monthly excess return on the FTSE All Shares, which is 
used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the portfolio of small stocks minus big in terms of size, HML 
is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and WML is winner minus loser in terms of momentum. *denotes 
significant at 5% level. 
 
 
 
 
2.4.6 Sentiment and Individual Stock Returns 
 
According to LST (1991), investors need a higher return due to the small investor sentiment, 
thus, compensate the sentiment risk. If sentiment does exhibit systematic effect on explaining 
the return generating process, we could observe that the ΔVWD and ΔCCI have significant 
loadings in individual stock returns. So we turn our focus on the relationship between 
monthly excess returns on 383 individual industrial stocks, ΔVWD (ΔCCI) and monthly 
excess return on the market, and B/M, size, momentum factors as well. From table 8, using 
the regression result of two-index model, we detect that the sensitivity of individual stock 
returns to our sentiment index ΔVWD (ΔCCI) is strong, because one third of the betas is 
significant at 5% level in all 383 regressions.  
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In the second model, the explanatory power improves a lot, while the beta of ΔVWD and 
ΔCCI appear more significant than in two-index model slightly.24 Specifically, 150 out of 383 
sentiment coefficients associated with ΔVWD and 182 with ΔCCI are statistically significant; 
it indicates us that the sentiment is much easier to be captured in six-index model. 
Interestingly, the sensitivity of individual stock returns to market factor is substantially 
weaker than all of previous regressions. The betas of the size factor are more significant than 
other factors; they are much easier to affect the returns on individual assets. These results 
corroborate our previous work; the betas for the investor sentiment and for the size are 
significant than the betas associated with the B/M and momentum, investor sentiment is a 
systematic factor in the individual stock return generating process. 
 
Table 2.6 clearly shows the times of sensitivities of mutual fund and individual stock returns 
on various factors are significant at 5% level in both two-index model and six-index model. 
As we discussed above, having the high individual ownership structure, individual stocks 
should be the most easily influenced portfolios by sentiment. These results associated with 
our previous findings to support the argument that investors require high returns to 
compensate their investor sentiment. Overall, all of the evidences in our diversified portfolios 
show that sentiment is an important factor in affecting the returns. Our UK empirical result is 
consistent with LST’s (1991) investor sentiment hypothesis. Interestingly, we find that the 
size factor can be related to the return generating process more frequently than investor 
sentiment. 
 
 
                                                             
24 Inconsistent with us, Dokas and Milonas (2004) in their study on Greek stock market, using sample in Athens 
Stock Exchange, find that in the case of the six-index model, the beta associated with sentiment is less 
significant than the one in two-index model. The regression results see Doukas, John A., and Nikolaos T. 
Milonas, 2004, “Investor Sentiment and the Closed-end Fund Puzzle: Out-of-sample Evidence” 
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Table 2.6 
  Times of factors are significant at 5% level: regression based on individual stocks 
Panel A 
Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numbers 383 383 
Rmt 28 18 
ΔVWD 127 150 
SMB - 247 
HML - 73 
WML  - 26 
Panel B 
Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numbers 383 383 
Rmt 36 34 
ΔCCI 145 182 
SMB - 252 
HML - 84 
WML  - 31 
Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between monthly excess returns on all individual stocks, 
sentiment proxy (ΔVWD and ΔCCI respectively), and the monthly excess return on the FTSE All Shares, 
which is used as a proxy for the market return (Rmt). SMB is the portfolio of small stocks minus big in terms of 
size, HML is high minus low in terms of Book to Market, and WML is winner minus loser in terms of 
momentum.  
 
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we tested the LST’s (1991) theory that small investor sentiment has a 
significant impact on stock risk premium and changing sentiment of individual investors 
explains the discounts of closed-end funds. In the investor sentiment theory, discounts are 
low when individual investors are optimistic on their future returns and high when investors 
are pessimistic. Discounts are existed in long run not only due to the inherent risk in the 
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portfolio but also the unpredictable sentiment risk in holding a closed-end fund. However, 
this theory appears to be inconsistent with much empirical evidence of the performance of the 
closed-end fund, and several indications of this theory have been involved in controversy.  
 
Along these lines, Elton et al (1998) are the first to raise the methodology that use out of 
sample test to investigate the closed-end fund discount puzzle and investor sentiment, 
moreover, Dokas and Milonas (2004) develop the method by using Greek evidence. Because 
without testing the findings outside the stock market in where they were discovered, it is still 
not robust enough to prove whether the results are merely limited in the US market. 
Accordingly, we use UK evidence to examine the significance of investor sentiment in return 
generating process out of US market. In order to test whether the discounts of closed-end 
funds are indeed related to the investor sentiment which is measured by the change in the 
discounts of closed-end funds, especially, we collect the newest dataset, add Carhart (1997) 
momentum factor to Fama-French three factor model to pay attention to the UK capital 
market which has quite close characteristics while comparing to US market,  
 
The UK stock market is a natural candidate to be examined since the composition of 
individual investors in UK is almost as same as in US. Furthermore, the UK stock market has 
experienced both a dramatic price run down and an unexpected bullish trend during the 1990-
2008 periods, so the investors encountered both pessimistic and optimistic psychology, the 
investor sentiment should be more notable. Besides, all the closed-end funds in our sample 
are trading at, on the average, 15% discount during 1990-2008 periods. Using the 
invulnerable sample and data, it is no doubt that our study provides a distinct opportunity to 
investigate whether the investor sentiment plays a key role in asset pricing. 
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The basic finding of this paper is that our evidence is consistent with the view of LST (1991) 
that investor sentiment influences the risk of common stock. According to our results, we are 
against to the argument of Elton et al (1998), Dokas and Milonas (2004) who indicate that 
investor sentiment cannot be related to the return generating process. We detect the investor 
sentiment in explaining closed-end fund discounts in a capital market whose characteristics 
are expected to be more identical to the capital market where the investor sentiment is 
originated in. This provides more powerful support to the claim that investor sentiment 
represents systematic asset pricing risk. In the regression results of our two-factor and five-
factor model, we also find that while entering the return generating process, the sentiment 
factor is significant as well as size which is not deemed as systematic asset pricing factors so 
that they can be a benchmark of comparison. Our models also detected that investor 
sentiment is more prevalent in smallest size portfolio than other portfolios; it offers us 
additional evidence to support another aspect of LST’s (1991) theory which is known as 
small firm effect. When we investigate the patterns of return sensitivity to the sentiment 
factor onto sector indices and individual stocks, there is a strong evidence to consistent with 
LST (1991) that they are more sensitive to the sentiment factor due to higher individual 
ownership. 
 
Overall, we documented that there is an evidence to support the investor sentiment as an 
important factor to represent systematic risk in return generating process and the discounts of 
closed-end funds can be explained by investor sentiment theory. Dimson and Minio-Kozerski 
(1999) propose that the price performance of closed-end funds is basically rational and the 
market appears to be efficient when dealing with open-ending by event study. Several kinds 
of event studies such as IPO patterns (cherkes, 2003) and managerial performance (Chay and 
Trzcinka, 1999; Berks and Stanton, 2007) have been linked to the closed-end fund discount 
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puzzle and investor sentiment. Thus, the event studies on the other aspects which are usually 
ignored by researchers, such as board structure of the corporate, mergers and acquisitions and 
corporate diversification, remain a topic for future research. 
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CHAPTER 3  
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND ETF PRICE 
PREMIUM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) have become an increasingly important and popular security 
in the index mutual fund product category. These investment hybrids of open-ended funds 
and common stocks hold a fixed basket of stocks based on an underlying index, with identical 
stocks and weights, but they trade throughout the day at market-determined prices on a stock 
exchange. They can be purchased on margin and sold short; about 90% of existing exchange 
traded funds are designed to track the market indices.  The inception of the Standard & Poor 
Depositary Receipts (SPDRs) on the AMEX Exchange in 1993, and the proliferation of 
iShares, DIAMONDS, and Qube (Q) products have led to a rapid development in ETFs in 
terms of both number of funds offered, and total assets. This growth and popularity have 
enhanced investment choices and brought new challenges to investigate the role played by 
ETFs in professional portfolio management, and to identify the factors that drive investors to 
invest in these products.  
 
Recent literature has studied numerous issues related to the impact of ETFs on our financial 
markets. Several authors analyse the advantages ETFs offer to investors in developed markets 
66 
 
 
such as the US and Australia (see Gastineau, 2001, and Gallagher and Segara, 2005, 
respectively). Other studies focus on the impact of ETFs on the index futures market, changes 
in the market liquidity, and pricing errors of the underlying stocks these ETFs hold (see 
Switzer, Varson and Zghidi, 2000, Hedge and McDermott, 2004, and Ackert and Tian, 2000, 
respectively.).  Meanwhile, Ackert and Tian (2000), Elton et al. (2002), and Poterba and 
Shoven (2002) investigate ETF pricing and performance, including, but not limited to, how 
ETF pricing differs from net asset value (NAV). 
 
However, little work has been done to extend our knowledge of what actually drives 
investors to invest in the ETFs, and to identify the significant factors in that investment 
decision. Therefore, we are interested to investigate what motivates ETF investors to trade at 
market prices which, in general, deviate from the fundamental NAV per share. These 
deviations may be statistically significant given that, unlike closed end funds whose prices 
also deviate from the NAV, ETFs, through a mechanism known as redemption in-kind, allow 
institutional investors, also called Authorized Participants,25 to potentially earn a profit by 
arbitraging away these pricing deviations by creating and deleting outstanding shares of the 
ETF.  Hence, we are motivated to identify the factors that may impact on the determination of 
these premiums and discounts to the NAV. Specifically, we intend to examine whether these 
pricing deviations are caused by investor biases, or by factors unrelated to risk as investor 
sentiment proxies. We will also examine whether market capitalization affects the pricing of 
the sample of ETFs used in this study. 
 
                                                             
25 Authorized Participants are those institutional investors authorized to initiate creations and deletions. 
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This paper seeks to increase our understanding of ETFs by analysing the effects of investor 
sentiment not related to risk, to determine 1) whether investor sentiment orthogonal to 
common risk factors plays a role in the pricing deviations from the NAV of ETFs, and 2) 
whether the significance of sentiment varies across various ETF characteristics. It attempts to 
shed light on whether and what factors unrelated to risk drive the trading of ETF investors, 
subsequently resulting in price deviation. To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first 
to explore our understanding of ETF price deviation and the question of whether individual 
investors affect these activities significantly in the UK market. 
 
Hughen (2001) suggests that many short-term investors like to trade in ETFs since they offer 
potentially higher profits; moreover, the ability to short ETF shares and trade them on margin 
may also be attractive. Poterba and Shoven (2002) compare the pre-tax and after-tax returns 
of SPDRs and Vanguard Index funds, tracking the S&P 500 Index, and show that individual 
investors may prefer ETFs to other similar investment products due to their preferential tax 
treatment. Moreover, institutional investors may be attracted to ETFs because of the growth 
in index investing in the US, another reason is that the price deviations from the NAV offer 
an opportunity for arbitrage by creating and deleting shares (see Bhattacharya and Galpin, 
2005). This creation and deletion mechanism also offers institutional investors an efficient 
means of transacting in small and medium capitalized securities. Following previous research, 
my interest is in whether these different types of investors are motivated by factors which are 
considered not to be related to risk or, in accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, 
strictly driven by knowledge about changes in fundamental risk. 
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Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) find that small investor sentiment has more significant effect 
on the pricing of small capitalized stocks than on that of large capitalized stocks. Additionally, 
they find that institutional fund managers tend to trade according to the need for liquidity. 
The present study examines whether or not these findings hold for ETFs, and uses direct 
measures of individual investor sentiment to investigate to what extent the investor bias may 
affect ETF pricing. We also attempt to check whether the investor biases affect the price 
deviations of ETFs, or whether other factors, such as liquidity, are motivators.26 
  
Since the ETFs are traded on the open market, and due to the intraday trading, the trading 
price for an ETF may be affected by non-risk related factors. The traders’ perceptions and 
expectations of the market may also affect the demand and thus drive market prices. 
Measures of investor sentiment, considered as a proxy for the extent to which investors have 
expectations about the market, i.e. the market will be better/bullish or worse/bearish, provide 
us with an important approach to test the impact of these non-risk related factors. 
Additionally, the dataset used in this study makes it possible to analyse investor sentiment on 
each individual ETF separately; this is critical to disentangle the effects these specific 
sentiment sets have on ETF price deviation. 
 
Further investigation of the ETF and investor sentiment measures provides an opportunity to 
analyse the differences between individual ETFs, which could have some implications for the 
traditional risk-based asset pricing model literature. Specifically, after accounting for the 
                                                             
26 See Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2001) and Datar (2001) for a discussion on the role of liquidity in 
trading activity and closed end funds, respectively. 
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portion of sentiment not attributable to risk, 27  we test whether investor sentiment has a 
significant impact on driving individual ETF performance and its market price. We are also 
interested to examine whether this relationship differs across ETFs based on size. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by adding investor sentiment to the traditional factors 
which affect ETF characteristics such as pricing, and by considering the interplay between 
ETFs and investor behaviour in the market. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
3.2.1 Investor Sentiment and Noise Trader Literature 
 
Tracking the indices has become the preferred investment approach of fund managers. 
Bhattacharya and Galpin (2005) show that in the US, fund managers’ stock picking and 
active management declined gradually from a high of almost 60% in the 1960s to a historical 
low of 24% in the 2000s. Results show that when taking expenses into account, active 
managers do not consistently outperform the market returns. Consequently, we are interested 
to examine whether, given the unique ETF trading mechanism, non-risk related investor 
perception plays an important role in explaining demand and price in the index markets with 
ETF products. 
                                                             
27 It is of interest to determine whether there is a significant difference in the level of institutional versus 
individual investor sentiment not attributable to risk. 
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Most papers use measures of investor sentiment to estimate investor optimism or irrational 
investor pessimism of the market. The studies test whether sentiment is related to some 
fundamental aspect of a security, such as returns, volatility or price. If uninformed noise 
traders or irrational investors base their trading decisions on sentiment rather than 
fundamentals, then measures of that sentiment may have explanatory power for asset pricing. 
 
Black’s (1986) theory of “noise traders” suggests that these investors cause the market to be 
inefficient, but often prevent us from taking advantage of inefficiencies. Noise is the opposite 
of information but essential to market liquidity. A large number of papers test the effect of 
investor sentiment measures on financial markets; however, most focus on the closed-end 
mutual fund or common stocks and their returns. Shleifer and Summers (1990), and DeLong, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) provide evidence that the less than fully rational 
investors could be able to affect the price, and these noise traders play a key role in our 
financial markets, which poses a huge challenge to the traditional efficient market hypothesis. 
Gemmill and Thomas (2002) use a general sample of closed-end funds in the UK market to 
investigate the reason for closed-end fund discount. Using retail investor flows as sentiment 
proxy they find that the fluctuations in discounts are generated from the function of irrational 
trader demand. However, they argue that the noise trader theory has little explanatory power 
for the long-run persistence of closed-end fund discounts. 
 
Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) (henceforth LST) examine the “closed-end fund puzzle” and 
conclude that there is a relationship between the closed-end fund discount and investor 
sentiment.  Their result suggests that changes in the individual investor sentiment can explain 
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the fluctuation of the discount, and subsequent changes in investor sentiment make closed-
end funds riskier than the underlying assets they hold. Additionally, they find that the smaller 
stocks tend to be more VULNERABLE to the change of retail investor sentiment. This is of 
interest because we will examine the effects of investor sentiment across different sizes of 
ETFs and, if we find consistent evidence of LST’s (1991) conjecture regarding size, the price 
deviations of ETFs tracking benchmarks holding smaller stocks should be greater than the 
deviations for ETFs that track indices holding large-capitalization stocks.28  
 
However, Chen, Kan and Miller (1993) challenge the findings of LST (1991). Using another 
dataset, they suggest that LST’s (1991) results are highly restricted to a fixed time period, and 
not sufficiently robust to an alternative sampling period.  Moreover, while according to 
LST’s (1991) theory, investor sentiment, proxied by the changes in closed-end fund discount, 
plays a significant role in explaining the return generating process for common stocks, Elton 
et al. (1998) propose that the closed-end fund discounts can be explained by factors unrelated 
to sentiment.  
 
Neal and Wheatley (1998) examine three indirect measures of investor sentiment, namely 
closed-end fund discount, mutual fund redemptions and odd-lot ratios, in explaining the stock 
return generating process. They find that the closed-end fund discount and mutual fund 
redemptions have predictive power in determining the premium in returns for both small and 
large firms, but there is no evidence that the odd-lot ratios can predict the returns. 
                                                             
28 Delong, Shleifer, Summer and Waldmann (1990) and Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) note that if noise 
traders, as proxied by investor sentiment, affect the mutual fund as well as the assets held by the fund, then there 
should be changes in NAV as well as in the price of the underlying stock. Given that these move in the same 
direction there should not be significant changes in the discounts of closed-end funds in this situation. 
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Bodurtha et al. (1995) investigate whether the measures of US investor sentiment affect the 
premiums and discounts of closed-end country funds, which invest solely in a specific foreign 
market29  and also sell at premiums or discounts to their NAV. Consistent with investor 
sentiment hypothesis, when the investors are optimistic/pessimistic about a security, the price 
will deviate from the NAV and subsequently there will be a mean-reversion.  
 
Brown (1999) finds that investor sentiment is significantly related to the price volatility of 
closed-end funds. Wang et al. (2006) document that while previous studies examine whether 
sentiment has predictive power on volatility, they always ignore the fact that the lagged 
returns information could also be useful for this purpose. Brown and Cliff (2004) use the 
direct measures of sentiment, to test whether they can predict short-run market returns. They 
find that changes in future investor sentiment are caused by market returns, but not vice versa. 
They also suggest that there is a significant relationship between contemporaneous returns 
and changes in sentiment. Furthermore, they provide evidence that the contemporaneous 
returns of large stocks are highly related to the institutional investor sentiment. In a later work, 
Brown and Cliff (2005) show that the market returns over the next 1-3 years can be predicted 
by a direct survey measure of investor sentiment. They also suggest that this measure has the 
ability to explain deviations from intrinsic value as measured by other stock price models 
documented in the literature.  
 
Lemmon and Portniagina (2006) find that investor sentiment proxied by the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment (ICS) provided by the University of Michigan has the ability to predict 
                                                             
29 A foreign market is labelled as such if the shares in the country fund are foreign to the exchange it sells on. 
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the returns of smaller capitalized stocks. Baker and Wurglur (2006) study how investor 
sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. The evidence shows that those securities 
whose valuations are highly subjective and difficult to arbitrage are more sensitive to the 
fluctuation of investor sentiment. For example, when the sentiment is relatively low, the 
returns are high for small stocks, young stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, 
non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme growth stocks, and distressed stocks. Similarly, in a 
more recent study, Baker et al. (2010) construct investor sentiment indices for six major stock 
markets. They combine them into one global index and then decompose that index into six 
local indices. They find that both global and local sentiment have contrarian predictive power 
when explaining country-level returns. When the global or local sentiment is high, the 
categories of difficult to arbitrage and value stocks have a low future return. The authors also 
investigate how global sentiment emerges and propagates; they find some evidence that 
private capital flows are one mechanism by which sentiment spreads across markets, helping 
to form global sentiment.  
 
3.2.2 ETF Literature 
 
While academic literature has long shown substantial interest in the performance and 
behaviour of traditional mutual funds, since 1993, with the launch of the first ETF, this 
relatively new investment instrument has become the focus of increasing research attention. 
Elton, Gruber, Comer and Li (2000) study the pros and cons of the Standard and Poor’s 
Depository Receipts (SPDRs) and conclude that ETFs hold the advantages of both open and 
closed-end funds. ETFs trade throughout the trading day and at a price close to the NAV, 
whereas closed-end funds trade at high premiums/discounts to their NAV. In an enlightening 
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paper about ETFs in the US market, Gastineau (2001) describes the main types of ETF, the 
exchanges where they are traded, their characteristics and the operating mechanism. He also 
identifies the benefits of ETFs in terms of flexibility, convenience, tax efficiency, risk 
diversification and cost advantages.  
 
Ackert and Tian (2000) study the pricing of the Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts. 
They find that the trading price of SPDRs does not significantly deviate from the NAV. The 
main reason for the slight price deviation is the opportunity for low cost arbitrage, whereby 
large investors exhibit efficient performance by using arbitrage strategies which eliminate the 
gap between the trading price and the NAV. It is interesting that with higher arbitrage costs, 
the mid cap SPDRs trade at a relatively large discount. Although the price deviation for US 
ETFs is small, the international ETFs exhibit more significant mispricing. Jares and Lavin 
(2004) use Japan and Hong Kong iShares data to provide evidence that deviations exist 
between the ETF price and the NAV, and that these deviations are positively related to the 
potential profit opportunity of subsequent ETF returns. Compared to a buy-and-hold strategy, 
this observation provides more return turnovers. Engle and Sarkar (2006) focus on whether 
the errors of reported prices and NAVs can explain the short-term mispricing. They suggest 
that the ETF mispricing in the US is very small and may last only a few minutes; however, 
for the country funds, the price deviation performs persistently. 
 
Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) find that the entry of a new product, the ETF, to the NYSE in 
2001 led to a dramatic improvement in liquidity. Their findings strongly support the view that 
the competition for order flow among market centres improves the market liquidity, and is 
75 
 
 
not likely to affect price discovery adversely. Hedge and McDermott (2004) examine the 
market liquidity effects of the underlying stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the 
NASDAQ after the introduction of DIAMONDS and Qubes.30 Based on the intraday data 
over the first 50 trading days, they find that DIAMONDS and Qubes, or “basket trading”, are 
associated with significantly lower liquidity costs than the corresponding portfolios holding 
the same component stock. Additionally, they indicate that the higher market liquidity of the 
baskets is decided mainly by lower adverse selection cost of trading in the composite 
securities. Their findings show that the market in DIA and Q’s are relatively more liquid, and 
that basket trading improves the market liquidity of corresponding component stocks. 
 
Poterba and Shoven (2002) compare the returns of SPDRs and Vanguard Index funds, which 
both track the S&P 500 Index, and find that these funds perform similarly. They also point 
out that ETFs take advantage of tax efficiency due to the “in kind” redemption process, which 
reduces the distribution of taxable realized capital gains. 
 
Numerous papers focus on the relationship between the ETFs and index futures market. Park 
and Switzer (1995) examine how the TIPs (Toronto 35 Index Participation Units31) impact on 
the Canadian index futures market. The results show that TIPs benefit the index futures 
market in both total trading volume and overall pricing efficiency. Similarly, in research 
focused on the US market, Switzer, Varson, and Zghidi (2000) and Chu and Hsieh (2002) 
                                                             
30 DIAMONDS are units of the exchange traded fund that mimics the Dow Jones Industrial Average by holding 
the same 30 component stocks as that Index. Qubes are units of the exchange traded fund that holds the same 
component funds as the NASDAQ 100. 
31 In March 1990 the Toronto Stock Exchange developed TIPs, which represent an interest in a trust that holds 
baskets of the stocks that make up the Toronto 35 Index. TIPs are akin to ETFs in the US market. 
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find that the introduction of SPDRs improved the pricing efficiency of the S&P futures 
market because it mitigated the pricing errors in the S&P Index futures contracts and 
simplified the short arbitrage process.   
 
Gallagher and Segara (2005) focus on the trading and return characteristics of Australian 
ETFs. They demonstrate that classical ETFs compensate investors with returns before 
expenses in proportion to the benchmark performance. Furthermore, ETFs exhibit lower 
tracking error relative to the corresponding index funds. They also find that the ETFs’ trading 
price deviations from NAV are infrequent and not sizeable. More interestingly, Charupat and 
Miu (2010) find differences in the behaviour of price deviations of bull and bear ETFs. On 
average, bull ETFs trade at a discount or a slight premium to NAV, while bear ETFs trade at 
a larger premium. This is consistent with their other finding that premiums occur more 
frequently than discounts for all bear ETFs, while discounts are observed more frequently 
than premiums for all bull ETFs. In comparison, they do not find any consistent pattern for 
traditional ETFs. Milonas and Rompotis (2006) use Swiss evidence to study the performance 
and trading characteristics of a sample of 36 ETFs during the period 2001-2006.  They find 
that Swiss ETFs fail to outperform their underlying indices and expose investors to greater 
risk. The tracking error observed is substantially high, with an average of approximately 
1.02%. This tracking error is positively related to the management fees and expenses, and 
negatively related to the ETF returns 
 
Moreover, Ascioglu et al. (2008) and Chelley-Steeley and Park (2010) show that the 
information asymmetry present in ETFs is lower than for individual securities, giving rise to 
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lower adverse selection costs. This suggests that if information asymmetry is an important 
influence over intraday trading patterns, then ETFs should display more homogenous trading 
volumes than observed in stock markets. Because information asymmetries are lower for 
ETFs, informed traders have less information advantage than they do in markets for 
individual securities, and this reduces the tendency for concentrated trading bouts to occur 
early on in the trading process. 
 
Innovation in financial markets is essential to their well-being and development. Fuhr (2001) 
considers ETFs as the leading financial innovation in the past decade. Although the literature 
discussed here is not exhaustive, it may still provide us with relatively rich information to 
gain a better understanding of ETFs. Our study aims to extend the understanding of ETF 
performance, its mechanism and its relations with the market and various market factors. 
 
This study will help to shed light on the role played by investor sentiment in determining the 
price deviation in ETFs. Specifically, we provide evidence of the extent to which investor 
sentiment orthogonal to risk significantly affects pricing deviations of ETFs. Further, inspired 
by the market capitalizations findings of Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) and Brown and Cliff 
(2004), we examine whether the significance of the sentiment measures differs across ETFs 
holding stocks with varying firm characteristics.  
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3.2.3 The Formal Hypotheses 
 
Brown (1999) notes that “it would be interesting to replicate our cross-sectional tests with US 
data and thereby verify, in a different environment, that it is the interplay of noise, arbitrage 
and expenses which cause closed-end funds to trade at market prices that deviate from 
fundamental values”. In line with this, we believe the UK market offers an attractive context 
in which to study ETFs, since it is well regulated and developed. This paper tests the 
following null hypotheses: 
 
1) H0: Investor sentiment has a significant effect on the pricing of UK exchange traded funds. 
2) H0: Investor sentiment has an equal impact on the pricing of exchange traded funds 
holding stocks of varying characteristics in the UK market. 
 
Our expectation is to reject the null of no significance. Generally, we expect that individual 
investor sentiment will have a significant and strong impact on our sample because we 
consider that those investors who have irrationally biased perceptions, i.e. noise traders, who 
may be considered as less sophisticated, may drive the trading price away from the ETF 
fundamental value. We also expect the respective measures of investor sentiment effect on 
the price deviation to vary across our sample group according to different market 
capitalizations. Specifically, the impact of sentiment should be greatest on small cap ETFs. 
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3.3 Data  
 
3.3.1 ETF Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this paper, our sample is constructed from UK iShares listed in the London stock exchange. 
Our sample is based on the daily data from 01/01/2007 to 31/08/2010 for 44 ETFs. The 
reason for this choice is that the iShares dominate the global ETFs, with over $620bn32 
invested in 474 funds. 43.0% of the world's total ETF assets under management are invested 
in iShares funds. Hence we believe that the UK iShares provide us with a good opportunity to 
study the UK ETF market. The sample consists of 44 ETFs listed in the London Stock 
Exchange. Although there are actually more ETFs listed in the Exchange, many of them 
either have missing data through the resource provider we use, or have only recently been 
listed. The data related to the ETFs in this paper were collected from Datastream and the 
iShares website. All other data were obtained from the Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment. 
As Michou, Mouselli and Stark (2007) note, there is no freely downloadable equivalent to the 
data on Ken French’s US website; however, Gregory, Tharyan and Huang (2009) remedy this 
situation by making available the Fama-French and Momentum portfolios and factors for the 
UK market to the wide community of UK academic and post-graduate researchers. 
 
In order to develop the descriptive statistics, it is important first to show the calculation 
methods of ETF price deviations. There are two main notations in the previous literature, of 
                                                             
32  Source: BlackRock, data as at end H1 2011 
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which one is computed as the difference between the ETF price and the fund’s NAV, divided 
by the NAV (Ackert and Tian, 2008):  
t t
t
t
p NAV
premium
NAV


                                                                      (3.1) 
The other uses the natural log of the fractional difference between the price and NAV (Engle 
and Sarkar, 2006): 
log logt t tpremium p NAV                                                          (3.2) 
 
From both equations, we may obtain the premium of the ETF; a discount is a negative value 
of premium. In each column of the ETF properties, the first row refers to the first equation 
and the second row to the second equation. 
 
Following the first method, for 31 of 44 funds the average deviation in price from NAV is 
positive (a premium), whereas for 11 funds a discount is observed; there are also 2 funds with 
no discount or premium, on average.  With the second method 12 funds have neither discount 
nor premium, 8 funds exhibit negative average price deviation, and 24 funds have premiums, 
on average. When we focus on individual funds, by both methods, the percentage of premiums is 
greater than the discounts and nets; the numbers of premiums, discounts and nets are close by two 
different methods. 
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The largest premium on any day in our sample is 25.79% for ETF44, while the largest 
discount observed is 18.96% for ETF30, based on the first method.  With the second method, 
the same ETFs exhibit the largest premium and discount, but the absolute values are much 
smaller, at 9.97% for premium and 9.13% for discount. We observe that no matter which 
method we use to calculate the price deviation, the average deviation is more often a 
premium than a discount, which may result from the redemption and creation process. An 
ETF that trades at a discount can be redeemed by a qualified investor with relatively low cost, 
whereas creating new units is more costly for the trust and may be implemented with a 
greater time lag. Therefore, it is not surprising that we see fewer discounts.  
 
Figure 3.1 also investigates the distribution of the ETF price deviation. Using the first method, 
most of the funds deviate significantly from their fundamental values by more than 0.5%, 
while with the second method the situation is dramatically different, and very few fund price 
deviations are observed. Furthermore, all of the standard deviations for the second method 
are much smaller than those for the first method.  
 
Comparing our descriptive statistic figures to previous studies, using equation (3.1), Ackert 
and Tian (2008) find that in the US, over a sample period from June 3, 2002 to January 13 
2005, 19 out of 28 funds have a premium, while 9 discounts are observed; in our study 31 of 
44 funds have a premium, 11 funds have a discount and there are 2 net funds.  Hence, the 
percentage of premium in both samples is very close; however, the average premium in 
Ackert and Tian’s (2008) study is very small, at 0.0154%, compared to our 0.117%. With 
regard to the largest premium and discount, their findings are 9.46% and 8.5%, whereas ours 
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are 25.79% and 18.96%. From these figures, we find that using equation (3.1), UK ETFs 
exhibit larger price deviation, and are more volatile, than US ETFs. Following approach (3.2), 
Engle and Sarkar (2006) find that out of a sample of 21 US ETFs, 15 have positive price 
deviation while 6 have negative deviation. The average premium is 0.0109%, which is even 
smaller than the results of Ackert and Tian (2008), whereas we obtain 0.047%. The average 
standard deviation is 0.1833%, with funds performing with great stability during the sample 
period. 
 
Overall, we may conclude that UK ETFs show larger values of all statistics under both 
equations. The premiums in the UK deviate more from zero and the distribution appears to be 
more volatile than in the US. 
 
Figure 3.1 plots the price deviations for the UK ETFs. Overall, the fund price closely tracks 
fundamental value and the premium does not vary far from zero over time. The behaviour of 
the price deviation is stable over the early sample period; the market prices of ETFs are close 
to their fundamentals.  In the middle of our sample period, the premiums are quite erratic, 
with what appear to be large and persistent deviations from zero. In addition, the distribution 
appears to have become more concentrated around zero in recent years. As with the 
developed markets ETFs, the distribution seems to converge toward fundamental price over 
time. Looking at individual funds, we find that the trend of the price deviations under the two 
methods over our sample period is exactly the same; however, the natural log measure of 
price deviation is less volatile than the division measure.  
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Panel A 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Figure 3.1 Price deviations for two equations 
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Table 3.1 presents all 44 ETFs in the sample grouped by capitalization. This table indicates a 
positive and significant relationship between fund size and average value of price deviation. 
The medium capitalization funds have the smallest standard deviation; both the occurrence of 
price deviation and the number of absolute values larger than or equal to 0.5% are less than 
for large cap and small cap funds. Therefore, it seems that the price deviation is not very 
relevant to their size. The trend is very similar for both equations. Based on our findings 
above, we use equation (1) for the following work, because it gives larger figures and more 
volatile data, which can make our regression more precise and convenient. 
 
Table 3.1 also presents the first-order to fifth-order autocorrelation coefficients, to explain the 
details of premium correlation over our sample period. From Panel B, we can see that the 
first-order correlations of 39 of the 44 ETFs are positive, which indicates that momentum 
may exist in fund premiums. Furthermore, nearly all of the t-values of the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients are significant at 5% level; the numbers of significance from 
first-order to fifth-order are: 35, 25, 14, 18 and 7. We find that the serial dependence becomes 
weaker beyond the first lag; however, the dependence is still significant after five lags (7 of 
44 funds). 
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Table 3.1 Funds Information 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of different size which is grouped by all the 44 ETFs 
capitalization. 
 
Panel B: ETFs Autocorrelation 
 
Obs. 1st-Order  2nd-Order 3rd-Order 4th-Order 5th-Order 
Avg. Mkt Value  
(Million) 
ETF1 952 0.1668 0.1096 0.1059 0.1077 0.0931 2387.29 
  
(5.15)* (3.36)* (3.24)* (3.30)* (2.88)* 
 ETF2 952 0.3816 0.2002 0.8652 0.0533 0.0693 265.47 
  
(11.80)* (5.80)* (2.59)* (1.62) (2.23)* 
 ETF3 952 0.1145 0.0250 0.0573 0.0133 0.0349 63.59 
  
(3.52)* (0.74) (1.75) (0.41) (1.07) 
 ETF4 952 0.1907 0.0818 0.0836 0.0620 0.0247 82.32 
  
(5.87)* (2.48)* (2.53)* (1.88) (0.76) 
 ETF5 952 0.5768 0.2032 0.0097 0.0631 0.0653 598.60 
  
(17.8)* (5.43)* (0.26) (1.69) (2.01)* 
 ETF6 952 0.0210 0.2191 -0.1424 -0.0309 -0.0388 125.01 
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(0.65) (6.74)* (-4.32)* (-0.95) (-1.19) 
 ETF7 952 0.0592 0.1094 0.0577 0.0679 -0.0187 214.05 
  
(-1.82) (3.37)* (1.77) (2.09)* (-0.57) 
 ETF8 952 0.0383 0.0504 0.0573 0.1185 -0.0063 139.51 
  
(1.18) (1.56) (1.77) (3.67)* (-0.194) 
 ETF9 952 0.0513 0.0535 -0.0120 -0.0461 -0.0430 94.60 
  
(1.58) (1.65) (-0.371) (-1.42) (-1.32) 
 ETF10 952 0.3761 0.1754 -0.0010 0.0550 0.0386 263.27 
  
(11.6)* (5.06)* (-0.03) (1.58) (1.19) 
 ETF11 952 0.0142 -0.0116 0.0334 0.0500 0.0616 265.46 
  
(0.44) (-0.36) (1.03) (1.53) (1.90) 
 ETF12 952 0.2309 -0.0862 0.0266 -0.0016 0.0878 76.42 
  
(7.13)* (-2.59)* (0.80) (-0.05) (2.71)* 
 ETF13 952 0.1426 -0.0222 -0.0311 0.0018 0.0185 184.87 
  
(4.39)* (-0.68) (-0.95) (0.06) (0.57) 
 ETF14 952 0.2199 0.0334 -0.0360 0.0976 0.0291 187.62 
  
(6.77)* (1.01) (-1.09) (2.94)* (0.90) 
 ETF15 952 0.1631 0.0396 0.0474 0.0432 0.0467 292.48 
  
(5.02)* (1.12) (1.44) (1.31) (1.44) 
 ETF16 952 0.1222 0.1051 -0.0070 0.0671 0.0314 66.05 
  
(3.76)* (3.22)* (-0.21) (2.05)* (0.97) 
 ETF17 952 0.1915 0.3725 0.1096 -0.1068 0.0100 3014.29 
  
(5.89)* (11.30)* (3.14)* (-3.24)* (0.29) 
 ETF18 952 0.1856 0.0533 -0.0640 0.0605 -0.0165 117.21 
  
(5.71)* (1.62) (-1.94) (1.83) (-0.51) 
 ETF19 952 0.9000 0.0202 0.0029 0.0756 -0.0043 364.85 
  
(2.77)* (0.62) (0.09) (2.32)* (-0.13) 
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ETF20 952 0.2205 0.0675 -0.0205 0.0656 -0.0197 182.64 
  
(6.78)* (2.03)* (-0.62) (1.97)* (-0.61) 
 ETF21 952 0.1481 0.1184 -0.0532 0.1587 0.0518 63.90 
  
(4.56)* (3.65)* (-1.63) (4.89)* (1.59) 
 ETF22 952 0.1199 0.0716 -0.0294 0.0457 -0.2927 40.21 
  
(3.69)* (2.19)* (-0.90) (1.40) (-0.90) 
 ETF23 952 0.1608 0.1120 0.0585 0.1164 0.0070 69.97 
  
(4.95)* (3.42)* (1.78) (3.56)* (0.22) 
 ETF24 952 -0.1127 0.0140 0.0256 0.0400 0.0109 106.35 
  
(-3.47)* (0.43) (0.78) (1.21) (0.34) 
 ETF25 952 -0.1880 -0.0823 -0.0326 -0.0538 -0.0520 52.28 
  
(-5.79)* (-2.49)* (-0.99) (-1.63) (-1.60) 
 ETF26 952 0.4914 0.0763 -0.0882 0.0183 0.1092 226.55 
  
(15.2)* (2.12)* (-2.45)* (0.51) (3.38)* 
 ETF27 952 0.1888 0.1211 0.1225 0.0673 0.0860 237.66 
  
(5.83)* (3.68)* (3.73)* (2.05)* (2.66)* 
 ETF28 952 0.2942 0.1082 -0.0672 0.0401 -0.0078 230.61 
  
(9.05)* (3.20)* (-1.98)* (1.18) (-0.24) 
 ETF29 952 0.0612 0.1729 0.1767 0.0354 0.0276 199.91 
  
(1.88) (5.31)* (5.44)* (1.09) (0.85) 
 ETF30 952 0.0098 0.0362 -0.9963 -0.0251 -0.0158 491.06 
  
(0.30) (1.11) (-3.08)* (-0.77) (-0.49) 
 ETF31 952 0.1747 0.0983 0.0477 0.1216 -0.0396 578.44 
  
(5.38)* (3.00)* (1.45) (3.72)* (-1.22) 
 ETF32 952 0.0407 -0.0040 0.0275 0.0504 0.0525 372.50 
  
(1.25) (-0.12) (0.85) (1.55) (1.61) 
 ETF33 952 0.1180 0.0716 0.0424 0.0540 -0.0561 139.15 
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(3.63)* (2.19)* (1.30) (1.66) (-1.73) 
 ETF34 952 0.1743 0.0975 0.0789 0.1780 -0.0337 1106.55 
  
(5.36)* (3.00)* (2.43)* (5.48)* (-1.04) 
 ETF35 952 0.1476 0.0738 0.0190 0.1032 -0.0409 292.12 
  
(4.54)* (2.26)* (0.58) (3.16)* (-1.26) 
 ETF36 952 -0.0758 -0.0167 -0.0634 0.0866 0.0350 1069.42 
  
(-2.33)* (-0.51) (-1.96)* (2.67)* (1.08) 
 ETF37 952 0.1697 0.0349 0.0447 0.1226 -0.0384 93.92 
  
(5.23)* (1.07) (1.37) (3.75)* (-1.18) 
 ETF38 952 -0.1484 -0.0066 0.0035 -0.0357 -0.0317 366.14 
  
(-4.57)* (-0.20) (0.11) (-1.09) (-0.98) 
 ETF39 952 0.2593 0.0880 0.0979 0.1216 -0.0627 124.03 
  
(7.99)* (2.64)* (2.94)* (3.65)* (-1.93) 
 ETF40 952 0.1808 0.0397 0.0685 0.1728 -0.0255 64.70 
  
(5.56)* (1.22) (2.11)* (5.31)* (-0.79) 
 ETF41 952 -0.0631 0.0283 0.0211 -0.0002 0.0220 1033.71 
  
(-1.94) (0.87) (0.65) (-0.01) (0.68) 
 ETF42 952 0.6181 0.2170 0.0258 0.0309 -0.0309 339.23 
  
(19.00)* (5.68)* (0.67) (0.81) (-0.95) 
 ETF43 952 -0.1095 -0.0092 0.0048 -0.0068 -0.0416 2723.21 
  
(-3.37)* (-0.28) (0.15) (-0.21) (1.28) 
 ETF44 952 0.8573 -0.0608 0.0788 0.0414 -0.0759 650.12 
  
(26.40)* (-1.42) (-1.85) (0.97) (-2.34)* 
 Notes: Panel B shows the first-order to fifth-order autocorrelation coefficients during 01/01/2007 and 
31/08/2010, the figure in ( ) denotes t-value, * denotes statistical significance at 5% level. 
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3.3.2 Sentiment Proxies 
 
We examine the impact of two types of sentiment proxies. Gemmill and Thomas (2002), 
Shleifer and Summers (1990), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldman (1990) and Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler (1991) all examine investor sentiment using indirect measures of investor 
sentiment. These measures include closed-end fund discounts, odd-lot sales and mutual fund 
redemptions. With regard to direct measures of investor sentiment, Brown and Cliff (2004, 
2005), and Han (2006) are amongst the first to use investor survey data, while Lemmon and 
Portniagina (2006) employ monthly data from the University of Michigan Index of Consumer 
Sentiment poll. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) propose the combination of several 
underlying proxies into a composite index of sentiment.  
 
One popular indirect proxy for investor sentiment is the option market. Baker and Wurglur 
(2006) suggest that options prices rise when the value of the underlying asset has greater 
expected volatility, and options pricing models such as the Black–Scholes formula can be 
inverted to yield implied volatility as a function of options prices. The Market Volatility 
Index (“VIX”), which measures the implied volatility of options on the Standard and Poor 
100 stock Index, is often called the “investor fear gauge” by practitioners. Wang, Keswani 
and Taylor (2006) propose the use of put-call trading volume and open interest ratios as a 
sentiment indicator. In the light of this, and taking into account data availability, in this study 
we focus on the option market. The daily sentiment indicators used comprise the 
Euronext.liffe London put–call ratio and implied volatility index. 
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According to Wang, Keswani and Taylor (2006), the put–call trading volume ratio (PCV) is a 
measure of market participants’ sentiment derived from options, and equals the trading 
volume of put options divided by the trading volume of call options. When market 
participants are bearish, they buy put options either to hedge their spot positions or to 
speculate bearishly. Therefore, when the trading volume of put options becomes large in 
relation to the trading volume of call options, the ratio goes up, and vice versa.  
 
Another measure of the put–call volume ratio uses the open interest of options instead of 
trading volume. This ratio can be calculated on a daily basis using the open interest of options 
at the end of the day, or on a weekly basis using the open interest of options at the end of the 
week. This might be a preferred measure of sentiment as it may be argued that the open 
interest of options is the final picture of sentiment at the end of the day or the week, and is 
therefore likely to have better predictive power for volatility in subsequent periods. Therefore, 
this measure of sentiment is also used. The put–call ratio calculated in this way is labelled the 
PCO ratio. 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean St. Dev Skew. Kurt. Autocorrelation         
          lag1 2 3 4 5 
PCV 0.7655 0.6388 3.1713 16.3216 0.2685 0.1025 0.0897 0.0545 0.0692 
     
(8.31)* (3.07)* (2.68)* (1.62) (2.13)* 
∆PCV 0.0011 0.7264 -0.6600 13.9407 -0.7017 -0.5509 -0.4414 -0.3594 -0.2909 
     
(-23)* (-15.4)* (-11.8)* (-10.1)* (-9.53)* 
PCO 0.7556 0.2078 0.6635 -1.0424 0.8514 0.0963 0.0927 -0.0253 -0.0187 
     
(26.2)* (2.26)* (2.17)* (-0.599) (-0.584) 
∆PCO -3.86901E-05 0.0159 -0.1906 33.6778 -0.142663 -0.0454759 0.040251 -0.0041 -0.05144 
          (-4.41)* (-1.39) (1.23) (-0.125) (-1.62) 
Notes: Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics different sentiment proxies and their autocorrelation from first 
lag to fifth lag. 
 
Table 3.2 contains summary statistics of all the sentiment variables discussed in this section. 
The levels of all the sentiment indicators display a skewed and leptokurtic pattern, whilst the 
first differences of all the indicators are also skewed and leptokurtic. None of the sentiment 
indicators has substantial positive autocorrelations; the first differences of PCV have 
significant negative lag autocorrelations, while those for ∆PCO have lag autocorrelations that 
are negative, but not significant.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows the trend comparison between the two sentiment measures. We find that 
PCV has a substantial positive correlation with PCO, but is more volatile; PCO tends to be 
stable over the whole sample period. 
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Figure 3.2 Trends of PCV and PCO measures 
 
3.4 Methodology 
 
One way to investigate the predictive power of sentiment and other factors for the ETF 
mispricing is to run the regression to determine whether there exists any relationship among 
them. First, we try to discover whether any other factors impact on the ETF price. Then, we 
investigate whether the sentiment has an important effect on the ETF mispricing. 
 
Following Ackert and Tian (2008), we use the natural logarithm of market value, the natural 
logarithm of home market trading volume, home market illiquidity (AIM), and momentum as 
the explanatory variables, and the fund premium as the explained variable. The fund premium 
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is defined as the difference between the ETF price and the fund’s net asset value, divided by 
the net asset value. MV is the natural logarithm of ETF market capitalization. VOL is the 
natural logarithm of pound trading volume. Amihud’s illiquidity measure (AIM) is the square 
root of the ratio of daily return and pound volume, and momentum (MOM) is measured by 
the continuous growth (percentage change) in the fund’s NAV. Therefore, our regression is 
based on the following equation: 
 
0 1 2 3 4it it i t i it i t i t i it itPREM SENT MV VOL AIM MOM            
(3.1)
 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
 
3.5.1 Preliminary Daily Results 
 
Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the result of using PCV as proxy for investor sentiment. From 
this panel, we can observe that sentiment has a significant effect on the ETF premiums: 27 
out of 44 funds have significant loadings at different levels, suggesting that sentiment may be 
an important factor in the UK ETF mispricing. For the market value variable, we find a 
significant relationship to the fund premiums in half (22 out of 44) the ETFs of the sample. 
There seems to be a negative relationship between the liquidity and the fund premium, since 
the market trading volume has a negative coefficient while the illiquidity factor has a positive 
coefficient; both have significant effect on ETFs, a result consistent with Ackert and Tian 
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(2008) finding in the US market, and supportive of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and 
Amihud (2002) arguments that more liquidity increases the fund price so that the fund 
premium would be lower. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between AIM and 
fund premiums. Furthermore, when we check the result for momentum factor, we find that 
past price changes in NAVs (momentum) have significant effect on premium in almost all the 
regressions, which indicates that the past information is not fully reflected in current UK ETF 
prices, and that the past price changes can be persistent over time 
 
Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the result of using the put-call ratio as proxy for investor 
sentiment. Once again, the result shows that sentiment has a significant effect on the ETF 
premiums. In this panel, 26 out of 44 funds have significant loadings at different levels, 
which are very close to our findings with PCV as proxy, suggesting that sentiment plays a 
key role in explaining the ETF mispricing. Regarding the market value variable, we find a 
significant relationship to fund premiums in half (22 out of 44) the ETFs of the sample, the 
same result as in Panel A. Moreover, the relationship between the liquidity and the fund 
premium has the same pattern as our previous findings. Similarly, the result for momentum 
factor shows that past price changes in NAVs (momentum) have significant effect on 
premium in almost all the regressions, which indicates that the past information is not fully 
reflected in current UK ETF prices, and that the past price changes can be persistent over 
time. 
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Table 3.3 Panel A 
The time-series regression results for 44 ETFs using the PCV proxy 
 Intercept SENT MV VOL AIM Momentum Adj.R^2 
Model : 0 1 2 3 4it it i t i it i t i t i it it
PREM SENT MV VOL AIM MOM              
ETF1 7.26** 0.0131** -0.847** -0.473** 2.85 9.51** 0.154 
ETF2 21.1** 0.0327** 1.46** -2.59** 30.6** -0.449 0.283 
ETF3 2.17 0.00348** 0.368* -0.273 5.78** 4.72** 0.0357 
ETF4 1.84 -0.00179 -0.248** -0.128 3.841 3.27** 0.0265 
ETF5 82.9** 0.0324** -1.33** -8.24** 84.4** 73.5** 0.305 
ETF6 -3.67 0.00917** 0.0295 0.355 -3.64 8.65** 0.0285 
ETF7 7.79* 0.00412* -0.0406 -0.793* 9.68* 3.64 0.0135 
ETF8 7.69** -0.00593** -0.0315 -0.759** -10.6** -10.8** 0.0244 
ETF9 2.76 -0.000649 0.0157 -0.283 -3.04 -6.10* 0.00506 
ETF10 -3.83 0.000777 -0.0614 0.391 9.60** 12.0** 0.0393 
ETF11 3.21 -0.00569** 0.0898** -0.331* -5.20** 1.33 0.0303 
ETF12 3.19 -0.00322** 0.0259 -0.321 4.43 4.04 0.0101 
ETF13 -0.535 -0.00215 0.0361 0.0558 0.151 4.70* 0.00252 
ETF14 -2.52 -0.000177 0.0312 0.260 1.56 -6.91 0.00766 
ETF15 4.80 -0.00635** 0.0377 -0.481 -6.88* 10.4** 0.0192 
ETF16 20.9** -0.00169 -0.739** -1.97** 26.1** 71.6** 0.244 
ETF17 -10.8** -0.00716** 1.799** 0.566 -9.59* 7.72** 0.0826 
ETF18 5.34** -0.00293* 0.0904 -0.545** -9.58** 5.76** 0.0369 
ETF19 0.847 -0.00687** -0.165 -0.0124 2.49 4.94** 0.0262 
ETF20 7.38** 0.00175 0.267** -0.807** 12.8** 3.96** 0.0426 
ETF21 3.08* -0.00199* -0.0968** -0.299 2.90 7.46** 0.0481 
ETF22 3.02* -0.00186 0.176 -0.326* -4.69* 5.26** 0.0255 
ETF23 33.8** -0.0326** -0.412* -3.29** 41.1** 70.3** 0.233 
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Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between the daily premiums on 44 ETFs NAV, changes in 
the put-call trading volume ratios, MV is the natural logarithm of ETF market capitalization, VOL is the natural 
logarithm of pound trading volume. AIM is the square root of the ratio of daily return and pound volume, MOM 
is measured by the continuous growth (percentage change) in the fund’s NAV. **Denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level.* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
 
ETF24 12.9* -0.00450 -0.120 -1.28* -13.6 5.82 0.00613 
ETF25 4.26 -0.0137* -0.0465 -0.358 -1.3 47.2** 0.0919 
ETF26 -15.5** 0.0138** -0.126** 1.54** 29.1** 0.00256 0.280 
ETF27 7.42** 0.00267 0.647** -0.860** 14.3** 1.67 0.0165 
ETF28 12.0** -0.00395 0.156 -1.22** 23.0** 5.06** 0.0468 
ETF29 -13.8** 0.00354 0.801** 1.24** 12.9** 6.55* 0.0208 
ETF30 9.58 0.0126** 1.39** -1.40* 18.1* 185.0** 0.727 
ETF31 49.9** -0.0285** -0.404** -4.95** 59.0** 80.1** 0.236 
ETF32 -4.81 -0.00216 0.422** 0.379 10.4 6.44 0.0142 
ETF33 18.1** -0.00138 0.151 -1.90** -19.8** 5.16** 0.0257 
ETF34 25.9** -0.0182** -0.116 -2.57** 27.9** 15.3** 0.0534 
ETF35 -3.98* 0.00679** -0.0448 0.399* 7.32** 6.63** 0.0478 
ETF36 10.0* 0.00344 0.737 -1.26** 17.0** 183.0** 0.695 
ETF37 32.3** -0.0387** -0.348 -3.14** 41.0** 62.8** 0.270 
ETF38 6.06 -0.00354 0.0557 -0.591 11.8 23.4** 0.0298 
ETF39 42.7** -0.0545** -1.28** -3.96** 51.5** 70.8** 0.247 
ETF40 12.5* -0.0138** -0.369** -1.15 -19.5** 22.7** 0.0588 
ETF41 17.6** -0.00907** -0.450** -1.63** 19.1** -8.99 0.0213 
ETF42 93.9** -0.0247** -0.753** -9.39** -94.1** 96.3** 0.185 
ETF43 -2.63 -0.000177 0.0650 0.272 -0.344 37.1** 0.0572 
ETF44 -176.0** 0.0383** 14.0** 14.0** 171.0** 30.6* 0.0352 
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Table 3.3  Panel B 
The time-series regression results for 44 ETFs using the PCO proxy 
 Intercept SENT MV VOL AIM Momentum Adj.R^2 
Model : 0 1 2 3 4it it i t i it i t i t i it it
PREM SENT MV VOL AIM MOM              
ETF1 14.6** -0.517** -1.07** -1.04** 10.8** 9.98** 0.101 
ETF2 15.3** -2.30** 0.574** -1.39** 20.1** -1.28* 0.180 
ETF3 5.12** 0.136 0.027 -0.521** 0.871** 4.808** 0.030 
ETF4 3.17 0.298** 0.308** -0.295 5.64** -3.21** 0.049 
ETF5 76.0** -3.67** -1.68** -6.88** 70.8** 0.909** 0.022 
ETF6 0.785 -1.67 0.105 -0.783 -0.971 -11.6** 0.124 
ETF7 3.21* -1.20** -1.01 -3.18* -3.23* -8.87* 0.082 
ETF8 1.52** 0.333* -0.582 -1.50** 1.83** -11.8** 0.126 
ETF9 1.57 0.382 0.00164 -1.58 -1.48 -14.7* 0.183 
ETF10 -1.39** -1.50** -1.68** 1.43** 3.22** -2.72** 0.037 
ETF11 0.072 0.730** 1.35** -0.152 0.298 -7.84* 0.060 
ETF12 0.725 0.325* 0.761 -0.758 0.754 -5.97* 0.033 
ETF13 0.00732 1.00* 0.350 -0.0218 0.104 -6.60 0.041 
ETF14 -0.401 0.913* 0.541 0.414 0.0756 -7.66* 0.058 
ETF15 0.300 0.885 0.563 -0.342 -0.403 -3.02** 0.006 
ETF16 3.16 -0.825** -3.31** -2.85 2.56 -1.18** 0.032 
ETF17 -3.74** 0.525 4.19** 2.80* 0.445 -4.13** 0.082 
ETF18 2.85** 0.748** 2.40** -2.89** -3.64** -4.19** 0.032 
ETF19 -0.120 1.08** 0.308 0.0885 -0.0974 -6.77** 0.044 
ETF20 4.65** -0.554 3.06** -4.73** 5.51** -4.65** 0.051 
ETF21 0.597** -0.766** -2.71** -0.509** 0.0603** -4.75** 0.033 
ETF22 1.52** 1.36** 2.51 -1.73** 1.80** -8.22** 0.068 
ETF23 1.06 -0.256 -0.633 -1.04 -0.566 0.606** 0.003 
ETF24 1.73* 0.489 -1.21 -1.71* -1.08 -17.6 0.244 
ETF25 -2.15 0.299** 1.80 2.16* 1.40 -47.9** 0.706 
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Notes: This table reports the time series relationship between the daily premiums on 44 ETFs NAV, changes in 
the put-call open interest ratios, MV is the natural logarithm of ETF market capitalization, VOL is the natural 
logarithm of pound trading volume. AIM is the square root of the ratio of daily return and pound volume, MOM 
is measured by the continuous growth (percentage change) in the fund’s NAV. **Denotes statistical significance 
at the 5% level.* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
3.5.2 Other Sentiment Proxies 
 
Gemmill and Thomas (2002), Shleifer and Summers (1990), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and 
Waldman (1990) and Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) all examine investor sentiment using 
ETF26 -5.55** -3.54** 0.357** 5.52** 9.26** -1.94 0.166 
ETF27 3.05 2.39** 1.45** -2.88 3.61* -1.52 0.018 
ETF28 3.16** 0.553 1.80 -3.28** 5.06** -4.39** 0.055 
ETF29 -3.23** 0.564 3.57** 2.94** 2.38** -4.35 0.031 
ETF30 1.48 0.116** 2.10** -1.83 -1.98 -2.08** 0.008 
ETF31 3.12** 1.29 -1.07 -3.16** -2.93** 1.42* 0.008 
ETF32 -0.871 0.113 2.02* 0.713 1.65 -12.6* 0.148 
ETF33 4.13* 0.381 0.733** -4.19 -3.28 -3.32 0.026 
ETF34 2.20 0.660 0.314 -2.25 -1.70 9.29** 0.088 
ETF35 0.291** -1.31** -0.608 -0.254** 0.515** -3.26** 0.011 
ETF36 0.742 0.219** 1.51 -1.37 1.39 -8.90** 0.075 
ETF37 0.602 1.08 0.216* -0.629 0.604 -1.87** 0.005 
ETF38 1.17 0.144 0.292 -1.16 1.58 -31.4** 0.510 
ETF39 1.76** 1.14* 0.778 -1.79** 1.64** 0.167** 0.004 
ETF40 0.385 0.125** -1.58* -0.259 0.838 4.09** 0.019 
ETF41 1.92** 1.34 -3.18** -1.76** 1.55* -4.73* 0.031 
ETF42 9.92** -0.530** -4.25** -9.92** 7.55** -1.98** 0.120 
ETF43 -0.741 0.152** 0.695 0.742 0.309 -31.8** 0.514 
ETF44 -4.95** 0.615 4.98** 4.36** 4.06** -10.8* 0.129 
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what are considered indirect measures of investor sentiment. These measures include closed-
end fund discounts, odd-lot sales and mutual fund redemptions. In the above sections, we 
have examined the proxies indicated by the option market, which can also be classified as 
indirect measures of investor sentiment. In contrast, Brown and Cliff (2004, 2005), and Han 
(2006) use investor survey data, which can be classified as direct measures of investor 
sentiment. They use retail and INST data to indicate the percentages of investors who feel 
bullish and bearish about the market, and are provided on a weekly basis. Lemmon and 
Portniagina (2006) use the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment poll, which 
is a monthly direct measure of investor sentiment. Given that two different types of measure 
may offer the most efficient means of testing the feelings and expectations of investors, this 
study employs both direct and indirect measures of investor sentiment.  
 
There are two main consumer confidence surveys carried out across the UK market which 
can be used as the proxy of investor sentiment. First, the GFK NOP Consumer Confidence 
Barometer has been running in the same format across Europe since the early 1970s, and in 
the UK since June 1995. The survey is carried out on a monthly basis on behalf of the 
European Commission, which sponsors the same research in all European Union member 
countries. Each month the survey tracks changes in personal finance, general economic 
situation, inflation, unemployment, current purchasing climate, consumer spending and 
saving. Quarterly research tracks car purchasing, home purchasing and home improvements. 
Results from The Consumer Confidence Barometer are available as either a 6-monthly or 
annual subscription, running from May to April.  
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Second, the Nationwide Building Society Consumer Confidence survey is conducted for the 
Nationwide by TNS.  This survey was started in May 2004. Each month 1,000 adults are 
interviewed, with the sample structured to be nationally representative of all adults in term of 
age, sex and socio-economic group. Data are available monthly. The questions asked are 
based on those asked by the Conference Board, tailored to UK conditions, and the Index is 
based on responses to 5 questions regarding respondents' appraisal of current economic 
conditions, economic conditions six months hence, current employment conditions, 
employment conditions six months hence, and their total family income six months hence. As 
can be seen from Figure 3, although the two surveys use different methodologies, the trend of 
the consumer confidence is almost the same. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Consumer Confidence Indices 
Since the two surveys are provided on a monthly basis, we employ monthly data spanning the 
period from January 2007 to December 2010.  This sample period ensures that we obtain 
sufficient fund information and observations.   
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3.5.3 Estimation of Sentiment Betas 
 
In this section, we add the Fama-French three factors, market, size and book-to-market, and 
the momentum factor, which together comprise Carhart’s (1997) four factors.  Therefore, the 
second model is designed to test the relationship between the sentiment in ETF price 
premium and Carhart’s (1997) four factors. The model can be presented as: 
it i i mt i t i t i t i t itPREM b R s SMB h HML wWHL SENT              (3.2) 
Where  
itPREM = fund premium, defined as the difference between the ETF price and the fund’s 
net asset value, divided by the net asset value 
mtR = the return of market portfolio m in month t minus risk free rate 
SMB= the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks 
(small minus big in terms of size)  
HML= the return on a portfolio of value stocks minus the return on a portfolio of growth 
stocks (high minus low in terms of B/M) 
WML= the return on a portfolio of winner stocks minus the return on a portfolio of loser 
stocks (winners minus losers in terms of return) 
SENT = standardized sentiment factor proxy, change of consumer confidence index 
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It is documented that betas obtained from the model could be statistically imprecise and may 
contain a fair amount of statistical noise due to a relatively low number of degrees of freedom 
and other statistical problems associated with the use of individual fund premiums. Previous 
studies on the securities market have developed some approaches to solve this problem. One 
such approach is based on portfolio formation, because if the errors in the individual security 
betas are substantially less than perfectly positively correlated, the betas of portfolios can be 
much more precise estimates of true betas. However, there is always a question regarding the 
most appropriate portfolio formation procedure, as it is subject to data-mining concerns. For 
example, Daniel and Titman (2005) point out that forming portfolios on the basis of common 
variables such as size and book-to-market (BM) is likely to wash out any variation in factor 
loadings that are independent of size and BM, leading to low test power to reject the null. 
Also, assigning portfolio betas to the securities in this portfolio disregards the fact that true 
betas are not the same for all stocks in a portfolio. 
 
The other common and useful way of reducing noise in the beta estimates is to “shrink” the 
usual estimates to a reasonable value, a procedure often referred to as the Bayes-Stein 
adjustment. The “shrinkage” estimate of beta is the weighted average of the usual OLS 
estimate and of the shrinkage target. Shrunk betas can be justified as so-called “Bayesian” 
estimators, in that they reflect not only current data but also prior knowledge or judgment. 
Bayesian estimators have solid axiomatic foundations in statistics and decision theory, unlike 
many other estimators commonly used by statisticians (see Vasicek, 1973; Blume, 1971, 
1973; Scholes&Willams, 1977; Jorion, 1986). For instance, Chan et al.’s (1992) results 
indicate that such robust “Bayesian” estimators (including ones that use the information 
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contained in the prior cross-section) are superior to more usual OLS estimates in terms of 
precision. The “shrinkage” approach is adopted in this paper. 
 
Specifically, in the first stage, sentiment betas are estimated separately for each stock using 
the traditional rolling OLS regression approach. The four-year period monthly regressions are 
run for each ETF. Priors are formed using the empirical Bayesian approach, that is, the prior 
density of sentiment betas is assumed to be normal with the mean 
prior
t and variance
2
,prior t ; 2 2, , ,
1
( )priorprior t i t t SENT i
itN
     ,i t ~ N (
prior
t , 
2
,prior t )   (1) 
Where the prior mean is an average of the absolute values of cross-sectional betas from the 
previous period and the prior variance is the cross-sectional variance of the last available 
cross-section of absolute values of sentiment betas. The posterior sentiment betas are 
obtained as follows: 
 
2 2
, , 1
, 1 , 12 2 2 2
, , 1 , 1 ,
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prior t t t prior t
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 
 
  
   

 
 
   
                    (2) 
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t i t
itN
   , 
2 2
, ,
1
( )priorprior t i t t
itN
     
Where tN  is the number of stocks used in estimation at time t, , 1
posterior
i t   is the shrinkage 
estimate of sentiment beta, henceforth referred to as “sentiment betas”, 
2
, 1t   is the 
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sampling variance of the OLS estimator computed in the period t+1 and , 1i t   is the 
standard OLS regression coefficient ,SENT i  from model (3.2), henceforth referred to as 
“original sentiment betas”. The intuition of formula (2) is straightforward: less precise betas 
get shrunk towards the prior with the weight reflecting the estimate’s precision relative to the 
precision of the prior. The advantage of the shrinkage approach compared to the portfolio 
approach is that the standard error of each sentiment beta is taken directly into account. 
 
Table 3.4 Panel A Summary statistics for the time-series averages of sentiment betas 
Extreme observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Company Ticker Value Company Ticker 
-0.0441 USD COPORATE BD. LQDE 0.0797 STOXX EURO 50 EUN 
-0.0166 MSCI EASTERN EUROPE 10/40 IEER 0.0416 MSCI TURKEY ITKY 
-0.0134 FTSE/MACQUARIE GLB.INFR.100 INFR 0.0410 MSCI TAIWAN  ITWN 
-0.0103 FTSE UK ALL STOCKS GILT IGLT 0.0407 FTSE EPRA/NAREIT US PR.FD IUSP 
-0.0098 XINHUA/CHINA 25 FXC 0.0398  MSCI JAPAN  IJPN 
  Descriptive statistics Quantiles   
 
N 44 100% Max 0.0797 
 
 
Mean 0.0085 90% 0.0355 
 
 
Median 0.0056 75%Q3 0.0164 
 
 
Std 0.0204 50%Median 0.0056 
 
 
Skewness 0.8593 25%Q1 -0.0058 
 
 
Kurtosis 2.2019 10% -0.0103 
 
 
Interquartile Range 0.0220 0%Min -0.0441 
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Table 3.4 Panel B Summary statistics for the time-series averages of shrunk sentiment 
betas 
Extreme observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Company Ticker Value Company Ticker 
0.0064 EUR GOVERNMENT BOND 1-3 IBGS 0.0566 STOXX EURO 50 EUN 
0.0072 EURO INFLATION LINKED BOND IBCI 0.0342 USD COPORATE BD. LQDE 
0.0072 FTSE UK DIV.PLUS IUKD 0.0326 MSCI TURKEY ITKY 
0.0074 DJ ER.STOXX GROWTH IDJG 0.0322 MSCI TAIWAN  ITWN 
0.0075 ISHARES ER.GVT.BD.15-30 IBGL 0.0321 FTSE EPRA/NAREIT US PR.FD IUSP 
  Descriptive statistics Quantiles   
 
N 44 100% Max 0.0566 
 
 
Mean 0.0161 90% 0.0321 
 
 
Median 0.0122 75%Q3 0.0181 
 
 
Std 0.0101 50%Median 0.0122 
 
 
Skewness 1.8815 25%Q1 0.0097 
 
 
Kurtosis 4.0892 10% 0.0075 
 
 
Interquartile Range 0.0080 0%Min 0.0064 
  
 
Tables 3.4a and 3.4b present the summary statistics/empirical distributions of original and 
Bayes-Stein sentiment beta estimates. The negative original sentiment betas indicate those 
contrarian sentiment traders who buy the securities when sentiment is low and sell when it is 
high, while the positive sentiment betas indicate momentum traders, who buy the securities 
when the sentiment is high and vice versa. Additionally, we can see that the distribution of 
the original betas is relatively symmetric around zero, although the mean of the distribution 
as zero is rejected at 1% level using standard t-test. This suggests that the impact of investor 
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sentiment on the UK market is non-zero action, and the two kinds of traders (contrarian and 
momentum) do not seem to cancel each other out when the market is considered as a whole. 
 
3.5.4 Sentiment Beta and Firm Characteristics 
 
Table 3.5 Firm characteristics 
  Beta Size Market Beta SMB HML Yield Age 6m returns Premium 
1 0.0071  2673 0.973  -0.137 0.118  0.048 112 0.068  0.079 
2 0.0076  1792 1.022  -0.076 0.090  0.041 110 0.088  0.093 
3 0.0097  1537 1.033  -0.023 0.050  0.037 104 0.093  0.149 
4 0.0103  1045 1.031  0.048 0.052  0.027 97 0.094  0.174 
5 0.0109  973 1.046  0.098 -0.009  0.023 94 0.105  0.265 
6 0.0120  842 1.090  0.125 0.021  0.018 86 0.106  0.278 
7 0.0136  821 1.068  0.204 0.002  0.016 82 0.112  0.302 
8 0.0164  766 1.118  0.228 -0.051  0.014 73 0.120  0.376 
9 0.0241  529 1.109  0.373 -0.094  0.014 68 0.124  0.390 
10 0.0365  496 1.134  0.492 -0.080  0.012 62 0.128  0.410 
 
 
Table 3.5 presents the relationship between sentiment beta and firm characteristics. It reports 
the time-series averages of cross-sectional means. Size is the market value of the ETF (in 
millions of pounds). Market/SMB/HML betas are the value-weighted averages of the 
corresponding betas of ETFs. Yield is the average distribution yield since inception. Age is 
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the number of months since the inception date of the individual ETF. Past 6 Months return is 
the cumulative return over six months prior to the beginning of the month.  
 
Comparison of book-to-market ratios across the deciles suggests that sentiment is relatively 
more pronounced in low B/M ETF underlying assets, which implies that effects of investor 
sentiment are more pronounced not in extreme growth ETFs but rather in moderate growth 
ETFs. Further evidence on the relation between sentiment beta and growth/value comes from 
the portfolios’ HML loadings: decile 1 (lowest sensitivity) has an HML beta of 0.118, 
whereas decile 10 (highest sensitivity) has an HML beta of only -0.080. The result shows that 
sentiment change is higher among glamour ETFs, which is consistent with findings by 
Frazzini and Lamont (2006), who report that high sentiment stocks tend to be stocks with low 
book-to-market ratios. It also supports evidence presented in Elsewarapu and Reinganum 
(2004), who find that annual excess returns on the stock market index are negatively related 
to the returns of glamour stocks in the previous 36-month period, whereas neither returns of 
value stocks nor aggregate stock market returns, net of glamour stock effects, have any 
predictive power. This result is, however, in contrast to Baker and Wurgler (2006), who do 
not find any significant difference in future returns of growth and distressed (value) stocks 
following periods of particularly high or low investor sentiment. 
 
More sentiment-sensitive ETFs have lower distribution yields. They fall monotonically from 
4.8% to 1.2% as we move from decile 1 to decile 10. The result also provides evidence that 
more profitable ETFs are more subject to shifts in investor sentiment, and they have more 
recent inception date. Further supporting evidence for our previous hypothesis that investor 
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sentiment can be a factor of ETF price premium comes from analysing the relationship 
between the premiums and sentiment beta. From the table, we may conclude that higher 
sensitivity to shifts in investor sentiment potentially arises due to the fact that certain ETF 
characteristics make it difficult for investors to value that ETF, resulting in greater 
differences of opinion among investors regarding the fair value. As a result of this, the larger 
premium appears. 
 
3.5.5 Results for all ETFs 
 
Table 3.6 
          
Panel regression for all 44 ETFs 
  SENT MARKET SMB HML WHL 
Coefficient 0.0085 2.2131 -0.7456 0.8904 -0.2738 
T-value 2.74** 2.00** -0.6 0.99 -0.18 
**Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level 
 
The previous results show that the investor sentiment has a significant effect on the price 
premium of most of the individual ETFs. However, this evidence may not reveal the whole 
story. Our next step is to analyse whether or not the sentiment factor plays a key role in the 
whole ETF industry price premium, when we take all the ETFs into account and attempt to 
explain what factors are significant in explaining the premium. 
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Table 3.6 offers the results from panel data regression. We estimate the five dependent 
variables from equation (2): sentiment proxy (CCI index), market return, size, B/M ratio and 
momentum. The evidence shows that only sentiment and market factors have coefficient 
significant at 5% level; the ETF price premium seems unaffected by any other hypothesized 
factors. As we expected, the sentiment proxy has a positive coefficient, which suggests that 
when the investor sentiment is high, large fund premium appears, and vice versa. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
Our objective in this paper is to discover whether investor sentiment can explain the UK 
exchange traded fund price premium. We address this issue by examining 44 iShare ETFs 
listed in the London Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2010. In order to test the hypothesis, we 
first construct a sentiment proxy from the derivative market as the option put–call trading 
volume ratio and the open interest ratio. The results provide evidence that this sentiment 
proxy has explanatory power for most individual ETF mispricing. Second, we develop a 
consumer confidence index sentiment proxy, obtained from the mainstream surveys and 
taken to individual fund level, defined as sensitivity of ETF price premiums to the changes of 
investor sentiment. Specifically, it is the coefficient in the time series regression of individual 
fund premiums on sentiment factor. The evidence shows that more sentiment-sensitive ETFs 
are smaller, younger and volatile stocks with low dividend yields. Finally, we take the whole 
industry into account and find that sentiment factor has incremental explanatory power and is 
positively related to the fund premium. 
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In general, all of these results present a consistent view which seems to indicate that investor 
sentiment significantly and positively impacts the ETF price premiums. When investors are 
very optimistic, they are more likely to miscalibrate, which leads to mispricing of the ETFs, 
and the premiums appear.  When investors are pessimistic, the premiums shrink or discounts 
appear. Furthermore, different characteristics lead to the ETF firms exhibiting different levels. 
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CHAPTER 4  
INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND REIT PRICE 
MOMENTUM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
A Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) is a listed property company that manages a portfolio 
of real estate to earn profits for shareholders. It must have elected for REIT status and operate 
in accordance with REIT regulations, which are intended to ensure the company is primarily 
engaged in property investment, rather than in development or other non-property related 
activities. After paying a conversion fee, a REIT escapes corporation tax. It must pay out 90% 
of its property income to shareholders annually in the form of dividends.  
 
The US Congress created REITs in 1960 as a way to give all investors the ability to invest in 
large-scale commercial properties. Since then, the REIT industry has been growing 
dramatically in both importance and size. Today, REITs own and operate commercial 
properties in every major metropolitan area across the US and in several international 
locations, and over the last few decades, REITs have outperformed most other major equity 
market benchmarks.33 The fact that Standard & Poor has added REITs to its major indices 
indicates that the REIT industry has been recognized as a mainstream investment. There are 
now approximately 172 publicly traded REITs in the US, with a total equity market 
                                                             
33 The compound annual return for Dec. 1971- Dec. 2012 for FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs is 12.10%; 
whereas NASDAQ Composite is 8.19%, Dow Jones Industrials is 6.78%, S&P 500 is 9.99%. Source: NAREIT. 
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capitalization of over $600 billion. As such, REITs have become an important segment of the 
US economy and investment market. 
 
The legislation laying out the rules for REITs in the United Kingdom was enacted in 
the Finance Act 2006 and came into effect in January 2007, when nine UK property 
companies converted to REIT status. British REITs have to distribute 90% of their income; 
they are close-ended investment trusts, which must be UK resident and publicly listed on 
a stock exchange recognized by the Financial Services Authority. Most UK REITs focus on 
the UK, although a few have European investments. This sort of specialization is a global 
characteristic of REITs, and reflects the diversity of legislation across countries. 
 
Today, institutional and individual investors alike are attracted to REITs for their 
diversification qualities. Moreover, REITs are very tax efficient, as the property company 
pays no corporation or capital gains on the profits made from property investment. The major 
UK REITs are many times larger than most property unit trusts, and are transparent, as they 
are subject to continual market scrutiny. As REITs are all listed property companies, 
investments in them are generally liquid. 
 
Stock price momentum has been extensively studied in the literature. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) document that the US stock market yields a 12% annual return over the 30 years 
before their study using a momentum trading strategy. The authors suggest that these 
momentum returns are not a result of systematic risk of the securities. Chui, Titman and Wei 
(2003) also find significant momentum returns in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
from 1982 to 2000, while Hung and Glascock (2008) find that REIT momentum returns are 
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higher in up markets, and REIT winner portfolios have higher dividend to price ratios. 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that investors’ perceptions might affect the pricing and 
returns of REITs. However, of primary interest here is whether and under what circumstances 
the portion of these market participants’ perception that is unrelated to risk, which serves as a 
proxy for irrational trader demand, has the ability to significantly affect REIT CEF price 
momentum. This paper sheds empirical light on whether investor sentiment affects the 
profitability of price momentum strategies in the REIT market. 
 
4.2 Literature Reviews 
 
4.2.1 Momentum in Stocks  
 
 
Notwithstanding the preponderance of evidence supporting the superiority of the contrarian 
investment strategy, some researchers have adduced evidence in support of superior 
performance from the momentum investment strategy. Momentum in stock prices is well 
documented in the seminal work by Levy (1967), who concludes that profitable results are 
attainable by buying stocks that are historically comparatively strong. This is based on the 
belief that average stock returns are related to past performance and thus, to a certain extent, 
are predictable. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) report a significant positive return using 
momentum trading strategy, which they define as a strategy that buys stocks that have 
performed well and shorts stocks that have performed poorly in the past periods, and holds 
the portfolio for 6 to 12 months. The authors find that this strategy yields a 12% annual return 
in the US stock market over the period from 1965 to 1990, and suggest that these momentum 
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returns are not a result of systematic risk of securities. Asness (1995, 1997) investigates the 
performance of both value and momentum strategy in the stock market to show that these 
strategies are effective even after accounting for common value measures. In particular, they 
are most effective when the definition of momentum excludes returns over the most recent 
month.34 
 
Cooper et al. (2004) find that the profits due to momentum strategies depend critically on the 
state of the market. Consistent with the DHS (1998) overreaction model, six-month 
momentum portfolio is profitable only following periods of market gains (up market state).35 
Moreover, the momentum profits increase when the lagged market return increases. They 
also reconfirm the findings of Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
that momentum profits are reversed in the long run, as predicted by the overreaction theories. 
Most of the institutional money managers, especially in large growth and the large core 
domains, are momentum traders.  
 
Sagi and Seasholes (2007) contribute to our understanding of momentum in a number of 
ways. First, they show that we can learn about future expected returns based on past returns 
and observable firm-specific attributes. Second, they suggest that momentum strategies 
carried out in high revenue volatility firms, low cost firms, and high market-to-book firms all 
produce greater profits than a traditional Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) strategy. Finally, in 
                                                             
34 Defining the momentum strategy in this way avoids measurement problems induced by the bid-ask spread 
(Asness 1995). 
35 They define two states: (1) “UP” is when the lagged three-year market return is non-negative, and (2) 
“DOWN” is when the three-year lagged market return is negative. 
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accordance with Cooper et al. (2004), they argue that firms will exhibit higher momentum 
profits in up markets than they do in down markets.  
 
Most recently, Daniel et al. (2012) investigate US stocks during the 978 months from July 
1929 to December 2010.  In their study, the returns generate an average monthly return in 
excess of 1.12% per month and an alpha of 1.70% per month with regard to the Fama and 
French (1993) three-factor model. The momentum strategy returns can result in a portfolio 
with a Sharpe Ratio of almost 0.28 per month when considered with the Fama and French 
(1993) three-factor returns. Nevertheless, inconsistent with previous studies, they argue that 
strategies also incur infrequent, but rather large, losses. In their sample of 978 months, there 
are 13 months with losses exceeding 20% per month. 
 
The literature on the momentum strategy is predominantly focused on US individual equities.  
However, studies conducted in other contexts should also be considered. Rouwenhorst (1998) 
documents international momentum returns in a sample of 12 European countries over the 
period from 1980 to 1995.36 The return patterns hold for both small and large firms, and 
exhibit stronger effect in small firms than in large firms. This is confirmed by Forner and 
Marhuenda (2003) in their analysis of the Spanish market, which has received little attention. 
Marshall and Cahan (2005) use Australian stock data to provide the first out-of-sample test of 
the 52-week high momentum strategy. After conducting a robustness test they find that the 
52-week high momentum strategy is highly profitable in the Australian stock market. Their 
result is much larger than the equivalent return for this strategy in the US, a finding consistent 
                                                             
36 In the sample, the twelve countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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with George and Hwang (2004). Furthermore, the result is robust to the stocks of different 
size and liquidity and persists after risk-adjustment. 
  
Several recent studies focus on the momentum effect in the emerging markets. Gonenc and 
Karan (2003) study the Istanbul Stock Exchange and find that a momentum portfolio 
performs better than a value portfolio. Jansen and Verschoor (2004) also provide evidence 
that growth premium exists in four emerging markets, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Russia. Naranjo and Porter (2007) confirm the profitability of momentum trading 
strategies in both developed and emerging markets using data on almost 16,000 firms from 
22 developed and 18 emerging markets over the period from 1990 to 2004. Muga and 
Santamaria (2007) contribute to the literature on the momentum effect at the international 
level; however, contrary to previous studies, they argue that momentum effects in emerging 
markets are notably smaller and weaker than in developed markets. Asness, Moskowitz and 
Pedersen (2013) examine value and momentum portfolios of individual stocks globally 
across four key equity markets: the US, the UK, continental Europe and Japan. They provide 
comprehensive evidence on the return premia to both value and momentum strategies in all 
four equity markets and a strong common factor structure among their returns. They further 
uncover that value and momentum returns correlate more strongly across asset classes than 
passive exposures to the asset classes, but value and momentum are negatively correlated 
with each other, both within and across asset classes. 
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4.2.2 Momentum in Housing and REITs 
 
Case and Shiller (1989) study the housing data from 1970 to 1986 for Atlanta, Chicago, 
Dallas and San Francisco/Oakland, and show that the market for single family homes does 
not appear to be efficient. They conclude that there is substantial persistence through time in 
the change of real housing prices in these cities and that the excess returns of housing prices 
can be forecasted, because a change in real housing prices tends to be followed by changes in 
the same direction in the subsequent year. Their argument implies that there is a profitable 
trading rule in the house market for those people who can time the purchase of their homes. 
In a later work, Case and Shiller (1990) use quarterly indices of existing single family home 
prices to support their previous study. In this paper, looking at housing prices for Atlanta, 
Chicago, Dallas and San Francisco over the period 1970 to 1986 and estimating excess 
returns, they find that the price changes in one year will continue for more than one year in 
the same direction. Furthermore, they show that the ratio of construction cost to price, 
changes in adult population and increases in real per capita income are positively related to 
excess returns or prices changes over the subsequent year. Abraham and Hendershott (1993, 
1996) document that the house price trends are localized phenomena; the lagged returns in 
the housing market in volatile coastal cities have double the explanatory power compared to 
the return in the inland cities. The areas where lagged returns have higher explanatory power 
are prone to form bubbles, and these areas have greater downward swings after the bubble 
bursts, particularly so in the Northeast and in California. The determinants of real house price 
appreciation can be divided into two groups: first, the growth in real income and real 
construction costs and changes in the real after-tax interest rate, which can explain changes in 
the equilibrium price; and second, lagged real appreciation and equilibrium real house price 
deviation. 
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Similarly, a number of studies investigate momentum at the real estate fund level, and find 
this to be significant. Chui et al. (2003) explore the REIT industry in detail, and test how the 
profitability of momentum changes over time. They suggest that REIT is a good industry to 
examine the intra-industry momentum, because it includes sufficient observations to estimate 
momentum returns, and because the structure of this industry changed around 1990, which is 
helpful to test the determination of momentum profit. 37  Their result shows that the 
momentum strategy generates 0.89 percent per month profit for the REIT sample during the 
1983-1999 period; however, the magnitude of the post-1990 period momentum effect is quite 
large, whereas the momentum before 1990 is relatively small. Mulvey and Kim (2008) 
compare a long-only industry-level momentum strategy to active funds, and find that active 
fund performance patterns have been very similar since 1993; the similarity becomes stronger 
as time passes, and as funds performs better. They focus on industry-level data because of its 
better diversification compared with stock-level momentum strategy. The evidence shows 
that by adopting momentum rules, the mangers can improve their performance.  
 
Kwame and lee (2009) investigate the relative return and risk of REIT value and momentum 
strategies. Their evidence illustrates that there is a significant value premium for the 
remaining holding period; in contrast, the momentum premium is attested to be statistically 
significant only for the yearly investment horizon. This suggests that value strategy in REIT 
investing is more profitable than momentum strategy. Their findings also imply that the 
return for value strategy cannot compensate for risk, but the momentum beta is found to be 
significant.  
                                                             
37 There is a significant change in REIT after 1990 in terms of liquidity, size (see Clayton and McKinnon, 
2000; Beneveniste, Capozza and Seguin, 2001; Chan, Erickson and Wang, 2003), investment portfolios 
(Capozza and Seguin, 1999, 2001a), ownership (see Capozza and Seguin, 2003) and capital structures and 
management strategies (see Capozza and Seguin, 1998, 2001b).    
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Beracha and Skiba (2011) examine whether there is return momentum in US residential real 
estate. Following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), they construct long-short zero cost 
investment portfolios based on the lagged returns of 380 metropolitan areas.  The result 
shows that the momentum returns of US residential real estate are statistically significant 
during the 1983-2008 sample periods; the average trading rule can earn up to 8.92 percent per 
year. Additionally, their finding indicates that the momentum effect in home prices is not 
impacted by the time period or geographical region.38  
 
Feng et al. (2012) investigate in the REIT industry to examine the relation between the price 
momentum and post-earnings announcement drift (the incomplete reaction to earnings news). 
They document that the performance of momentum in REIT returns is well established, and 
that over the last two decades it has been increasing substantially compared to previous years. 
The drift is a unique aspect of equity REITs which has received a great deal of research 
attention in the recent literature, and this offers a good opportunity to study the potential 
industry level link between momentum and drift. Their result shows that the returns 
attributable to one tend to increase as the level of the other decreases, which suggests that 
there is a negative relation between REIT momentum and drifts. They conclude that the REIT 
drift has more pronounced effect on the future returns than does the momentum, and that it 
subsumes the payoffs to a momentum strategy at the industry-level.   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
38 Nevertheless, they find that the momentum effect appears to be more pronounced in the West and 
Northeast regions during the 2004-2008 periods. 
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4.2.3 Why Momentum Strategies Work  
 
There is a rich array of testable hypotheses supporting momentum strategies. Conrad and 
Kaul (1998) argue that the profitability of momentum strategies can potentially be explained 
by the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Specifically, based on the empirical 
decomposition of profits, bootstrap and Monte Carlo simulations and alternative estimates, 
they find that the cross-sectional differences in mean returns play a key role in momentum 
profitability. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) find that the momentum strategies are 
significantly less profitable when they control for industry momentum; however, when they 
buy past winning industries and sell losers, they yield high profits. Accordingly, they claim 
that industry-based momentum strategy generates more profits than individual stock 
momentum strategy, and that the significant component of firm-specific momentum returns 
can be explained by industry factors. Inconsistent with their arguments, the evidence in 
Grundy and Martin (2001) suggests that neither cross-sectional differences in expected 
returns nor industry effects are important determinants of the momentum phenomenon. In 
order to test the Conrad–Kaul conjecture, they use each stock as its own control for risk; 
Grundy and Martin (2001) find that even after subtracting each stock’s mean return from its 
return during the investment period the mean return of momentum strategy still remains 
economically and statistically significant. Moreover, to address the contrary evidence of the 
Moskowitz-Grinblatt conjecture, they claim that although the returns of industry-based 
momentum strategy are consistent with an intra-industry lead-lag effect, industry momentum 
alone does not explain the profitability of momentum trading strategies. 
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Cheng and Roulac (2007) employ five groups of variables to demonstrate the multi-
dimensional complexity of REIT companies and to investigate the predictability of REIT 
returns. The multifactor approach is based on a set of firm-specific factors: risk factors, 
liquidity factors, expensiveness, return history and profitability. The empirical result shows 
that their model is able to predict the momentum effect with fairly high consistency, and the 
fundamental characteristics of the “winners” versus the “losers” have a substantial 
explanatory power for the REIT momentum performance. However, this work raises 
questions regarding the validity of market efficiency, since the analysis contradicts and 
challenges the efficient market hypothesis. This point remains to be addressed by further 
study.   
 
Derwall et al. (2009) point out that the conventional factor models that control for beta, size, 
book-to-market and common stock momentum factor significantly underestimate the 
momentum effect in the REIT industry. Their result is consistent with the findings of Fama 
and French (1996) that a three-factor model of returns fails to explain intermediate-horizon 
price momentum (see Rouwenhorst, 1998). Hung and Glascock (2008) study the REIT 
momentum in different market states.  They report that the momentum of US REITs is higher 
during up markets; furthermore, the higher returns are not accompanied with higher risk, 
which supports the findings of previous research that momentum returns are not explained by 
risk. In sum, they conclude that the momentum returns of REITs can be explained jointly by a 
time-varying factor (market state) and a cross-sectional variance in dividend yields. In a later 
work, Hung and Glascock (2010) apply a GARCH-in-mean model to test asymmetric 
volatility effect in momentum returns in REITs.  Additionally, they investigate whether 
idiosyncratic volatility and liquidity play a significant role in REIT momentum returns. They 
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find that the momentum returns in REITs display asymmetric volatility, and are positively 
related.  Furthermore, losers have higher levels of idiosyncratic risk than winners; the 
difference between them is statistically significant, which can contribute to momentum. 
Moreover, losers’ returns are negatively related to their idiosyncratic risks, whereas winners’ 
are positively related, and investors do not require a higher risk premium for holding losers’ 
idiosyncratic risks; consequently, their low risk premia help to explain their low returns.  
Finally, they find a positive relationship between momentum and liquidity, which is 
measured by turnover. 
 
In a recent study, Fama and French (2012) examine the return patterns in developed markets 
in North America, Europe, Japan, and Asia Pacific. They find strong momentum returns in all 
regions except Japan. Their new evidence focuses on how the international value and 
momentum returns differ with firm size, and reveals that value premia decrease from smaller 
to bigger stocks, except in Japan.  Meanwhile, the momentum returns are also larger for small 
stocks, but no momentum returns are observed in any size group in Japan. Additionally, the 
authors investigate whether the value and momentum effects in average returns are captured 
by empirical asset pricing models, and whether these models explain that the asset pricing is 
integrated across regions. In the test of the global CAPM, three-factor and four-factor models 
on the value and momentum portfolio returns, only the four-factor model is passable for 
average returns on global size-B/M and size-momentum portfolios. Although the result is 
good for global models and integrated asset pricing, all three global models fail to explain 
regional returns. Specifically, the local four-factor model performs better than the other two 
models when explaining the value returns; however, it performs poorly on the size-
momentum portfolios, and the other two models are even less successful than the four-factor 
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models. 
 
4.2.4 Momentum and Behavioural Finance 
 
It would appear that the most credible proposed rationale for the momentum premium is to be 
found in behavioural explanations regarding the under-reaction and overreaction behaviour of 
investors. According to the overreaction hypothesis, Delong et al. (1990) explain that when 
investors are over optimistic, they tend to overreact to events by buying “winner” stocks, and 
when they are over-pessimistic they sell “loser” stocks. Thus, even where there is a lack of 
fundamental information, “trend-chasers” reinforce movements in stock prices induced by 
positive (negative) feedbacks; as a result, both positive and negative returns for past winners 
and losers tend to be substantial. 
 
Chan et al. (1996) provide evidence that a stock’s prior return and prior earnings information 
predict the drift in future returns over the next six and twelve months, while the drift cannot 
be explained by the conventional factors of market risk, size and book-to-market effects. 
Those stocks with low past returns will on average experience low future returns over 
intermediate horizons can be explained by the under-reaction theory. An earnings momentum 
strategy may benefit from under-reaction to information announcements related to short-term 
earnings, while a price momentum strategy may benefit from the market's slow response to a 
broader set of information, including longer-term profitability. Similarly, Barberis et al. 
(1998), Daniel et al. (1998), and Hong and Stein (1999), provide evidence that momentum 
profits arise from inherent biases in the way investors interpret information.  
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Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam’s (DHS, 1998) overconfidence theory suggests that 
investor overconfidence can generate the observed momentum effect, and since the REITs 
are relatively more difficult to value in the later period, this momentum is likely to be 
stronger. Contrarily, Hong and Stein (1999) propose that momentum profits relate to the 
speed of the diffusion of information; the theory predicts that momentum should be stronger 
in the earlier period due to weaker analyst coverage. Consistent with the DHS (1998) 
overconfidence theory, Chui, Titman and Wei (2003) find that the REIT momentum effect is 
small and weak in the pre-1990 period; however, it becomes strong and prevalent during the 
post-1990 period. Additionally, they find that the positive returns of the momentum portfolio 
are reversed in the two years after the formation period, which suggests that the momentum 
profits are generated from delayed overreaction rather than by under-reaction to information. 
 
In a recent study, Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) use international data to examine the extent 
to which the momentum effect is generated by behavioural biases. Using an “individualism” 
index reported by Hofstede (2001), based on survey evidence from 50 countries, 39  they 
examine whether momentum profits are greater in those countries where investors are likely 
to exhibit the psychological biases discussed in the behavioural finance literature. Their 
evidence indicates that investors in different cultures interpret information in different ways 
and are subject to different biases; consequently, culture can have an important effect on the 
stock price momentum, which is consistent with the idea that individualism is positively 
associated with trading volume and volatility, as well as with the magnitude of momentum 
profits. 
                                                             
39 According to Hofstede (2001), ”individualism” reflects the degree to which people focus on their internal 
attributes, such as their own abilities, to differentiate themselves from others. 
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4.2.5 Investor Sentiment and REIT Momentum 
 
As we have documented, the phenomenon of REIT price momentum has been investigated in 
many studies, and has been found to be significant in different asset classes and markets. The 
controversial explanations for REIT price momentum can be classified into three general 
categories: theories of market frictions (Hong and Stein, 1999), theories of time-varying 
expected returns (Johnson, 2002), and behavioural theories of market inefficiency (Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). The investor sentiment explanation stems from the 
DHS (1998) behavioural theory, which refers to whether an individual feels optimistic or 
pessimistic about future returns for whatever extraneous reason; in this theory, DHS (1998) 
suggest that the momentum effect is generated by investor overconfidence and self-
attribution bias. We consider whether the psychological theories may provide an adequate 
explanation for price momentum by examining the relationship between investor sentiment 
and REIT price momentum. This study contributes to the existing literature by being the first 
to examine whether direct measures of investor sentiment, which proxy for unsophisticated 
investors’ trading activities, affect the momentum returns of REITs, and to what extent these 
investors’ behavioural biases impact on the short-/long-run momentum. 
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4.3 Methodology and Data  
 
Our data sample comprises publicly traded REIT between 2000 and 2012.40 There are 226 
REITs including equity, mortgage, and hybrid are listed in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, 
however we select the REITs that have return data available in the Bloomburg during the 
sample period. 110 REITs monthly stock returns and market index returns over the sample 
period are obtained from the Bloomburg as well as the Consumer Board (CB) Consumer 
Confidence Index.  
 
The measures of investor sentiment we adopt is the monthly time series data of consumer 
confidence index which is constructed by the CB, which has been published on the last 
Tuesday of each month since 1967.41 Although it is considered as an index, this report is the 
questionnaire sent to around 5,000 households by mail with about 3,500 respond which 
change each month. The participants are asked to respond to five questions about their 
perception for the economy.42 For each question, the CB calculates the scores based on the 
possible three answers the participants give which are positive, negative or neutral. This 
proportion is benchmarked to the average of the same proportions that occurred in the year 
1985, which is assigned a CCI value of 100. This benchmarked number is then the value of 
the headline Consumer Confidence Index for that month. The CCI index is one of the ten 
                                                             
40 We select this sample period due to the restriction of formatting the momentum portfolios, not enough REITs 
are available before the year of 2000.  
41 This survey began on a two-month survey basis; the monthly data comes from 1977.  
42 The questions are: current business conditions; business conditions six months hence; current employment 
conditions; employment conditions in the next six months; their own total family income in the next six months.  
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leading economic indicators published by CB; many previous studies use this index as the 
predictor of investors’ behavior.43 
 
Our study follows the methodology of forming momentum portfolios of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993). In order to increase the power of our test, we construct overlapping portfolios 
with holding period. Specifically, in any given month t, we sort all the REITs on their returns 
for the past J months. Based on these rankings, ten deciles of equally weighted portfolios are 
formed. The top decile is called the “loser” decile and the bottom decile is called the “winner” 
portfolio. Every month, the strategy buys the winner portfolio and sells the loser portfolio, 
holding this position for K months. Further, we close out the position initiated in the month t-
K in both the winner and loser portfolios. Therefore, under this strategy, in any given month, 
we revise the weights on 1/K of the REITs in the entire portfolio and carry over the rest from 
the previous month.44  
 
In order to mitigate the effects of macroeconomic conditions from the CB index, McLean and 
Zhao (2009), Antoniou et al (2010) use six macroeconomic indicators to perform a regression 
with this monthly index which are: growth in industrial production, real growth in durable 
consumption, non-durable consumption, services consumption, growth in employment and an 
NBER recession indicator. Finally, they save the residuals from the regression to be the 
sentiment proxy. Moreover, to test whether a given formation period is optimistic or 
                                                             
43 See Ludvigson (2004) for household spending activity, Fisher and Statman (2003) for the investor optimism, 
Lemmon and portniaguina (2006) , Antonio et al (2010) for investor sentiment  
44 For example, for the 6-month holding period strategy (J,K=6), in any given month t+1, the winner portfolio is 
constructed by 1/6(winners from t-1) + 1/6(winners from t-2) + … + 1/6 (winners from t-6), and loser portfolios 
are formed in the same approach. Month t is skipped. 
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pessimistic, Antoniou et al (2010) use the rolling average of sentiment level for the three 
months prior to the end of formation period. They report results by dividing the investor 
sentiment states into two different classifications as optimistic and pessimistic to ensure the 
investigation is not sensitive to the definition of the sentiment states. If the three-month 
rolling average sentiment in months t belongs in the top 30% of the sentiment time series, 
then this formation period is considered as optimistic and vice versa. Addition to this, 20% as 
breakpoint to classify optimistic and pessimistic periods will be used as well for robustness.  
 
In order to examine the long-run performance of momentum portfolios, we focus on 6-month 
formation/holding period strategy. Followed by the approach Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
used, we define an event time which is equal to 13 months following the initial formation 
date. Then we hold this portfolio for six years to check its performances in the optimistic 
formation periods and pessimistic formation periods individually.   
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Figure 4.1 Investor sentiment from 2000-2010 
Notes: This figure shows the raw data of consumer confidence index provided by CB; the 
residual from regress the CB index on the macroeconomic variables; the 3-month rolling 
average of the residual respectively. 
 
As provided by Figure 4.1, we may find three investor sentiment indexes exhibit extremely 
similar performance during our sample period from 2000 to 2010. The sentiment falls from 
the beginning of our sample and forms a short time peak in 2002. From 2003, the sentiment 
rises substantially in one year; this wave lasts for about five years without huge fluctuations. 
However, from the end of 2006, the index drops dramatically to the 10-year bottom, as our 
knowledge, this is cause by the financial crisis which is generated around that time period. 
Interestingly, the investor sentiment reaches historically high in the two years’ time, but it 
fails to last for a long time. Besides, we also observed that the 3-month rolling average of the 
residual, which will be the sentiment proxy in the following work, performs considerably 
close to the CB index.  
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Table 4.1 exhibits the descriptive statistics for the sentiment index. In this table, Panel a 
shows the raw data from the CB index, whereas Panel B shows our constructed 3-month 
rolling average residuals from the regression.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the investor sentiment 
Panel A: CB consumer confidence   
 
Mean σ Q1 Median Q3 Minimum Maximum N 
84.77 13.27 71.45 87.65 91.67 55.32 112.48 132 
Panel B: CB consumer confidence orthogonal to macroeconomic variables 
  32.15 19.87 13.29 48 57.23 -61.17 76.3 132 
 
Table 4.2 presents our REITs characteristics of the sample over period. We identify the 
winner/losers by using 20% and 30% breakpoint respectively, mean return is the average 
monthly return of REITs, S.D. of return is the monthly standard deviation of REIT returns, 
the average market capitalization, average monthly total shares traded and average monthly 
turnover are shown as well. We also provide the differences between winner and loser 
portfolio. In the sample, we have 110 REITs with the average 3% monthly return, and 7.36% 
monthly standard deviation. When we use two different breakpoints, we find that the winners 
always have a higher market capitalization than losers; the difference is 0.42 million of 
dollars by the 20% breakpoint and 0.48 by the 30% breakpoint. In terms of the liquidity, we 
observed that the trading volumes are fairly close in the two groups; however the winners 
always have better turnover than the losers.   
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for the REIT sample from 2000-2010 
Panel A:20% breakpoint Entire Sample Winners Losers Difference(winners-losers) 
 No.of REITs 110 22 22 
 
 Mean Return 3.01% 6.22% -3.40% 9.62% 
 S.D.of Return 7.36% 11.92% 13.12% 
 
 Market capitalization 1.64m 1.25m 0.83m 0.42m 
 Volume 32993 35820 34921 899 
 Turnover 0.79 0.93 0.84 0.09 
Panel B:30% breakpoint 
    
 No.of REITs 110 33 33 
 
 Mean Return 3.01% 4.15% -2.64% 6.79% 
 S.D.of Return 7.36% 9.26% 10.71% 
 
 Market capitalization 1.64m 1.72m 1.24m 0.48m 
 Volume 32993 34245 33189 1056 
 Turnover 0.79 0.82 0.8 0.02 
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4.4 Empirical Results 
 
4.4.1 Investor Sentiment and REIT Short-run Momentum 
 
Followed by Antoniou et al (2010), we investigate the REIT momentum strategies under two 
different sentiment periods. We define the top/bottom 30% (20%) of the rolling average 
sentiment as optimistic/ pessimistic periods, which can be considered as investors are 
positive/negative about future market conditions. We also use the widely recognized 
approach to construct the momentum portfolio by a six-month ranking period (J) and holding 
periods (K) for three, six and twelve months. 
 
Table 4.3 provides us the six-month REIT formation portfolios for holding different time 
periods. From the 30% breakpoints, we find that in all three holding periods the average 
monthly momentum profits are significant in the optimistic periods; this suggests that when 
the investor sentiment is high, the momentum profits are very sensitive. However, this pattern 
cannot be found in the pessimistic periods, which shown to be statistically insignificant. 
Specifically, in the three months holding period, the monthly momentum profits are at an 
average level of 6.24% in the optimistic periods, whereas this figure turns to be much lower 
to an average level of 2.69% in the pessimistic periods. When the holding period extends to 
six months, the average monthly profits are 5.40% in optimistic states and declined to 1.84% 
in the pessimistic states. The corresponding average monthly momentum profits are 4.57% 
and 0.31% respectively in the longest twelve months holding periods. This result is consistent 
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with Gutierrez and Hammeed (2004) who suggest that momentum profits depend on whether 
the economy has been expanding or contracting.   
 
Table 4.3 Momentum Profits and Investor Sentiment 
 
Note: This table presents average monthly returns in percentages for price momentum strategies involving all 
110 REITs for the time period 2000 until 2010. At the beginning of each month all stocks are ranked based on 
their cumulative returns over the previous J months. Portfolio 1 includes the loser stocks and portfolio 10 the 
winner stocks. The winner stocks are bought and the loser stocks sold, and this position is held for K months. 
Monthly holding period returns come from overlapping strategies and are computed as an equal- weighted 
average of returns from strategies initiated at the beginning of this month, and the previous K-1 months. 
 
1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [ t-stat.]
                  Panel A:30%-30% Sentiment States
Optimistic (n=79) -0.91 1.66 2.95 3.37 3.69 3.78 4.08 4.26 4.54 5.33 6.24 [7.65]
Pessimistic (n=31) 3.29 5.34 5.95 5.48 5.34 5.74 5.27 4.87 4.62 5.99 2.69 [1.85]
Opt.-Pes. 3.55 [1.98]
Optimistic (n=83) -0.46 1.55 2.44 2.80 3.19 3.39 3.72 3.86 4.36 4.94 5.40 [6.59]
Pessimistic (n=27) 3.68 4.39 5.08 5.25 5.13 5.19 5.22 4.67 4.58 5.52 1.84 [1.06]
Opt.-Pes. 3.56 [2.39]
Optimistic (n=90) 0.81 2.48 3.49 3.85 4.39 4.61 4.96 5.18 5.41 5.38 4.57 [8.55]
Pessimistic (n=11) 6.69 8.06 8.37 6.89 7.96 5.47 7.95 7.36 7.39 7.00 0.31 [0.32]
Opt.-Pes. 4.26 [2.63]
Optimistic (n=88) -1.02 1.66 2.87 3.21 3.51 3.62 3.89 3.96 4.27 4.92 5.94 [6.32]
Pessimistic (n=22) 5.82 7.18 6.38 6.58 7.96 4.65 7.38 6.37 6.14 8.13 2.31 [0.94]
Opt.-Pes 3.63 [1.99]
Optimistic (n=94) -0.76 1.28 2.30 2.60 2.96 3.19 3.48 3.65 4.05 4.61 5.37 [6.21]
Pessimistic (n=16) 7.04 7.93 8.39 7.69 7.24 8.15 6.97 7.64 7.14 6.71 -0.33 [-0.96]
Opt.-Pes. 5.70 [2.36]
Optimistic (n=100) 0.39 1.70 2.40 2.69 3.07 3.17 3.39 3.55 3.71 4.51 4.12 [7.98]
Pessimistic (n=10) 10.56 8.62 9.37 7.69 9.36 9.57 8.36 9.45 9.57 9.32 -1.24 [-1.36]
Opt.-Pes. 5.36 [2.98]
Panel B1:J=6,K=3
Panel B2:J,K=6
Panel B3:J=6,K=12
Momentum Portfolio
Panel B:20%-20% Sentiment States
Panel A1:J=6,K=3
Panel A2:J,K=6
Panel A3:J=6,K=12
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Another finding of Panel A is that there is a ascend trend in all three holding periods during 
optimistic sentiment states. The returns of momentum portfolios in pessimistic periods cannot 
hold this pattern which seems the highest return are from the middle of the portfolios. 
Specifically, the interesting result is that the returns of all the momentum in the pessimistic 
sentiment states are much higher than those in the optimistic sentiment state. This is because 
the investors may overestimate/underestimate the negative/positive information when their 
sentiment is low/high, lead to a lower/higher trading price.  
 
From Panel B we can find that in terms of pattern, it performs fairly close to the Panel A, the 
significant momentum profits can be found only in the optimistic states. However, the 
corresponding absolute value of each momentum portfolio is higher than those in Panel A. 
Since this panel is based on a more extreme sentiment periods, we may propose that the REIT 
momentum returns are positively related to the market. Further, the average monthly profit 
seems to be lower in the 20% sentiment breakpoints. Overall, our result is consistent with 
Antoniou (2010) that in the high sentiment periods, investors ignore the negative events about 
loser REITs and due to short-selling constraints, arbitrage is not existed. 
 
4.4.2 Sentiment, Momentum and Liquidity   
 
Baker and Stein (2004) document that market liquidity can be a sentiment indicator. They 
find that both turnover and the equity share are noisy measures of the liquidity. In numerous 
other studies, Baker and Wurgler (2007), Boot et al (2008), Cherkes et al (2009), Boot (2013) 
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also consider the liquidity is linked to investors’ behaviour,. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
suggest that there is an important relation between momentum and liquidity which is proxied 
by the trading volume.  Specifically, they find that firms with high (low) past turnover 
ratios45 earn lower (higher) future returns, and have consistently more negative (positive) 
earnings surprises over the next eight quarters. Glascock and Hung (2009) find a positive 
relationship between the REIT momentum and the liquidity with is measured by turnover 
rates.  
 
Further to these studies, we investigate whether the high/low liquidity confines the level of 
sentiment effect on the momentum portfolios. We construct momentum portfolios as stated 
before and additionally, in the formation period, we rank all the REITs based on their 
monthly turnover (calculated by trading volume/ shares outstanding). According to the 
turnover rates, we classify the liquidity measures into three groups: the first 30% highest 
turnover as high, the following 40% as middle and the last 30% is the low. Then we test the 
ten momentum groups and three liquidity groups during optimistic and pessimistic formation 
period respectively.  
 
Table 4.4 shows the regression result for the momentum returns under different liquidity 
groups during two sentiment state periods. Panel A and Panel B present two different 
breakpoints for optimistic periods and pessimistic periods of the rolling average sentiment, 
respectively.  
 
                                                             
45 They use trading volume and a proxy of liquidity and in the test, the turnover ratio is a measure of trading 
volume. 
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Table 4.4 Momentum Profits, Investor Sentiment and Trading Volume 
 
 
From the evidence of 30% breakpoint, we may find that the sentiment effect can be captured 
in all the liquidity portfolios. Specifically, during optimistic periods, in the high turnover rate 
group, the momentum profit is 6.72%, which is the highest among the three liquidity 
portfolios, this figure drops from the highest turnover rate group to the lowest groups by 
descend order, the middle one is 6.34% and the low turnover rate group is 5.53%. The pattern 
in the pessimistic periods exhibits the similar performance, with the highest profit of 3.25% 
and lowest 1.76% and the middle one is 2.62%. Furthermore, we can observe that in the 
1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [ t-stat.]
                                                           Panel A:30%-30% Sentiment States
Optimistic (n=83) -1.48 1.18 2.05 2.36 2.74 3.19 3.57 3.72 4.29 5.24 6.72 [6.59]
Pessimistic (n=27) 1.52 3.65 4.18 4.19 4.22 4.22 3.99 4.07 4.37 4.77 3.25 [1.63]
Opt.-Pes. 3.47 [1.52]
Optimistic (n=83) -0.30 2.24 3.19 3.38 3.80 3.95 4.14 4.44 5.09 6.04 6.34 [6.58]
Pessimistic (n=27) 3.46 5.01 5.89 6.08 6.16 6.01 5.73 5.89 5.89 6.08 2.62 [2.13]
Opt.-Pes. 3.72 [1.36]
Optimistic (n=83) 0.87 2.39 3.34 3.80 4.22 4.45 4.75 5.09 5.66 6.30 5.53 [6.39]
Pessimistic (n=27) 5.80 6.38 6.80 6.08 6.73 6.54 6.68 7.31 7.22 7.49 1.76 [0.95]
Opt.-Pes. 3.77 [1.92]
                                                           Panel B:20%-20% Sentiment States
Optimistic (n=94) -1.82 0.79 1.55 1.87 2.36 2.63 3.02 3.06 3.56 4.43 6.25 [7.36]
Pessimistic (n=16) 5.95 7.16 7.81 7.38 7.24 7.16 6.52 6.66 6.77 6.80 0.85 [1.63]
Opt.-Pes. 5.40 [1.52]
Optimistic (n=94) -0.61 1.73 2.74 2.92 3.35 3.46 3.64 3.92 4.50 5.53 6.14 [8.63]
Pessimistic (n=16) 7.67 8.89 9.10 9.12 9.11 8.71 8.28 7.96 7.94 8.09 0.42 [0.34]
Opt.-Pes. 5.72 [2.63]
Optimistic (n=94) 0.72 2.01 3.02 3.53 3.86 4.03 4.36 4.79 5.29 5.97 5.25 [6.42]
Pessimistic (n=16) 9.32 9.54 9.43 9.36 8.96 8.57 8.42 8.57 8.28 9.85 0.53 [0.34]
Opt.-Pes. 4.72 [1.99]
 Panel B3: Low Vol.
Momentum Portfolio
 Panel A1: High Vol.
 Panel A2: Mid. Vol.
 Panel A3: Low Vol.
 Panel B1: High Vol.
 Panel B2: Mid. Vol.
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Panel A1 the momentum profits reduce to an average monthly return from 6.72% in 
optimistic periods to 6.34% in pessimistic periods. In the other two groups, the corresponding 
figures are all declined from optimistic periods to pessimistic periods.   
 
In the panel B of 20% breakpoints, we find that the average monthly momentum returns for 
each liquidity group are lower than 30% breakpoints. The differences are more pronounced in 
the pessimistic periods which are declined substantially, particularly, we find that there is a 
negative return of -0.53% in the Panel B3 during pessimistic periods. However, the general 
trends are same as our 30% breakpoints test; the results show that the high turnover rates 
group has more momentum profits than the middle and low turnover rates group. The 
differences between two sentiment periods in each liquidity group are more significant in the 
20% breakpoints. 
 
Our results show that the sentiment effect is captured in all the liquidity groups. The 
momentums returns are positively related to the turnover, which is performed as higher 
turnover REITs have more profitable returns. We can also confirm that winners/loser have 
higher/lower risk premia to liquidity risk, causing momentum returns. The findings are 
consistent with previous works and even stronger than their result which has been Hung and 
Glascock (2009). However, in the pessimistic periods, the momentum returns of liquidity 
portfolios seem to be not significant with investor sentiment, this finding is consistent with 
Antoniou et al (2010) for testing the sentiment effect on the common stock momentums. In 
sum, the REIT momentum returns are sensitive to the liquidity, and they are positively related, 
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however, this result is only significant during the optimistic periods when the sentiment is 
high.  
 
4.4.3 Sentiment, Momentum and Size 
 
Regard the size, LST (1991) conjecture that the smaller stocks are predominantly traded and 
held by individual investors, so the changes in their sentiment should be correlated with the 
returns on small capitalization stocks. The small firm effect based on investor sentiment story 
has been further investigated by Swaminathan (1996) and Nagel (2005). Both of their long 
horizon forecasting regressions demonstrate that the future excess returns on small firms can 
be predicted by the investor sentiment. In this part, we discuss whether the REIT momentum 
profitability, is affected by the size of company.  
 
In order to classify the different REITs size group, we rank all the REITs at the end of the 
formation period based on the ascend order, we choose the first 50% REITs as the small 
capitalization firms and the other 50% are large capitalization firms, Based on the rolling 
average sentiment series, we define the top 30% as optimistic periods and the bottom 30% are 
pessimistic periods. 
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Table 4.5 Momentum, Investor Sentiment and Firm Size 
 
Note: This table shows momentum strategies conditional on the investor sentiment and firm size. Size is 
measured as price x shares outstanding at the end of the formation period. Size decile breakpoints are from 
Kenneth French’s data library. 
 
Then we try to find whether our momentum strategy is affected by the different capitalization. 
In the table 4.5, from Panel A, the momentum portfolios returns are increasing from -1.09% 
to 5.36% and the momentum profits is 6.45% for the small cap in optimistic periods. When 
comparing with the pessimistic periods, the momentum profits are declined to 3.02%, there is 
not a trend like in optimistic markets. However, all the winner and loser deciles have a higher 
return than in the optimistic periods. Panel B exhibits the same pattern as Panel A, 
interestingly, in the optimistic period, even the absolute vale of the figures listed in the Panel 
B are almost as the same as panel A. Regarding with the pessimistic periods, each portfolio 
returns are substantially higher than those in the optimistic periods, nevertheless, the 
1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [ t-stat.]
Optimistic (n=83) -1.09 1.33 2.34 3.02 3.56 3.85 4.32 4.54 5.01 5.36 6.45 [8.75]
Pessimistic (n=27) 3.06 4.71 5.90 6.26 6.44 6.51 6.19 6.52 6.34 6.08 3.02 [1.87]
Opt.-Pes. [1.26]
Optimistic (n=83) 1.51 2.48 2.95 3.24 3.17 3.31 3.53 3.65 4.10 4.86 3.35 [6.13]
Pessimistic (n=27) 3.24 4.14 4.43 4.61 4.57 3.89 3.96 3.89 3.87 3.67 0.43 [1.01]
Opt.-Pes. [1.21]
Optimistic (n=96) -1.48 1.04 2.09 2.84 3.35 3.61 4.07 4.36 4.72 5.08 6.56 [8.34]
Pessimistic (n=24) 7.70 8.96 9.91 9.65 9.79 8.91 9.03 9.00 8.94 8.54 0.84 [1.36]
Opt.-Pes. [1.04]
Optimistic (n=96) 1.15 2.19 2.66 2.99 2.95 3.02 3.24 3.36 3.74 4.43 3.28 [3.79]
Pessimistic (n=24) 6.73 7.16 6.98 7.02 6.98 5.80 6.01 5.69 5.83 5.46 -1.27 [-0.34]
Opt.-Pes. [1.85]
Panel B1: Small Cap.
 Panel B2: Larger Cap.
Panel B:20%-20% Sentiment states
Panel A:30%-30% Sentiment states
Momentum Portfolio
Panel A1: Small Cap.
 Panel A2: Larger Cap.
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momentum returns in this periods are dropped to a relatively low level comparing with the 
optimistic periods.  
 
Overall, the result reports that the sentiment affects for both small and large REIT firms. 
Moreover, the evidence show that the sentiment impacts on the smaller REIT firms to a 
relatively higher level than large firms. The findings in this table are consistent with the 
argument of Nagel (2005), Baker and Wurgler (2006) that investor sentiment is hard to be 
valued in the smaller firms, thus more prone to subject estimation, then it will be more 
significant in these firms. The sentiment effect is strong and robust to firm size, although in 
the pessimistic periods, it is not significant, both small and large firms show significant price 
momentum in the periods of investor sentiment is optimistic. 
 
4.4.4 Other Sentiment Measures 
 
The University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index (MCSI) is produced by the 
University of Michigan and distributed by Thomson Reuters. The Index of Consumer 
Expectations is an official component of the US Index of Leading Economic Indicators. The 
MCSI is designed to analyses consumer attitudes toward the overall business climate, the 
state of personal finances, and consumer spending. The University of Michigan survey of 
consumer sentiment started in 1947 on a quarterly basis and turn to be a monthly basis from 
1978. The survey is sent to 500 households, and the respondents are asked the following 
questions: (1) Would you say that you (and your family living there) are better off or worse 
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off financially than you were a year ago? (2) Do you think that a year from now, you (and 
your family living there) will be better off financially or worse off, or about the same as now? 
(3) Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during 
the next 12 months, we will have good times financially or bad times or what? (4) Looking 
ahead, which would you say is more likely—that in the country as a whole we will have 
continuous good times during the next five years or so or that we will have periods of 
widespread unemployment or depression, or what? And (5) Do you think now is a good or 
bad time for people to buy major household items? The MSCI is widely followed as the 
measure of investor sentiment which is documented by numerous papers, see Dominitz 
(2003), Ludvigson (2004), Golinelli (2004), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006).  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) examine the sensitivity of investor sentiment to the cross-section 
of stock return by using the monthly measure of constructing a combined multifactor investor 
sentiment index. They suggest that investor sentiment can be captured from various market-
based variables that relate to investors’ propensity to purchase stocks. They construct a 
sentiment time series using six sentiment-revealing variables: trading volume (measured as 
total NYSE turnover), dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, number and first day 
returns in IPOs, and the equity share in new issues. Because these variables are partly related 
to economic fundamentals, they regress each of these sentiment proxies against growth in 
industrial production, real growth in durable consumption, non-durable consumption, services 
consumption, growth in employment, and an NBER recession indicator, and use the residuals 
from this regression as the sentiment proxies. The overall sentiment index is the first 
principal component of the six sentiment proxies. For more detail on the construction of the 
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index, see Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007).46 This time series is available on a monthly basis 
from 1966 to 2005. 
 
Table 4.6 Momentum and different sentiment measures 
 
Note: This table present the momentum profits conditional on two different sentiment proxies. BW sentiment is 
measured using the monthly sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2007), using trading volume 
(measured as total NYSE turnover), dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, number and first day returns 
in IPO’s, and the equity share in new issues. 
 
Table 4.6 reports the momentum results for optimistic and pessimistic periods, by using the 
Baker and Wurgler sentiment measure (BW) and MCSI survey based measure respectively.47 
Apart from the sentiment index changed by the BW and CCI, all the other constructions and 
calculation are the same as previous tables.  
 
Consistent with our previous findings, the result from this table confirms that the 
performance of momentum profits under optimistic sentiment state remains significant even 
                                                             
46 This index is available from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website (http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/). 
47 For the MSCI sentiment index, we apply the same approach as the CCI, which is the 3-month rolling 
average residual.  
1=Sell 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10=Buy Buy-Sell [ t-stat.]
Optimistic (MCSI) -0.91 1.26 2.31 2.81 3.08 3.42 3.64 3.89 4.36 4.83 5.74 [8.56]
(BW) -0.58 1.66 2.66 3.10 3.46 3.67 3.89 4.00 4.32 4.75 5.33 [7.21]
Pessimistic (MCSI) 5.64 6.76 7.34 7.10 7.11 6.93 6.86 7.13 7.02 6.82 1.18 [1.52]
(BW) 6.55 7.34 7.52 7.45 7.13 7.06 7.16 7.34 7.88 8.78 2.23 [0.36]
Optimistic (MCSI) -0.28 1.82 2.80 3.18 3.54 3.67 3.94 4.27 4.62 5.04 5.32 [7.93]
(BW) -0.14 2.09 3.06 3.49 3.82 3.99 4.24 4.43 4.79 5.36 5.50 [7.21]
Pessimistic (MCSI) 6.41 1.82 2.80 3.19 3.53 3.78 4.06 5.91 6.05 6.90 0.49 [1.53]
(BW) 8.82 8.60 8.50 8.14 7.60 7.49 7.49 7.45 7.74 7.36 4.91 [1.13]
Momentum Portfolio
                                                           Panel A:30%-30% Sentiment States
                                                           Panel B:20%-20% Sentiment States
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we change use the alternative sentiment indexes. When we focus on the MSCI sentiment 
index, we find that the momentum profits are significant in both 30% and 20% breakpoints. 
Specifically, the average monthly momentum profits are dramatically higher in the optimistic 
states with the figure of 5.74% than those profits in pessimistic state. Moreover, the 
momentum return profits cannot observe to be significant, which adds the support to our 
previous finds. In panel B, although each portfolio has higher returns than in panel A, the 
average monthly momentum return is even smaller than Panel A. The difference of the 
momentum profits between two sentiment states is close under the 30% and 20% breakpoints.      
 
The BW sentiment measure adds another support to our previous finds. In the Panel A, where 
optimistic (pessimistic) periods are defined as those that fall into the top (bottom) 30% of the 
sentiment rolling average time series, the average monthly momentum profits are 5.33% in 
the optimistic states, this return is reduced substantially to 2.23% in the pessimistic periods. 
From Panel B, for the 20% breakpoints, this difference in two different sentiment states is 
narrow with 5.50% in optimistic periods and 4.91% in pessimistic periods. These findings 
support our precious study that the momentum returns are significantly related to the investor 
sentiment during the optimistic states. Further, the other choices of our sentiment index 
enhance the explanatory power for the sentiment effect on the REIT price momentums.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
Stock price momentum has been extensively studied in the literature. Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) document that the U.S. stock market yields 12% annual return over the past 30 years 
using momentum trading strategy. Additionally, the authors suggest that these momentum 
returns are not a result of systematic risk of the securities. Chui, Titman and Wei (2003) also 
find significant momentum returns in Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) from 1982 to 
2000 and Hung and Glascock (2008) find that REIT momentum returns are higher in up 
markets and REIT winner portfolios have higher dividend to price ratios. 
 
However, Price momentum is an anomaly not captured by the Fama and French (1996) three-
factor model. It has been linked to both rational and behavioural explanations. In this paper, 
we provide evidence on the validity of behavioural explanations by investigating the interplay 
between price momentum and investor sentiment. 
 
In order to investigate the momentum profitability, we classified the formation period into 
two sentiment states as optimistic and pessimistic. The evidence indicates that when the 
sentiment is high, the REIT momentum profitability is substantial and significant; however, 
when the sentiment is low, the profits from the REIT momentum are much lower and not 
significant. We also examine the interplay between REIT liquidity and momentum 
profitability, particularly, we find that high REIT liquidity portfolios generate higher 
momentum returns, but this is only significant when the sentiment is optimistic. The firm size  
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is also considered in this chapter, consistent with our previous findings, our evidence that 
momentum is generally larger for smaller companies confirms that the size effect is still 
available in the REIT industry. This is because the smaller companies are hard to value, 
which are more prone to subjective evaluations; the sentiment thus could be more significant 
in small size companies. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Research Overview and Implications 
 
Fund price deviations from fundamental value and the price momentum are the anomalies 
that cannot be well captured by the conventional finance models such as the Fama and French 
three-factor model. Attempts therefore have been made in the literature to find the plausible 
explanations. The recent research in this field is generally linked to both rational and 
behavioural elucidations. In this thesis, we follow the investor sentiment approach to provide 
a behavioural explanation of the fund market anomolies by way of estimating and analysing 
the empirical relationship between investor sentiment and fund anomalies, particularly the 
closed-end fudn puzzle, the ETF price movements and REITs’ price momentum.  
 
In chapter 2, we analyse the empirical evidence regarding the theoretical prediction that small 
investor sentiment has a significant impact on stock risk premium and the changing sentiment 
of individual investors explains the discounts of closed-end funds. Focusing on the UK 
market, we apply the time series regression on the augmented CAPM and the four-factor 
models. The econometrical formulation is fine-tuned by adding the sentiment factors to check 
if the return generating process of closed-end funds’ stock is related to the sentiment. Our 
evidence is consistent with the view of LST (1991) that investor sentiment influences the risk 
of common stocks. According to our results, we argue against the findings of Elton et al 
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(1998), Doukas and Milonas (2004) who indicate that investor sentiment cannot be related to 
the stock return generating process. We find that the sentiment factor is significant when 
entering the return generating process and size does matter. Our estimation detects that 
investor sentiment is more prevalent in smallest sized portfolios than in other larger ones. It 
offers us additional insights into LST (1991) theory which claims that the sentiment influence 
is a small firm effect. When we investigate the patterns of return sensitivity to the sentiment 
factor in terms of sector indices and individual stocks, there is strong evidence that they are 
more sensitive to the sentiment factor due to higher individual ownership.  
 
In chapter 3, we investigate whether measures of investor sentiment have a significant effect 
on the pricing of UK exchange traded funds and, if any, how such an impact varies with the 
varying characteristics of the stocks that UK ETFs hold. Particularly, in this study, we 
construct the sentiment index based on the put–call volume ratio which can be calculated 
using both the open interest of options and trading volume. Using a multi-factor model, the 
result suggests that the sentiment is an important factor which causes the UK ETF mispricing. 
However, there seems to be a negative relationship between the liquidity and the fund 
premium; both of them have a significant effect on ETFs. This finding is consistent with the 
argument that in more liquid makes the fund price would go higher, so that fund premium 
would be lower. Another finding is related to the momentum factor. We find that past price 
changes in NAVs (momentum) have a significant effect on the fund premium in almost all 
the regressions, indicating that the past information is not fully reflected in the current UK 
ETF prices and the past price changes can be persistent over time. 
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From Chapter 3, we document that betas obtained from the traditional multi-factor model 
could be statistically imprecise and may contain a fair amount of statistical noise due to a 
relatively low number of degrees of freedom and other statistical problems associated with 
the use of individual fund premiums. In this light, we adopt the Bayes-Stein sentiment beta 
estimates in further tests. The results indicate that for the contrarian sentiment traders, whose 
behaviour is such that they buy the securities when sentiment is low, and sell them out when 
the sentiment is high. The empirical outcome also shows that the contrarian and momentum 
traders cannot cancel each other. Moreover, the fund returns’ sensitivity to investor sentiment 
varies across different ETF characteristics. Of particular note is the interesting finding that 
the smaller, younger ETFs are prone to be affected by sentiment. 
 
In Chapter 4, we focus on whether investor sentiment affects the profitability of REITs’ 
momentum strategies. In order to investigate this issue, we classify the formation period into 
two sentiment states, i.e. the optimistic and pessimistic states. Evidence unearthed indicates 
that when the sentiment is high, the REIT momentum profitability is substantial and 
significant. However, when the sentiment is low, the profits from the REIT momentum are 
much lower and not significant. We also examine the interplay between REIT liquidity and 
momentum profitability, to find that high REIT liquidity portfolios generate higher 
momentum returns, but this is only significant when the sentiment is optimistic. The firm size 
is also considered in this chapter. Consistent with our previous findings, evidence suggests 
that momentum profit is generally larger for smaller companies, which confirms that the size 
effect is still present in the REIT industry. This is because the smaller companies are hard to 
value, hence are more prone to subjective evaluations that tend to be biased. As a result, the 
sentiment could become more significant in small sized companies. 
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Overall, we capture the evidence that investor sentiment is statistically significant in 
explaining the fund anomalies in both the UK and US markets. The results are robust when 
we use different proxies measuring investor sentiment which are constructed in both the 
direct and indirect ways. When conditioning on the firm size, firm characteristics, market 
liquidity, market states, and other risk adjustments, the results are robust as well. 
 
The results of this paper have a number of serious implications for fund market anomalies 
and investor rationality. Most importantly, if investor rationality characterized fund markets, 
the fund price would not be excessively deviated from its fundamental value. Although the 
fundamental value has its easily captured indicators, the pricing of funds are still inconsistent 
with hypothesis of market efficiency. Holding the fund is risker than holding its underlying 
assets directly and this risk is systematic thus cannot be diversified, the investors must require 
a higher returns on the funds than the same underlying portfolio purchased directly. This 
means the fund must, on average, deviate from its fundamental value.  
 
Secondly, the changes of the fund deviation are highly correlated. This is because they are 
driven by the same investor sentiment, this sentiment not only impacts on the funds but also 
the underlying assets. The observation that the smaller, younger, lower institutional 
ownership funds are more sensitive to investor sentiment, since these funds are hold 
predominantly by the irrational individual investors, these investors trade in the fund market 
infer too much from small pieces of information, they are likely to forecast price instead of 
fundamental value, consequently, observing price changes might be mistakenly over-
informative. 
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The third implication of our research on the REIT momentum is that when the investor 
sentiment is high, the momentum profitability is substantial and significant, but when the 
sentiment is low, the profits from the REIT momentum are much lower and not significant. 
Because if investors are very optimistic, they are more miscalibrated, when noise traders are 
particularly optimistic about the REIT, entrepreneurs can profit by putting assets together into 
REIT and selling them to the noise traders, which leads to the momentum in securities. 
Additionally, the smaller, younger, lower institutional ownership funds can generate more 
momentum profits, as they are hard to value and therefore are more prone to subjective 
evaluations, and produce more momentum profits. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research  
 
Although this work makes a critical contribution to a better understanding of the fund 
anomalies in terms of CEF puzzle, ETF price premium, REIT price momentum, there are 
several limitations existing, which are listed below as the areas for future research. 
First, several kinds of event studies have been linked to the investor sentiment and fund 
performances such as in the studies of IPO patterns (Cherkes, 2003) and managerial 
performance (Chay and Trzcinka, 1999; Berk and Stanton, 2007). Thus, the event studies on 
the other aspects of the sentiment-fund performance nexus are a promising avenue for future 
research. Currently, this methodology is generally ignored by researchers. Other topics, such 
as board structure of the corporate, mergers and acquisitions and corporate diversification, 
and their roles in fund market anomalies may also be worth of future research. 
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Second, in the UK market, the increasing popularity of the fund industry could well mean 
that fund returns and characteristics are interesting influences to be explored in testing the 
fund price performance. Their roles could be more pounced and insightful. Additionally, due 
to data availability problems in the UK, it is not easy to construct a combined sentiment 
proxy such as the one used by Baker and Wurgler (2006) work for the US market. The 
sentiment index construction remains an area requiring further studies because the investor 
sentiment can be expressed in many different ways and there remain rooms for improve the 
measurement of investor sentiment.    
 
Finally, the model we proposed in the thesis may be extended by incorporating more 
additional explanatory variables. Although the existing models and the variables we use in 
this study are relevant to the model specification and the estimation results are robust,  in 
order to obtain a more precise evaluation, the information related to the fund managers and 
more macroeconomic factors may need to considered to address the sentiment issue which 
illusive by its nature. Moreover, as we discussed in the thesis, investor sentiment may vary 
across different markets and geographical locations. It will be very promising for future 
studies on the fund market to extend their research coverage to consider more markets around 
the world.    
 
 
 
 
 
152 
 
 
References 
 
Abraham, Jesse and Patric H. Hendershott. 1993. “Patterns and determinants of metropolitan 
house prices, 1977-91” in Browne and Rosengreen (eds.), Real Estate and the Credit Crunch, 
Proceedings of the 25th Annual Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference, 18-42. 
 
Abraham, Jesse and Patric H. Hendershott. 1996. “Bubbles in metropolitan housing markets.” 
Journal of Housing Research, 7, 191-207. 
 
Ackert, L. and Y. Tian. 2000. “Arbitrage and valuation in the market for Standard and Poor’s 
depositary receipts”, Financial Management, 29, 71-88. 
 
Ackert, L. F. and Tian, Y. S. 2008. “Arbitrage, liquidity, and the valuation of exchange traded 
funds.” Financial markets, institutions & instruments, 17(5), 331-362. 
 
Allen, F., Morris, S. and Postlewaite, A. 1993, “Finite bubbles with short-sale constraints and 
asymmetric information.” Journal of Economic Theory, 61, 206–229. 
 
Almazan, A., Brown, K.C., Carlson, M. and Chapman, D.A. 2004 “Why constrain your 
mutual fund manager?” Journal of Financial Economics, 73, 289–321. 
 
Amihud, Y. 2002. “Illiquidity and stock returns: Cross-section and time-series effects.” 
Journal of financial markets, 5(1), 31-56. 
 
153 
 
 
Ammer, J. M. 1990. “Expenses, yields, and excess returns: New evidence on closed-end fund 
discounts from the UK.” London School of Economics Financial Markets Group Discussion 
Paper Series, 108. 
 
Anderson, S. and Born, J. 1992. “Closed-end investment companies: Issues and answers.” 
Innovations in Financial Markets and Institutions, 7.  
 
Andre, P., Kooli, M. and L'her, J. F. 2004. “The long-run performance of mergers and 
acquisitions: Evidence from the Canadian stock market.” Financial Management, 33(4). 
 
Antoniou, Constantinos, John A. Doukas and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 2010. "Investor 
sentiment and price momentum." SSRN eLibrary.  
 
Ascioglu, A., Hegde, S. P. and McDermott, J. B. 2008. “Information asymmetry and 
investment–cash flow sensitivity.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(6), 1036-1048. 
 
Asness, Clifford. S. 1995. “The power of past stock returns to explain future stock returns.” 
Working paper, Goldman Sachs Asset Management. 
 
Asness, Clifford S. 1997. "The interaction of value and momentum strategies." Financial 
Analysts Journal, 29-36. 
 
Asness, Clifford S., Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2013, “Value and 
momentum everywhere.” The Journal of Finance, 68(3), 929-985. 
154 
 
 
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 2006. ‘‘Investor Sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns.’’ 
Journal of Finance, 61, 1645-1680. 
 
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 2007. “Investor sentiment in the stock market.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 21, 129-151. 
 
Barber, B. 1994. “Noise trading and prime and score premiums.” Journal of Empirical 
Finance, 1(3-4), 251–278. 
 
Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1998. "A model of investor 
sentiment." Journal of financial economics, 49(3), 307-343. 
 
Barberis, N. and Thaler, R. 2002. “A survey of behavioural finance.” NBER working paper 
9222. 
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A. and Wurgler, J. 2005. “Comovement.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 75, 283–318. 
 
Benveniste Lawrence, Dennis R. Capozza and Paul J. Seguin. 2001. "The value of liquidity." 
Real Estate Economics, 29(4), 633-660. 
 
Beracha, Eli and Hilla Skiba. 2011. "Momentum in residential real estate." The Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 43(3), 299-320. 
 
155 
 
 
Berk, Jonathan B., and Richard Stanton. 2007. "Managerial ability, compensation, and the 
closed‐end fund discount." The Journal of Finance, 62(2), 529-556. 
 
Bhattacharya, Utpal and Galpin, Neal E. 2005. “Is stock picking declining around the world?” 
Working Paper Series. 
 
Black, F. 1986. “Presidential address: Noise.” Journal of Finance, 41, 529-543. 
 
Boehmer, Beatrice and Ekkehart Boehmer. 2003. "Trading your neighbor’s ETFs: 
Competition or fragmentation?" Journal of Banking & Finance, 27(9), 1667-1703. 
 
Boudreaux, K. 1973. “Discounts and premiums on closed-end funds: A study in valuation.” 
Journal of Finance, 28(2), 515–522. 
 
Brennan, M. J. and Subrahmanyam, A. 1996. “Market microstructure and asset pricing: On 
the compensation for illiquidity in stock returns.” Journal of financial economics, 41(3), 441-
464. 
 
Brickley, J., Steven, M. and James, S. 1991. “The tax-timing option and the discounts on 
closed-end investment companies.” Journal of Business, 64, 287–312. 
 
Brauer, Gregory, A. 1984. “Open-ending closed-end funds.” Journal of Financial Economics, 
13, 491-507.  
 
156 
 
 
Burch, T. and Weiss Hanley, K. 1996. “When are closed-end funds open? Rights offers as a 
response to premiums.” Working Paper, University of Maryland. 
 
Capozza, D. R. and P. J. Seguin. 1998. “Managerial style and firm value.” Real Estate 
Economics, 26, 131–150. 
 
Capozza, Dennis R., and Paul J. Seguin. 1999. "Focus, transparency and value: the REIT 
evidence." Real Estate Economics, 27(4), 587-619. 
 
Capozza, Dennis R., and Paul J. Seguin. 2001a. “Debt without taxes: Capital structure at 
REITs.” Real Estate Finance, 17, 38–46. 
 
Capozza, Dennis R., and Paul J. Seguin. 2001b. “Why focus matters.” Real Estate Finance, 
17(4), 7–15.   
 
Capozza, Dennis R., and Paul J. Seguin. 2003. "Inside ownership, risk sharing and Tobin's Q‐
ratios: Evidence from REITs." Real Estate Economics, 31(3), 367-404. 
 
Carhart, M.M. 1997. “On persistence in mutual fund performance.” Journal of Finance, 52, 
57-82. 
 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. 1989. "The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family 
Homes." The American Economic Review, 125-137. 
 
157 
 
 
Case, Karl E. and Robert J. Shiller. 1990. "Forecasting prices and excess returns in the 
housing market." Real Estate Economics, 18(3), 253-273. 
 
Chan, J., Jain, R. and Xia, Y. 2008. “Market segmentation, liquidity spillover, and closed-end 
country fund discounts.” Journal of Financial Markets, 11, 377–399 
 
Chan, Louis KC, Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Josef Lakonishok. 1996. "Momentum 
strategies." The Journal of Finance, 51(5), 1681-1713. 
 
Chan, Su Han, John Erickson, and Ko Wang. 2003. "Real estate investment trusts: Structure." 
Performance, and Investment Opportunities, 1. 
 
Charupat, N. and Miu, P. 2011. “The pricing and performance of leveraged exchange-traded 
funds.” Journal of Banking & Finance, 35(4), 966-977. 
 
Chay, J. B. and Trzcinka, C. A. 1999. “Managerial performance and the cross-sectional 
pricing of closed-end funds.” Journal of Finance, 3, 379-408. 
 
Chelley-Steeley, P. and Park, K. 2010. “The adverse selection component of exchange traded 
funds.” International Review of Financial Analysis, 19(1), 65-76. 
 
Chen, G., Rui, O. and Xu, Y. 2002. “A first look at closed-end funds in China”, The 
University of Texas, working paper. 
 
158 
 
 
Chen, J., Hong, H. and Stein, J. 2002. “Breadth of ownership and stock returns.” Journal of 
Financial Economics, 66, 171-205. 
 
Chen, N., Kan, R. and Miller, M.H. 1993a. “Are the discounts on closed-end funds a 
sentiment index?” Journal of Finance, 48, 795-800. 
 
Chen, N., Kan, R. and Miller, M.H. 1993b. “Yes, discounts on closed-end funds are a 
sentiment index: A rejoinder”, Journal of Finance, 48, 809-810. 
 
Cheng, Ping, and Stephen E. Roulac. 2007. "REIT characteristics and predictability." 
International Real Estate Review, 10(2), 23-41. 
 
Cherkes, Martin. 2003. "A positive theory of closed-end funds as an investment vehicle." 
EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Paper. No. 1317.  
 
Cherkes, M., Sagi, J. And Stanton, R. 2009. “A liquidity-based theory of closed-end funds.” 
Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 257-297. 
 
Chordia, T., R. Roll and A. Subrahmanyam. 2001. “Market liquidity and trading activity.” 
Journal of Finance, 56, 501-530. 
 
Chopra, N., Lee, C. M. C., Shleifer, A. and Thaler, R. H. 1993, “Yes, discounts on closed-end 
funds are a sentiment index.” The Journal of Finance, 48, 801-808. 
 
159 
 
 
Chowdhury, Abdur R. 1994. “The behaviour of closed-end country fund prices in the Asian 
NIEs.” Applied Economics Letters, 1, 219–222. 
 
Chu, Q., and W. Hsieh. 2002. “Pricing efficiency of the S&P 500 index market: Evidence 
from the Standards and Poor’s Depositary Receipts.” Journal of Futures Markets, 22, 877-
900. 
 
Chui, Andy CW, Sheridan Titman, and K. C. Wei. 2003. "The cross section of expected 
REIT returns." Real Estate Economics, 31(3), 451-479. 
 
Chui, Andy CW, Sheridan Titman, and KC John Wei. 2010. "Individualism and momentum 
around the world." The Journal of Finance, 65(1), 361-392. 
 
Clayton, Jim and Greg MacKinnon. 2000. "Measuring and explaining changes in REIT 
liquidity: Moving beyond the bid–ask spread." Real Estate Economics, 28(1), 189-115. 
 
Conrad, Jennifer and Gautam Kaul. 1998. "An anatomy of trading strategies." Review of 
Financial Studies, 11(3), 489-519. 
 
Cooper, Michael J., Roberto C. Gutierrez and Allaudeen Hameed. 2004. "Market states and 
momentum." The Journal of Finance, 59(3), 1345-1365. 
 
Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 1998. "Investor psychology 
and security market under‐and overreactions." The Journal of Finance, 53(6), 1839-1885. 
160 
 
 
Daniel, K. D., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A. 2001. “Overconfidence, arbitrage, and 
equilibrium asset pricing.” The Journal of Finance, 56, 921–965. 
 
Daniel, Kent, Ravi Jagannathan, and Soohun Kim. 2012. “Tail risk in momentum strategy 
returns.” National Bureau of Economic Research, No. w18169. 
 
Datar, Vinay. 2001. "Impact of liquidity on premia/discounts in closed-end funds." The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 41(1), 119-135. 
 
Delong, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L.H. and Waldmarn, R.J. 1990. “Noise trader risk in 
financial markets.” Journal of Political Economy, 98, 703-738. 
 
Derwall, J., Huij, J., Brounen, D. and Marquering, W. 2009. “REIT momentum and the 
performance of real estate mutual funds.”  Financial Analysts Journal, 24-34. 
 
Dimson, E. and Minio-Kozerski, C. 1999. “Closed-end funds: A survey.” Financial Markets, 
Institutions & Instruments, 8, 1–41. 
 
Dimson, E. and Minio-Paluello, C. 2002. “A factor model of the closed-end fund discount.” 
Working paper, London Business School. 
 
Dimson, E., Marsh, P. and Staunton, M. 2002. “Triumph of the optimists: 101 years of global 
investment returns.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
161 
 
 
Doukas, J. A. and Milonas, N.T. 2004. “Investor sentiment and the closed-end fund puzzle: 
Out-of-sample evidence.” European Financial Management, 10, 235–266.  
 
Duffie, D., Garleanu, N. and Pedersen, L.H. 2002. “Securities lending, shorting, and pricing.” 
Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 307–339. 
 
Draper, P. and Paudyal, K. 1991. “The investment trust discount revisited.” Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 18(6), 791-805. 
 
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J. and Busse, J. A. 1998. “Do investors care about sentiment?” 
Journal of Business, 77, 477–501. 
 
Elton, E., M. Gruber, G. Comer, and K. Li. 2002. “Spider: Where are the bugs?” Journal of 
Business, 75, 453-473. 
 
Engle, R. F. and Sarkar, D. 2006. “Premiums-discounts and exchange-traded funds.” ETF 
and Indexing, 1, 35-53. 
 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. 1992. “The cross‐section of expected stock returns.” the 
Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465. 
 
Fama, E. F. 1998. “Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioural finance.” Journal 
of financial economics, 49(3), 283-306. 
 
162 
 
 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. 1993. “Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and 
bonds.” Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56. 
 
Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French. 2012. "Size, value, and momentum in international 
stock returns." Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 457-472. 
 
Feng, Zhilan, S. McKay Price and C. F. Sirmans. 2012. "The relation between momentum 
and drift: Industry-level evidence from equity real estate investment trusts (REITs)." 
Available at SSRN 1966246.  
 
Fisher, Kenneth L. and Meir Statman. 2003. "Consumer confidence and stock returns." The 
Journal of Portfolio Management, 30(1), 115-127. 
 
Forner, Carlos, and Joaquín Marhuenda. 2003. "Contrarian and momentum strategies in the 
Spanish stock market." European Financial Management, 9(1), 67-88. 
 
Fuhr, Deborah. 2001. “Exchange traded funds: A primer.” Journal of Asset Management, 2, 
260-274. 
 
Gallagher, D. R. and Segara, R. 2005. “The performance and trading characteristics of 
exchange-traded funds.” Journal of Investment Strategy, 1(1), 47-58. 
 
Garay, U. and Venezuela, C. 2001. “The behavior of Asian and Latin American closed-end 
country funds and investment trusts premiums following the Asian financial crisis.” Working 
Paper Series. 
163 
 
 
Gastineau, G. L. 2001. “Exchange‐traded funds.” Handbook of Finance. 
 
Gemmill, G. and Thomas, D. 2002. “Noise-trading, costly arbitrage, and asset prices: 
Evidence from closed-end funds.” Journal of Finance, 57(6), 2571–2594. 
 
George, Thomas J. and Chuan‐Yang Hwang. 2004. "The 52‐week high and momentum 
investing." The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2145-2176. 
 
Gibbons, M. R., Ross, S. A. and Shanken, J. 1989. “A test of the efficiency of a given 
portfolio.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1121-1152. 
 
Greenwood, R. and Sosner, N. 2002. “Trading patterns and excess co-movement of stock 
returns.” Unpublished working paper, Harvard University. 
 
Gregory, A., Harris, R.D.F. and Michou, M. 2009. “The Fama-French and momentum 
portfolios and factors in the UK.” Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment, University of 
Exeter. 
 
Grullon, G. and Wang, A. 2001. “Closed-end fund discounts with informed ownership 
differential.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(2), 171–205. 
 
Grundy, Bruce D. and J. Spencer Martin. 2001. "Understanding the nature of the risks and the 
source of the rewards to momentum investing." Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 29-78. 
 
164 
 
 
Halkos, G. E. and Krintas, T. N. 2006. “Behavioural and fundamental explanations of 
discounts on closed end funds: An empirical analysis.” Applied Financial Economics, 16(5), 
395-404. 
 
Hedge, S.P. and J.B. McDermott. 2004. “The market liquidity of DIAMONDS, Q’s and their 
underlying stocks.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28, 1043-1067. 
 
Hofstede, Geert H. 2001. “Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions 
and organizations across nations.” Sage Publications.   
 
Hong, Harrison and Jeremy C. Stein. 1999. "A unified theory of underreaction, momentum 
trading, and overreaction in asset markets." The Journal of Finance, 54(6), 2143-2184. 
 
Hughen, J. C. 2001. “Premiums on exchange traded funds: Should traders be concerned?” 
Investment Guide, Fall, 70-75. 
 
Hung, Szu-Yin Kathy, and John L. Glascock, 2008. "Momentum profitability and market 
trend: evidence from REITs." The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 37(1), 51-
69. 
 
Hung, Szu-Yin Kathy, and John L. Glascock. 2010. "Volatilities and momentum returns in 
real estate investment trusts." The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 41(2), 
126-149. 
 
165 
 
 
Jackson, A. 2003. “The aggregate behaviour of individual investors.” Working Paper of 
London Business School. 
 
Jansen, Paul FG. and Willem FC Verschoor. 2004. "A note on transition stock return 
behaviour." Applied Economics Letters, 11(1), 11-13 
 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan and Sheridan Titman. 1993. "Returns to buying winners and selling 
losers: Implications for stock market efficiency." The Journal of Finance, 48(1), 65-91. 
 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan and Sheridan Titman. 1999. "Profitability of momentum strategies: 
An evaluation of alternative explanations." The Journal of Finance, 56(2), 699-720. 
 
Jares, T. E. And Lavin, A. M. 2004. “Japan and Hong Kong exchange-traded funds (ETFs): 
Discounts, returns, and trading strategies.” Journal of Financial Services Research, 25(1), 57-
69. 
 
Johnson, Timothy C. 2002. "Rational momentum effects." The Journal of Finance, 57(2), 
585-608. 
 
Khurshed, A. and Mudrambi, R. 2002. “The short-run price performance of investment trust 
IPOs on the UK main market.” Applied Financial Economics, 697-706. 
 
Kuhn, T. S. 1970. “The structure of scientific revolutions.” Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
166 
 
 
Kumar, A. and Lee, M.C. 2006. “Retail investor sentiment and return comovements.” The 
Journal of Finance, 61, 2451-2468. 
 
 Kwame, A. and Lee, P. Y. 2009. “Investing in REITS: Contrarian versus momentum.” 
PRRES 2009 Conference, Sydney, Australia. 
  
Lamont, O. and Thaler, R. 2001. “Can the market add and subtract? Mispricing in tech stock 
carve-outs.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 8302. 
 
Lee, C.M.C. and Ready, M. J. 1991. “Inferring trade direction from intraday data.” The 
Journal of Finance, 46, 733–746. 
 
Lee, C.M.C., Shleifer, A. and Thaler, R.H. 1991. “Investor sentiment and the closed-end Fund 
puzzle.” The Journal of Finance, 46, 76-110. 
 
Lee, Charles, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan. 2000. "Price momentum and trading volume." 
The Journal of Finance, 55(5), 2017-2069. 
 
Lemmon, M. L. and Portniaguina, E. V. 2006. “Consumer confidence and asset prices: Some 
empirical evidence.” Review of Financial Studies, 19(4), 1499-1529. 
 
Levis, M. and Thomas, D. C. 1995. “Investment trust IPOs issuing behaviour and price 
performance: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange.” Journal of Banking Finance, 19, 
1437-1458. 
 
167 
 
 
Levis, M. and Thomas, D. 2000. “Country funds and investor sentiment: UK and US 
evidence.” Working paper, City University Business School. 
 
Levy, Robert A. 1967. "Relative strength as a criterion for investment selection." The Journal 
of Finance, 22(4), 595-610. 
 
Ludvigson, Sydney C. 2004. "Consumer confidence and consumer spending." The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 18(2), 29-50. 
 
Malkiel, B. 1977. “The valuation of closed-end investment-company shares.” The Journal of 
Finance, 32(3), 847–858. 
 
Marshall, Ben R. and Rachael M. Cahan. 2005. "Is the 52-week high momentum strategy 
profitable outside the US?" Applied Financial Economics, 15(18), 1259-1267. 
 
McLean D. R. and M. Zhao. 2009. “Investor sentiment and real investment.” Working Paper, 
University of Alberta. 
 
Minio-Paluello, C. 1998. “The U.K. Closed-End Fund Discount.” Ph.D. dissertation, London 
Business School. 
 
Michou, M., Mouselli, S. and Stark, A. 2007. “Estimating the Fama and French factors in the 
UK: An empirical review.” Manchester Business School. 
 
168 
 
 
Milonas, N. T. and Rompotis, G. G. 2006. “Investigating European ETFs: The case of the 
Swiss exchange traded funds.” Working paper for the annual conference of the HFAA in 
Thessaloniki. 
 
Moskowitz, Tobias J., and Mark Grinblatt. 1999. "Do industries explain momentum?" The 
Journal of Finance, 54(4), 1249-1290. 
 
Muga, Luis and Rafael Santamaria. 2007. "The momentum effect in Latin American 
emerging markets." Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, 43(4), 24-45. 
 
Mulvey, John M. and Woo Chang Kim. 2008. "Active equity managers in the US: Do the 
best follow momentum strategies?" The Journal of Portfolio Management, 34(2), 126-134. 
 
Nagel, S. 2005. ‘‘Short sales, institutional investors and the cross-section of stock returns.’’ 
Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 277–309.  
 
Naranjo, Andy and Burt Porter. 2007. "Including emerging markets in international 
momentum investment strategies." Emerging Markets Review, 8(2), 147-166. 
 
Neal, R., and Simon, W. 1998. “Do measures of investor sentiment predict returns?” Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 33, 523–547. 
 
Palomino, Fredric. 1996. “Noise trading in small markets.” The Journal of Finance, 51, 
1537-1550. 
 
169 
 
 
Park, T. and L. Switzer. 1995. “Index participation units and the performance of index futures 
markets: Evidence from the Toronto 35 index participation units market.” Journal of Futures 
Markets, 15, 187-200. 
 
Peavy, John W. 1990. “Returns on initial public offerings of closed-end funds.” Review of 
Financial Studies, 3, 695-708 
 
Pontiff, J. 1997. “Excess volatility and closed-end funds.” American Economic Review, 87, 
155-169. 
 
Poterba, J. and J. Shoven. 2002. “Exchange traded funds: A new investment option for 
taxable investors.” American Economic Review, 92, 422-427. 
 
Prior, M. J. 1995. “Institutional shareholdings and the investment trust discount as an agency 
cost.” Applied Financial Economics, 5(3), 169-177. 
 
Qiu, L. and Welch, I. 2005. “Investor sentiment measures.” Working paper, Brown University. 
 
Rock, K. 1986. “Why new issues are under-priced.” Journal of Financial Economics, 15(1), 
187–212. 
 
Ross, Stephen A. 2002. “Neoclassical finance, alternative finance and the closed end fund 
puzzle.” European Financial Management, 8, 129-137.  
 
170 
 
 
Rouwenhorst, K. Geert. 1998. "International momentum strategies." The Journal of Finance, 
53(1), 267-284. 
 
Sagi, Jacob S. and Mark S. Seasholes. 2007. "Firm-specific attributes and the cross-section of 
momentum." Journal of Financial Economics, 84(2), 389-434. 
 
Scruggs, J. T. 2007. “Noise trader risk: Evidence from the Siamese twins.” Journal of 
Financial Markets, 10, 76-105  
 
Seltzer, D. F. 1989. “Closed-end funds: Discounts, premiums, and performance.” Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Arizona. 
 
Seyhun, H. N. and Skinner, D. J. 1994. “How do taxes affect investors' stock market 
realizations? Evidence from tax-return panel data.” Journal of Business, 231-262. 
 
Sias, R. 1997a. “Price pressure and the role of institutional investors in closed-end funds.” 
Journal of Financial Research, 20, 211-229.  
 
Sias, R. 1997b. “The sensitivity of individual and institutional investors’ expectations to 
changing market conditions: Evidence from closed-end funds.” Review of Quantitative 
Finance and Accounting, 8(3), 245–269. 
 
Sias, R., Starks, L. and Tinic, S. 2001. “Is noise trader risk priced?” Journal of Financial 
Research, 24(3), 311–329. 
171 
 
 
Simpson, M. W. and Ramchander, S. 2002. “Is differential sentiment a cause of closed-end country 
fund premia? An empirical examination of the Australian case.” Applied Economics Letters, 9, 615-
619. 
 
Starks, L. T., Li, Y and Lu Z. 2006. “Tax-loss selling and the January effect: Evidence from 
municipal bond closed-end funds.” Journal of Finance, 61, 3049-3067. 
 
Swaminathan, B. 1996. ‘‘Time-varying expected small firm returns and closed-end fund 
discounts.’’ Review of Financial Studies, 9, 845–887.  
 
Switzer, L., P. Varson, and S. Zghidi, 2000. “Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts and 
the performance of the S&P 500 index futures market.” Journal of Futures Markets, 20, 705-
716. 
 
Thompson, R. 1978. “The information content of discounts and premiums on closed-end fund 
shares.” Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 151-186. 
 
Vijh, A. 1994. “S&P 500 trading strategies and stock betas.” Review of Financial Studies, 7, 
215–251. 
 
Warther, V. A. 1995. "Aggregate mutual fund flows and security returns." Journal of 
Financial Economics, 39, 209-235. 
 
Weiss, K. 1989. “The post-offering price performance of closed-end funds.” Financial 
Management, 18(2), 57-67. 
172 
 
 
Weiss Hanley, K., Lee, C.M.C. and Sequin, P.L. 1996, “The marketing of closed-end fund 
IPOs: Evidence from transactions data.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 5, 127-159. 
 
Wu Y. and Han L. 2007. “Imperfect rational, sentiment and closed-end fund discount puzzle.” 
Economic Research Journal, 42, 117-129. 
 
Zweig, M. E. 1973. “An investor expectations stock price predictive model using closed-end 
fund premiums.” The Journal of Finance, 28, 67-78. 
 
 
